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by Jian Li 
Transfer pricing is the price used for internal sales of goods and services between profit centres 
within the same firm (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). The issue of transfer pricing has long 
been a source of frequent managerial concern and frustration (Rushinek and Rushinek, 1988). 
Compared with domestic business, pricing considerations for multinationals involved in 
international business are far more complicated. Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are exposed 
to a greater variety of environmental disturbances than domestic firms. The constantly changing 
international environment can have a significant impact on multinational transfer pricing 
practices (Tang, 1982, Ghosh and Crain, 1993). 
The objectives of this study are four-fold. First, it investigates the similarities and differences in 
international transfer pricing (lTP) practices by MNEs in New Zealand, Australia, and China. 
Second, it ascertains whether an ITP tax audit is an important concern of MNEs in formulating 
their ITP policies. Third, it identifies the characteristics of MNEs that make them more 
vulnerable to ITP tax audits. Fourth, it examines the ITP monitoring system in China. 
Data were gathered through a questionnaire survey of 300 New Zealand subsidiaries, 250 
Australian subsidiaries and 500 Chinese subsidiaries. The overall usable response rate was 20 
percent. Four Chinese tax authorities were interviewed. Non-parametric statistical analysis was 
carried out using data collected through the questionnaire survey. 
The research presents comprehensive statistical evidence on the ITP practices of the developing 
and developed economies in this study. Survey results revealed statistically significant 
differences between the' ITP methods used by Chinese companies and their New Zealand and 
Australian counterpatts. Statistically significant differences were also found between the two sets 
of companies regarding the degree of emphasis placed on environmental factors that affected 
their ITP policies. 
Tax authority transfer pricing auditing was an important concern in ITP decisions for New 
Zealand and Australian companies. In contrast, it was relatively unimportant for Chinese firms. 
This is, perhaps, because New Zealand and Australian tax authorities are more aggressive than 
their Chinese counterpalts in administering and enforcing their transfer pricing rules. 
A number of corporate attributes were associated with the potential risk of tax audits. Three 
corporate attributes, i.e., nationality, size and financing, are significant and positively related to 
ITP tax aUditing - the dependent variable - both directly and interactively. This survey also 
found that the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department (IRD) and the Australian Tax Office 
(A TO) tended to audit large-sized multinationals; in contrast, the Chinese tax authorities focused 
their tax audit efforts on relatively small-sized firms. As the audits of large firms require 
sophisticated techniques, the Chinese tax authorities claimed that they lacked sufficient staff 
resources and experience to tackle the ITP issues raised by large MNEs. In this study, seven 
factors were identified as constraining the Chinese ITP monitoring system. 
This study has significant implications for ITP theory and practices. It provides a useful insight 
into ITP practices and audits across New Zealand, Australia and China, providing MNEs and 
other businesses, which already operate or intend to operate between these three markets, with 
guidance in complying with the transfer pricing regulations of the three Asia-Pacific national 
economic regimes involved. 
Key words: International transfer pricing methods; environmental factors; tax audits; New 
Zealand; Australia; China 
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1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Study 
The emergence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been one of the most significant 
global economic phenomena of recent decades (Leitch and BalTett, 1992; Ernst and Young, 
1999). MNEs tend to integrate their operations globally, rather than within the boundaries of 
individual countries (Lin, 2001). 
As a result, they transfer large quantities of goods and services among operating subsidiaries 
in different countries. International transfer pricing (ITP) is the pricing process they use for 
transferring goods and services between related companies located in different countries 
(Borkowski, 1997b, Chan and Chow, 1998, Oyelere, Emmanuel and Forker, 1999). The 
pricing system for such transfers across borders within corporate networks, especially those 
between foreign affiliates and the parent company itself, creates considerable managerial and 
tax problems owing to its direct effects on the profits of both parties and the revenue of host 
and home countries (Bartelsman, 2000). 
Because of their widespread international operations, MNEs are exposed to a greater variety 
of environmental factors than domestic enterprises. These environmental factors differ 
substantially from country to country. The way they are perceived is likely to have a great 
impact on multinational transfer pricing policies (Al-Eryani et ai., 1990, Borkowski, 1997b). 
A number of environmental variables affecting multinational transfer pricing have been 
identified in previous studies (Tang and Chan, 1979, Tang, 1982, Yunker, 1983, Lecraw, 
1985, Al-Eryani, Alam and Akhter, 1990, Tang, 1993, Borkowski, 1997a, 1997b, Chan and 
Chow, 1998, Oyelere et aI., 1999). While the existing literature provides evidence that various 
environmental factors affect ITP decisions, the studies often have a single nation focus, or, in 
contrast, focus on two or more developed national jurisdictions. Limited studies have been 
completed on the ITP practices of MNEs that operate in developing countries as compared to 
those operating in developed countries (Al-Eryani et ai., 1990). This study aims to investigate 
and contrast multinational transfer pricing practices and tax audits in a cross-national context 
- New Zealand in relation to Australia and China. 
1.2 The Purposes of the Study 
The specific objectives of this research are: 
1) to investigate the similarities and differences in ITP practices by MNEs in New 
Zealand, Australia, and China; 
2) to ascertain whether an ITP tax audit is an important concern of MNEs in formulating 
their ITP policies; 
3) to identify the characteristics of MNEs that make them more vulnerable to ITP tax 
audits; and 
4) to examine the ITP monitoring system in China. 
The People's Republic of China is a timely subject for this study for several reasons. First, as 
the largest developing country in the world, China has become increasingly important in the 
international economic community since it implemented policies of economic reforms and 
adopted an open door trading policy in 1978 (Chan and Chow 1997a). China is a potentially 
enormous market. It is estimated that, measured by total gross domestic product, China is 
likely to become the second largest economy in the world by 2010. Over the past decade, the 
rapid economic growth in China has been accompanied by a large inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Chan and Chow 1997a; Carnaut and Song, 2003). 
China has long been the largest single recipient of FDI among the developing countries, and 
the second largest recipient of FDI in the world, during the period 1993 to 2001 (Chan and 
Chow 1997a, 1997b, 1998). With China's strong economic growth, the amount of FDI 
attracted to China jumped from US$3.487 billion in 1990 to US$52.74 billion in 2002. Since 
then, China has finally overtaken the U.S. as the world's largest recipient ofFDI (Camaut and 
Song, 2003). The cumulative total ofFDI from 1979 to 2002 was US$ 447.9 billion. 
Table 1.1 shows this dramatic rate of increase of FDI over the period 1990-2002. The number 
ofFDI projects increased from 7,273 in 1990 to 34,171 in 2002. The contractual value ofFDI 
projects increased from US$6.596 billion in 1990 to US$82.768 billion in 2002. The realised 
value of all FDI projects increased from US$3.487 billion in 1990 to US$52.743 billion in 
2002. Following China's entry into the world trade organisation (WTO) in 2001, FDI is likely 
to reach US$100 billion per year (Camaut and Song, 2003). The sheer magnitude ofFDI has 
raised concerns among China's governmental authorities over how to deal with ITP issues. 
2 
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Table 1.1 
Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1990-2002 
Year Number of Projects Contractual Value Realized Value 
(US$billion) (US$billion) 
1990 7,273 6.596 3.487 
1991 12,978 11.977 4.366 
1992 48,764 58.124 11.008 
1993 83,437 111.436 27.515 
1994 47,549 82.680 33.767 
1995 37,011 91.282 37.521 
1996 24,556 73.236 41.726 
1997 21,001 51.003 45.257 
1998 19,799 52.102 45.463 
1999 16,918 41.223 40.319 
2000 22,347 62.380 40.715 
2001 26,140 69.195 46.878 
2002 34,171 82.768 52.743 
. . 
Source: Mmistry of Commerce ofthe People's Repubbc ofChma's websIte . 
The website address is http://www.mofcom.gov.cn. 
Second, ITP is a very important issue, not only for MNEs, but also for the economies of most 
countries around the world, especially those of developing nations. Arpan (1972, p. 10) stated 
that "differences in perceived importance are a function of different cultural influences; and 
cultural differences lead to different international intracorporate pricing systems". The 
business environments in developing countries are distinctly different from those in 
developed nations. Vaitsos (1974) suggested that the systematic transfer of wealth away from 
developing countries by MNEs is due to a conjunction of motives with market opportunity 
and incentives based on the developing nations' own policies. Chan and Chow (2001, p. 104) . 
argued that "multinational companies' operations in developing countries are subject to more 
economic, political and social risks and restrictions due to the peculiar business environments 
in these countries". 
Since market imperfections caused by government regulations or natural externalities in the 
transfer of knowledge and information are far more serious in developing countries, the 
temptations for MNEs to practise transfer pricing manoeuvres in developing countries should 
be stronger than in developed countries (Plasschaert, 1985). For this reason, governments of 
developing countries may be more vulnerable than those in developed countries to the transfer 
pricing manoeuvres of MNEs. The increasingly sophisticated and complex economIC, 
3 
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political and regulatory environment in developing countries enhances this trend (Brean, 
, 1979; Ralunan and Scapens, 1986). The number of MNEs operating in developing countries 
has increased significantly. Anecdotal evidence suggests that MNEs operating in developing 
countries have more income shifting oppOliunities by means of ITP manoeuvres. Given the 
increasing importance of China in the developing world, this study should add to our 
knowledge of ITP issues in developing nations. 
Third, the Asia-Pacific region is home to a majority of the world's population. Within it, 
China is developing as one of the world's largest economies. Elsewhere in the region, New 
Zealand and Australia are two countries that have substantially expanded their trade with 
China and are set to develop it flUiher. Currently, China is Australia's third and New 
Zealand's fourth largest trading partner. Free trade agreements are being negotiated between 
China and New Zealand on the one hand and between China and Australia on the other. New 
Zealand and Australia are likely to extend their international trade by establishing subsidiaries 
in the Chinese market, and vice versa. The conduct of companies in their dealings with 
taxation and the tax authorities will become an increasing matter of concern for managers 
who make the pricing decisions for their companies (Goldsmith, 2003; New Zealand and 
China to work towards free trade agreement, 2004). The examination and comparison of ITP 
practices in the three countries may have considerable practical implications for those in 
business in the region. 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
A critical issue for MNEs, both domestically and internationally, always exists over the prices 
they should fix for transferring, on the one hand, assets between their various divisions in 
their home countries and, on the other, the prices they should fix for transferring assets 
between their subsidiaries which are located in a number of foreign countries. The levels of 
pricing, and the control of those levels, are matters of constant concern and importance. For 
example, it might be desirable to transfer goods at cost price, but that could mean, either, a 
variable cost, the full cost or some other variation, such as standard cost. In contrast, the 
transfer price could also be set at market price, or some other form of negotiated market price. 
Specifically, at the international level, additional considerations may obscure the ITP issue. 
Since intercompany transfers can be a significant portion of the transfers between an MNE 
and its various subsidiaries, the transfer prices an MNE chooses to adopt may have as their 
rationale the minimisation of taxation liabilities in the host country for the overall benefit of 
4 
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the company, but also the attainment of other financial or commercial objectives. 
At first sight, it might be supposed that commercial interests would dominate the attitudes of 
all trading companies over the issue and practice of ITP, irrespective of their type of business 
and the host countries in which they are located. However, given the high level of similarity 
between New Zealand and Australia, questions arise as to the level of comparability of ITP 
practices in the two countries, as compared to China1• Hence, the following.research questions 
were addressed in the study: 
1) What are the primary ITP methods used by MNEs operating in China as compared to 
those operating in New Zealand and Australia? 
2) Are the environmental factors affecting ITP practices in China different from those in 
New Zealand and Australia? 
Many tax and non-tax factors influence an MNE's ITP policies. However, these factors could 
conflict with the objectives of the host governments2. For this reason, tax authorities in many 
countries have improved their scrutiny of the ITP practices of MNEs. Therefore, ITP audits 
have significant tax implications for the MNEs involved (Ernst and Young, 1999, 2001). 
Predictably, an ITP tax audit should be an increasingly important variable in influencing 
multinational transfer pricing policies. Certain characteristics of MNEs are more likely to 
render them subject to ITP tax audits. Hence, the other research questions addressed in this 
study are: 
3) Is tax authority ITP auditing an impOliant factor influencing ITP policies of MNEs in 
New Zealand, Australia and China? 
4) What corporate attributes are associated with ITP audits by tax authorities in China as 
compared to New Zealand and Australia? 
The prior proposition that developing governments lack the technical expertise to challenge 
internal prices set by MNEs is conceptual rather than empirical, as it has not yet been subject 
to empirical analysis. As the largest developing country in the world, China provides an 
appropriate opportunity for investigating this issue. The remaining research questions 
addressed in the study are: 
I The political, legal and economic systems and cultures in New Zealand and Australia are essentially similar but 
are different from those of China. 
2 While MNEs view ITP as an instrument for the effective management of their internal markets, host 
governments may view it as a serious tax avoidance issue, which could have an adverse effect on their 
economies. (Rugman and Eden, 1985, Nobes and Parker, 2000, Gresik, 2001). 
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5) What is the present extent of transfer pricing abuse in China? 
6) How do the Chinese tax authorities administer a transfer pricing tax audit? 
7) How adequate are the existing Chinese ITP control measures? 
8) What factors constrain the ITP monitoring system in China? 
9) How can the Chinese ITP monitoring system be improved? 
1.4 Review of the Relevant Literature 
1.4.1 ITP Methods 
MNEs use a large variety of transfer pricing methods to deal with jntercompany transfers 
crossing international boundaries. These methods may be classified into three major 
categories: market based, cost based and negotiated prices (Chan and Chow, 2001). Market 
based methods are based on the 'arm's length principle'. This principle establishes the 
transfer price of goods and services at the price that would have been obtained between 
independent enterprises in comparable transactions and circumstances (Evans, Taylor and 
Rolfe, 1999). Cost based methods are those derived mainly through cost information as 
opposed to using the market price of the goods transferred. Examples include the variable 
cost, the full cost or some other variation of cost, like, the standard cost (Evans et aI, 1999). In 
some cases, the subsidiaries of a multinational group are free to negotiate transfer prices 
between themselves. Available information about costs and market prices may be entered into 
and used in these negotiations (Evans et aI, 1999). 
In a seminal article on transfer pricing, Hirshleifer (1956) developed an economic model to 
explain which transfer pricing methods should be used under given circumstances. Since then 
many accounting authors3 have espoused Hirshleifer's rule, that is, ifthe intermediate market 
is competitive, the transfer price should be the market price; but if the intermediate market is 
imperfectly competitive, then marginal pricing replaces market pricing (Hirshleifer, 1956). 
Wu and Sharp (1979) investigated the dominant transfer pricing policies adopted by 61 films 
based in the U.S. when the market price was unavailable. They reported that when a market 
price exists for an intermediate product, market pricing was the prevalent method, followed in 
descending order by negotiated pricing, full cost plus profit margin, adjusted market price, 
full cost, marginal cost, variable cost plus profit margin, and mathematical programming. In 
the absence of a market price, the top three transfer pricing methods used were full cost plus 
3 See, for example, Wilson and Chua (1993, p. 294); Hansen and Mowen (1997, p. 497); Maher, Stickney and 
Weil (2000, p. 456); and Homgren, Foster and Datar (2000, p. 796). 
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profit margin, negotiation and full cost. Their finding reflects the approach encompassed in 
, the economic model for explaining transfer pricing strategies. 
A study by Borkowski (1990) found that most companies used the full cost method where 
market price did not exist. But the existence of a market price did not lead to the conclusion 
that the market pricing method would be used, as the accounting literature had indicated. This 
result suggested that MNEs did not choose ITP methods based on theoretical 
recommendations, or solely based on their organisational characteristics. Instead, it seems that 
MNEs chose ITP systems that were perceived as optimal for their own particular situations. In 
other words, multinational transfer pricing method choices depended on the operating 
environments in which they were involved (Borkowski, 1992, p. 35). 
1.4.2 Environmental Factors Affecting ITP 
Several empirical studies have analysed environmental factors that affect ITP policies. Tang 
(1982) investigated 20 environmental variables considered by British multinational 
companies in formulating their multinational transfer pricing policies. Of the 20 variables 
investigated, 'overall profit to the company' was the most important. The study also found 
that 'competitive position of subsidiaries' and 'maintaining adequate cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries' were highly ranked by the respondents while 'differentials in income tax rates 
and income tax legislation' received low ratings. 
Yunker (1983) investigated the empirical relationships within and among three dimensions of 
multinational policy. The three policy dimensions were performance evaluation, subsidiary 
autonomy and transfer pricing. Her results revealed significant interrelationships among the 
policy variables. MNEs that used transfer prices to achieve overall global profit placed less 
emphasis on the performance evaluation of divisional managers. She also found that overall 
market conditions and demand for the product, government regulations and restrictions, 
material and labour costs and the level of competition were the most important environmental 
factors affecting the transfer pricing method choice of those U.S. based MNEs. 
Tang (1993) examined tax and management issues relating to U.S. transfer pricing practices 
in the 1990s. The results showed that many companies used at least one transfer pricing 
method. He found that companies used market-based transfer prices more often in the 1990s. 
Of the 12 variables, 'overall profit to the company' received the highest rating. Other 
relatively high ratings included 'income tax consideration', 'restrictions on repatriation of 
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profits or dividends', 'the competitive position of foreign subsidiaries' and 'rate of customs 
. duties and customs legislation where the company has operations'. The three least influential 
variables were 'U.S. government requirements on FDI', 'risk of expropriation by foreign 
country' and 'rate of inflation in foreign countries'. 
Oyelere et al (1999) investigated the relative importance of 17 environmental factors as 
ranked by two groups of foreign-controlled MNEs and indigenously-controlled ones. Data 
were collected by surveying 300 UK-based companies on the Times 1000. Half of the sample 
companies were foreign-controlled MNEs. These were then matched against 150 UK-
controlled ones. Their results showed a high level of consistency between the two groups of 
companies on the rank ordering of all the 17 variables when taken as a whole. When the 
factors were layered into three distinct groups (income shifting, internal operations and 
economics related), however, the two groups of companies were found to only agree on the 
rank order of income shifting factors. They failed to agree on the ranks of internal operations 
and economic factors. On an individual factor level, significant differences were found in 
their ranking of five environmental factors consisting of 'performance evaluation', 
'maintenance of cash flows', 'economic/market conditions', 'restrictions on repatriation of 
income' and 'subsidiary autonomy'. 
Chan and Chow (1998) investigated ITP practices by foreign investors in China. The results 
showed that 'compliance with tax law and customs regulations' was the most important 
variable in transfer pricing decisions. Other variables considered important by MNEs were 
'share of the Chinese market', 'a good relationship with the Chinese government', 
'differentials in income tax rates', 'competitive position in China' and 'minimisation of 
disputes among pm1ners over transfer pricing'. 'Foreign exchange control' and 'devaluation 
of Renminbi' were considered as moderately imp011ant, while 'restriction on payments of 
royalties' and 'interest and risk of expropriation and nationalisation' were considered 
unimportant. 
From an MNE's perspective, ITP is a management instrument that exploits environmental 
differences between related countries. Given the economic, political and cultural differentials 
between nations, one dominant inducement in a host country may be trivial in another, 
suggesting that a more valid analysis of multinational transfer pricing practices should be 
conducted in cross-national settings. 
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A sizable and growing literature investigates and compares environmental factors affecting 
, ITP practices in two or more countries. Tang and Chan (1979) investigated the enviromnental 
variables of ITP policies of Japanese and U.S. MNEs, and identified the environmental 
variables which discriminated between the Japanese and U.S. ITP practices. The results 
showed that overall profit was the most important consideration of ITP decisions for both the 
Japanese and U.S. companies. Other factors of joint importance to them were 'competitive 
position of foreign subsidiaries', 'restrictions on repatriation of profits', 'income taxes' and 
'devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies'. Five variables were identified as causing 
the discrimination between the two national groups. They were: 'the interests of local 
partners', 'devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies', antidumping legislation', 
'import restrictions imposed by foreign countries', and 'differentials in income tax rates and 
income tax legislation among countries'. Japanese corporations ranked the first three variables 
higher than the U.S. companies. The latter ranked the last two variables higher than Japanese 
firms. 
Lecraw (1985) interviewed top managers of 153 subsidiaries of the 111 MNEs in six light 
manufacturing industries in five Southeast Asian countries - Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. His results showed that MNEs used transfer prices to reduce 
customs duties and profit taxes, move funds across national boundaries and allocate them 
between subsidiaries, reduce country risk, and circumvent government price and capital-profit 
remittance controls. 
Borkowski (1997a) compared organisational, environmental and financial factors influencing 
the transfer pricing choices of Japanese and U.S. MNEs. She found that Japanese and U.S 
companies used different transfer pricing methods. The Japanese sample preferred noncost 
(primarily market and negotiated) methods. By contrast, the U.S. sample was divided between 
cost (47 percent) and noncost methods (53 percent). In her study, organisational variables 
included 'size', 'industry', and 'MNE home country', while environmental variables were 
'corporate income tax rates', 'import duties', 'withholding tax rates', 'profit repatriation 
policies', 'currency fluctuations', and 'the form of the investment' . 
Borkowski (1997b) extended her investigation of organisational, environmental and financial 
factors affecting the transfer pricing choices to Canadian and U.S. based MNEs. She found 
that Canadian MNEs preferred market methods, while U.S. MNEs preferred other methods. 
As for factors influencing method choice, her findings revealed that most organisational and 
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environmental variables did not seem to affect either country's choice, while prior audit 
. experience was the only statistically significant environmental factor across both country and 
method choices. Financial variables were found to differ between the two countries but not by 
transfer pricing method. 
While the existing literature provides evidence that various environmental factors affect 
transfer pricing decisions, studies have been focused on a single nation, or, for comparative 
purposes, across two or more developed national jurisdictions. Few studies provide evidence 
of ITP practices by MNEs that operate in developing countries (Lecraw, 1985; Chan and 
Chow, 1998). Fewer still have been completed to date on the ITP practices of MNEs that 
operate in developing countries, as compared with those operating in developed countries (AI-
Eryani et al., 1990). 
Chan and Chow (2001, p. 104) argued that "multinational companies' operations in 
developing countries are subject to more economic, political and social risks and restrictions 
due to the peculiar business environments in these countries". Given the fact that trade and 
investment relations among developed and developing countries have expanded rapidly in 
past decades due to globalisation, and, especially, that the economic, political characteristics 
and cultures in developing and developed countries are distinctly different, MNEs operating 
in developing countries may have different motives for their ITP behaviour (Chan and Chow, 
1997a, 1998, 2001, 2004). Hence, any conclusions drawn from a single developed or 
developing national setting, while valid for that particular economy, provide a limited picture 
and perhaps a biased one for a more general understanding of ITP issues. 
This study investigates and contrasts environmental factors of ITP policies and differences in 
pricing methods used by multinationals in two developed economies, New Zealand and 
Australia, on the one hand, and in China, the largest developing country in the world, on the 
other. 
1.4.3 Tax Audits on ITP 
In facing the growth of multinational business, national governments have become 
increasingly aware of the losses of tax revenues as a result of ITP abuses (OECD, 1995, 
Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999, Ernst and Young, 1999,2002). Consequently, a growing number 
of governments have devised measures to counter real or perceived ITP manoeuvres. The 
tendencies toward aggressive transfer pricing audits have been observed in the past. In many 
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industrial countries, notably Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S., a comprehensive set of 
regulations have been put into force. It can be anticipated that multinational transfer pricing 
anangements will be subject to stricter tax auditing by tax authorities over time (Ernst and 
Young, 1999). Predictably, an ITP tax audit should be an increasingly significant variable in 
influencing multinational transfer pricing policies. However, in the research of environmental 
factors affecting multinational transfer pricing, the variable of tax authority transfer pricing 
audit has remained largely ignored. Researchers have not recognised the impact of tax 
auditing as a main government countermeasure on multinational transfer pricing decisions. 
One exception is Borkowski (1997b) who found that the prior tax audit experience was the 
only statistically significant environmental factor affecting ITP. However, she did not 
specifically analyse the potential underlying reasons why tax authorities initiated a tax audit 
onITP. 
There is evidence that certain types of companies are more likely to manipulate transfer prices 
and therefore to be selected for ITP tax audits by tax authorities. Jacob (1996) suggested that 
multinationals with the greatest level of intercompany transfers had the most opportunities 
and the greatest incentive to shift income through transfer prices. Feresa and Nancy (2000) 
argued that larger companies were more likely to shift income through transfer pricing. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) found that larger firms encountered more governmental scrutiny. 
Atkinson and Tyrrall (1999) found that tax authorities tended to target those firms dealing in 
pharmaceuticals, electronics, or motor industry products. The subsidiaries of Japanese 
multinationals in the u.K. and the u.s. in particular, have been subject to a large number of 
transfer pricing investigations. Buckley and Hughes (2001) and Borkowski (2001) confirmed 
that Japan-owned subsidiaries were frequently audited by the host countries' tax authorities 
around the world. 
While the above studies have provided evidence that certain types of companies are more 
likely to be selected for ITP tax audits, none of them has addressed the issue by using 
multivariate methodology. Because a considerable number of corporate attributes (predictor 
variables) may simultaneously relate to ITP audits, studies that rely on univariate analysis 
only (i.e., each individual study involving only one predictor variable), provide an inadequate 
basis for judging the relative impOliance among various predictor variables. 
The work of Chan and Chow (1997b) is an exception. In a study of ,:ariables influencing ITP 
tax audit practices in China, Chan and Chow (1997b) found that tax audits on transfer pricing 
11 
were confined mainly to medium and small-sized foreign investments, lower-technology 
. companies and the transfer of tangible goods, and tended to focus on certain nationalities and 
forms of foreign investment. Persistent losses, low profitability, and lack of. local paliners in 
joint venture management most often triggered tax audits. Chan and Chow used 81 cases of 
tax audits undeliaken in 1992-1993 on transfer pricing to confirm their findings. While their 
conclusion was drawn from archival data and were valid for that particular period, their 
results, based on archival or less than systematic evidence, failed to reflect the changes in the 
attitudes of the Chinese tax authorities towards their tax issues since then. 
Via a multivariate statistical analysis (i.e., the logistic regresslOn analysis), this study 
investigates the relationships between corporate characteristics and the probability of being 
selected for transfer pricing audits by tax authorities, along with examining whether MNEs 
are concemed about the risk of an ITP tax audit in formulating their ITP policies. 
The literature suggests that ITP is typically more detrimental to developing countries than to 
developed ones (Easson, 1991, Chan and Chow, 1997a, 1997b). Brean (1979), Lall (1979), 
and Plasschaert (1985) argued that developing countries were more vulnerable to transfer 
pricing manipulations both because of their limited knowledge of ITP matters and, even 
where tax authorities in developing countries had strong suspicions that transfer prices were 
being manipulated, their lack of information, expertise and staff to tackle the issue. 
Nonetheless, these assertions lack empirical support. This study examines tax authorities' 
expeliise and ability to detect and prevent ITP abuse in the world's largest developing 
economy, namely China. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
ITP is an interdisciplinary subject (Chan and Chow, 1998, p.140). To understand and 
effectively address the problems and issues on the subject, a multidisciplinary approach is 
required. This study takes a multidisciplinary approach to analysing the issues involved by an 
exploration of the neo-classical economics of FDI to interpret the origin of ITP, by 
investigating the use of various transfer pricing methods in developing and developed 
environments, by examining tax and legal implications in the use of various transfer pricing 
methods, and by comments on national legislation and tax auditing on restrictive transfer 
pricing practices. The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. 
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Chapter 2 builds the regulatory framework for transfer pricing in New Zealand. This chapter 
, reviews the New Zealand transfer pricing regulations and guidelines. 
Chapter 3 builds the regulatory framework for transfer pricing in Australia. This chapter 
reviews the Australian transfer pricing regulations. 
Chapter 4 builds the regulatory framework for transfer pricing in China. This chapter reviews 
the Chinese transfer pricing regulations. 
Chapter 5 reviews the neo-classical economics of FDI, interprets the origin and the nature of 
ITP, and examines the economic impact of ITP manipulations on the economies of host 
countries. 
Chapter 6 examines the theoretical and empirical studies on multinational transfer pricing 
method choices, with contingency theory literature seen as underpinning the divergence of 
theoretical and empirical studies on this subject. This chapter also describes various 
environmental factors and their possible impact on multinational transfer pricing decisions. 
Chapter 7 develops hypotheses to test possible differences in the rankings of transfer pricing 
methods used, and environmental variables of ITP among the samples of MNEs operating in 
the three research settings. To investigate the corporate attributes associated with ITP audits 
in a multivariate setting, a logit model is also developed in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 describes both the quantitative and qualitative approaches used in this study, 
discussing their corresponding strengths and weaknesses and, why and how they were 
employed. This chapter also states how the data were collected and analysed. 
Chapter 9 describes some essential characteristics of the respondent firms. It also reports the 
findings from the survey on ITP methods used by the respondent firms in the three countries. 
Chapter 10 first reports the findings on environmental factors of ITP in the three countries, 
and then provides a comparison of environmental factors affecting ITP policies of MNEs. 
Chapter 11 describes ITP tax auditing practices in New Zealand, Australia and China, and 
reports on corporate attributes triggering the potential risk of ITP tax audits. 
13 
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, Chapter 12 chapter repOlis on the use of a qualitative approach to describe the Chinese lTP 
auditing system and illustrates its effectiveness in restricting multinational transfer pricing 
practices. It also presents questionnaire survey results generated from 37 respondent Chinese 
tax officials. 
Chapter 13 presents conclusions drawn from the findings of this study, policy implications, 
research limitations, and suggestions for future research . 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of this study. The next three chapters review the 
transfer pricing regulations and guidelines in the three countries. 
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Chapter 2 
The Regulatory Framework for Transfer Pricing in New Zealand 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the New Zealand transfer pricing regulations and guidelines. The main 
contents of the New Zealand transfer pricing regulations and guidelines include the definition 
of associated persons, the acceptable arm's length pricing methods, the burden of proof, 
documentation requirements, penalties, and advance pricing agreements (APAs). 
2.2 Transfer Pricing Legislation in New Zealand 
The development of the transfer pricing regulations and guidelines in New Zealand is 
relatively recent compared with those of its major trading partners. In 1915 and 1917, for 
example, the first transfer pricing legislation was established in the u.K. and the U.S., 
respectively. The Australian statutory rules on transfer pricing are contained within Division 
13, Part III of the Income Tax Assessment ACT 1936 ('ITAA'), s. 136 of that ACT. 
Before its international tax reform, the old rules - contained in the previous s GC 1 of the 
Income Tax Act 1994 - governing the transfer pricing practices of multinationals was 
infrequently used by the Commissioner of the Inland Revenue Department (IRD). This can be 
attributed to the difficulty associated with the application of that section. The increased 
operating losses of MNEs have drawn serious attention of the IRD to the fact that 
intercompany transfer pricing may be abused in New Zealand (Harrison and Glyn-Jones, 
1999). In December 1995, the New Zealand government eventually overhauled the old rules 
and introduced new transfer pricing rules to deal with the issue of transfer pricing in the 
country (Coopers and Lybrand, 1997; Harrison and Glyn-Jones, 1999). 
Following the release of two series of transfer pricing draft guidelines in October 1997 and 
January 2000, respectively, the IRD issued transfer pricing guidelines in a final form applied 
these rules in October 2000. The 2000 guidelines provide a general overview of the 
conceptual framework within which the transfer pricing rules operate, they discuss the level 
of documentation to be maintained by taxpayers to meet the requirement of the rules, and they 
address some specific transfer pricing issues involving the treatment of intangible property, 
provision and receipt of inter-group services, and cost contribution (New Zealand transfer 
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pricing guidelines, 2002). 
The CUlTent New Zealand transfer pricing rules are contained in Sections GD 13, FB 2 and 
GC 1 of the Income Tax Act 1994. The rules are intended to prevent the New Zealand tax base 
being evaded by the blatant shifting of income out of the country without tax liability. The 
main transfer pricing rule - Section GD 13 - generally only applies to cross-border associated 
transactions between separate entities which have the potential effect of depleting the New 
Zealand tax base (Harrison and Glyn-Jones, 1999). 
Section FB 2 stipulates the use of an arm's length basis to apportion income within a single 
legal entity such as an overseas head office and its New Zealand branch. In some 
circumstances, arrangements may occur where the parties are not technically associated. To 
ensure the regime is effective, a specific anti-avoidance provision is incorporated in Section 
GC 1 to deal with certain non-arm's length transactions that are entered into by a taxpayer, 
subject to GD 13, but have the purpose or effect of avoiding the application of GD 13 
(Harrison and Glyn-Jones, 1999). 
2.2.1 The Scope of the Current Transfer Pricing Regime 
The New Zealand transfer pricing regime applies to income derived in the income year 
1996/1997 and all subsequent years. The regime focuses on cross-border transactions between 
associated parties which may result in a loss of New Zealand tax revenue. The scope of the 
current regime under Section GD 13 includes the following: 
• the supply or acquisition of goods, services, money, other intangible property, or anything 
else; 
• the supplier and acquirer who are associated persons - essentially, any two companies 
with 50 percent or more common ownership; 
• arrangements which are cross-border in character; 
• arrangements on other terms other than arm's length basis; and 
• arrangements with the potential to deplete the New Zealand tax base. 
AlTangements which do not fall within the transfer pricing rule in Section GD 13 may be 
subject to the anti-avoidance provisions in Section GC 1 or the head office/branch structure 
provisions for Ii single legal entity in Section FB 2 (HalTison and Glyn-Jones, 1999; Clews 
and Howe, 2001). 
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2.2.2 The Main Features of the Transfer Pricing Regime 
. Associated Persons Section GD 13 applies only to transactions between associated persons. 
Associated persons are defined as companies with common ownership of 50 percent or more. 
Common examples of associated persons include the following: 
• New Zealand parent companies and their overseas subsidiaries; 
• foreign shareholders - both individuals and companies - of New Zealand companies, 
where the shareholders own more than 50 percent of the shares; 
• New Zealand companies and overseas sister subsidiaries; and 
• New Zealand resident settlers of foreign trusts. 
Acceptable Methods Following the methods contained in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, Section GD 13 (7) prescribes five different methods as an acceptable range from 
which the taxpayer can make his choice for calculating the arm's length transfer price (Clews 
and Howe, 2001). These pricing methods can be categorised as either transaction based or 
profit based methods, where the transaction based methods consist of the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, and the cost plus method, while the profit 
methods consist of the profit split method and the comparable profits methods (Clews and 
Howe, 2001). 
The New Zealand legislation does not impose a hierarchy of preference for the acceptable 
transfer pricing methods. However, in the selection of a pricing method, a taxpayer must 
select the method that provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length amount. This 
provides multinationals with opportunities for selecting methods more appropriate for their 
circumstances. In practice, the availability of comparable data often determines which 
method can be used. Given the small size of the New Zealand market, reliable comparable 
data are difficult to locate in the New Zealand market. The IRD, therefore, allows overseas 
data in foreign markets, such as the U.S. and Australia, to be used in the taxpayer's transfer 
pricing analysis (Harrison and Glyn-Jones, 1999; Clews and Howe, 2001). 
Burden of Proof Section GD 13 (9) prescribes that the onus is on the taxpayer to determine 
an mm's length amount. In this regard, the regime is consistent with the transfer pricing rules 
of other tax jurisdictions. However, unlike the regulations of its major trading partners, which 
explicitly require taxpayers to prepare and maintain transfer pricing documentation to support 
the method and calculations used to set transfer prices, the IRD puts the onus on the 
Commissioner to show that the transfer price used by the taxpayer is not of an arm's length 
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consideration. Thus, the burden of proof lies with the Commissioner. If the Commissioner 
chooses to dispute the price determined by the taxpayer is at ann's length, the Commissioner 
must be able to prove that either: 
• another price provides a more reliable measure of an arm's length amount; or 
• the taxpayer is not co-operating with the Commissioner in the administration of the 
regime (Rolfe, 1997; Harrison and Glyn-Jones, 1999; Clews and Howe, 2001). 
Documentation and Penalties Section GD 13 requires taxpayers to determine their transfer 
prices in accordance with the arm's length principle. As a practical matter, it would be 
necessary for taxpayers to prepare and retain sufficient documentation to show: 
• how their transfer prices have been detelmined; and 
• why these prices are considered to be consistent with the arm's length principle. 
Documentation requirements include a functional analysis of the parties, which describes the 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the business in its transaction with 
related parties, and justification for selecting the pricing methods actually chosen. 
The transfer pricing regime does not have any special penalty provisions. Rather, it is subject 
to the general penalty provisions applicable to income tax issues. With regard to a taxpayer's 
transfer pricing arrangements, the taxpayer is likely to be required to demonstrate that the 
most reliable method has been selected and applied in an appropriate manner. A taxpayer that 
fails to document transfer pricing arrangements appropriately may incu~ a minimum penalty 
of 20 percent under Section 141A of the Tax Administration Act 1994 for not exercising 
"reasonable care". In addition, depending on the size and sophistication of a taxpayer, the 
absence of documentation in the determination of an arm's length amount makes the taxpayer 
vulnerable to a 40 percent penalty under Section 141 C, on the basis that the taxpayer has been 
"grossly careless". Since these penalties are non-deductible for income tax to the taxpayer, 
they represent a significant potential cost. To avoid such a penalty, the taxpayer must 
maintain a sufficient level of supporting documentation to meet the requirements of the 
transfer pricing regime (Rolfe, 1997; Rich and Harrison, 1997). 
Advance Pricing Agreements An AP A is a binding legal agreement between the taxpayers 
and the tax authority. The APA programme provides an important mechanism for allowing 
taxpayers to be certain that their transfer pricing policies and procedures meet the 
requirements of the arm's length standard. The New Zealand regime has issued binding APAs 
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dealing with the application of the arm's length standard to intercompany transfer prices4. An 
. AP A is issued as either a private binding ruling by the Commissioner under Section 91 E of 
the Tax Administration Act 1994, or under the Mutual Agreement article of the applicable 
double taxation agreement (Rolfe, 1997). 
2.3 Summary 
The basic principle underlying the New Zealand transfer pricing regime is that the ann's 
length standard should be adopted as the overriding benchmark for determining transfer prices 
between related parties. That is, the transfer price adopted by the related parties must be 
compared with the price adopted by independent parties operating on the open market. 
Section GD 13 applies to cross-border associated transactions between separate entities. 
Section GD 13 (7) prescribes two types of methods. They are transaction based methods 
(comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, and cost plus) and profit based methods (profit 
split and comparable profits). Transaction based methods compare prices or gross margins 
whereas profit based methods compare net profits. 
4 In 2001, the IRD and the ATO reached an agreement over APA for the purpose of eliminating taxpayers' risk 
of double taxation and providing tax certainty for international transactions between New Zealand and Australia 
(Ferrel'S, 2001). In the same year, Australia's largest gaming machine company - the Aristocrat International Pty 
Ltd - simultaneously signed the first bilateral APA between New Zealand and Australia on the pricing of its 
dealings with its New Zealand subsidiary (Le., Aristocrat Technologies NZ Ltd). 
19 
Chapter 3 
The Regulatory Framework for Transfer Pricing in Australia 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the Australian transfer pricing regulations. These regulations provide 
guidance with respect to acceptable methods, documentation requirements, potential penalties 
for taxpayers who do not comply with transfer pricing requirements in their international 
dealings with related parties, relief from double taxation, and AP As. 
3.2 Transfer Pricing Legislation in Australia 
Transfer pricing regulations in Australia follows U.S. legislation, i.e., the Section 482 
regulations and the Section 6662 transfer pricing penalty regulations of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code. In addition, they fully endorse the OECD definition of acceptable transfer 
pricing methods. 
Compared to its New Zealand counterpart, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has 
established a comprehensive structure for dealing with related party transfer pricing issues. 
The Australian statutory rules on transfer pricing are contained in Section 136 of Division 13, 
in Part III of the Income Tax Assessment ACT 1936 (ITAA). The ATO has also issued various 
taxation rulings concerning transfer pricing. They include Rulings TR 92/11, TR 94/14 
(Transfer Pricing); TR 95/23 (APA); TR 97/20 (Methods); TR 98/11 (Documentation); TR 
98/16 (Penalties); TR 99/1 (Services); TR 99/8 (Adjustments); TR 2000/16; TR 2001111; TR 
2002/5; TR 2002/2 and TR 2004/1. The main features of the Australian transfer pricing 
regime are presented as follows: 
Relationship Tests The test level of common ownership required is not specified by the 
ATO. This is a significant difference between the Australian and the New Zealand transfer 
pricing legislation. The New Zealand legislation specifies that the relationship test of 
associated parties is the existence of ownership of 50 percent or more. In contrast, the 
Australian relationship test is based on determining whether the consideration in any 
transaction between two parties is of arm's length in nature. Therefore, dealings between 
seemingly unrelated parties in the view of the New Zealand IRD may be caught out by 
Australian rules. As such, Australian taxpayers are under a burden to confirm that the 
involved price is arm's length in nature (Campos 1996; Rolfe, 1997). 
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,Acceptable Methods The ATO permits the use of the traditional transaction based methods, 
such as, on the one hand, the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, 
the cost plus method and, on the other hand, profit based methods, such as the profit split 
method and the transactional net margin method. These are consistent with the OECD 
Guidelines on transfer pricing methods. However, the Australian regulations do not prescribe 
any hierarchy or order of preference for applying the various methods. The ATO expects 
taxpayers to use the method that is 'most appropriate' or 'best suited' to their facts and 
circumstances. That is, where there is an insufficiency of data, or the existing methods cannot 
be used, the ATO allows taxpayers to use 'novel' or 'hybrid' methods, provided these 
methods can produce a comparable result. Hybrid methods are those methods that may be 
necessary in cases in which the application of more than one method is needed to increase the 
reliability of the taxpayer's results (Campos 1996; Rolfe, 1997). 
Burden of Proof The A TO imposes the burden of proof upon the taxpayers. The taxpayers 
are required to demonstrate that their pricing practices equate with the norm of arm's length 
pricing. To reduce the risks of disputes with the Australian Commissioner, multinational firms 
must prepare and retain sufficient documentation as evidence that their transactions with 
affiliates satisfy the arm's length standards (Campos 1996; Rolfe, 1997). 
Contemporaneous Documentation The Australian regime requires taxpayers to prepare and 
maintain documentation to demonstrate that the amounts charged in related party transactions 
are consistent with the arm's length standard. In addition to the ordinary documentation 
requirements, such as regular books and records and contractual agreements, the ATO also 
requires taxpayers to create and retain contemporaneous documentation which details the 
pricing methods adopted and indicates why a particular method is most appropriate in 
determining an arm's length price. The contemporaneous documentation requirements are a 
substantial administrative and operational burden for multinationals in relation to the 
justification and documentation of international transactions. These requirements contribute to 
more detailed and tighter rules in the Australian jurisdiction (Campos, 1996; Rolfe, 1997). 
The ATO has placed great emphasis upon the value of contemporaneous documentation in 
demonstrating that two related companies are, in fact, dealing at arm's length. The 
documentation can be used to justify the use of a method to price cross-border transfers and 
thus prevents the Australian Commissioner from using his or her power to deem an amount to 
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be arm's length in nature. For a multinational subsidiary operating in Australia, if it wishes to 
, avoid disputes with the ATO on intercompany charges, and if it wishes to avoid double 
taxation of income, contemporaneous documentation is imperative. 
Penalties Both the Australian and New Zealand transfer pricing rules emphasise that their tax 
authorities need to be able to collect a fair share of tax with respect to international transfers. 
Consequently, the two tax jurisdictions restrict the application of their transfer pricing penalty 
regimes to transactions ~hat have the effect of depleting their tax base (Campos, 1996; Rolfe, 
1997). 
In comparing the two transfer pricing penalty regimes, however, it appears that Australia has 
adopted a more rigorous approach. In Australia, a non-deductible penalty of 25 percent of the 
tax shortfall plus deductible interest will be payable where there is no dominant tax avoidance 
purpose. In the situation where profit shifting involves a dominant tax avoidance purpose, the 
relevant penalties will be 50 percent of the tax shortfall. If certain CUlpable behaviour has 
occurred, this penalty may be as high as 90 percent. If, however, the taxpayer has a 
reasonably arguable position as, for example, when the taxpayer's transfer pricing policy is 
well documented, then the penalty will be reduced to 10 percent of the tax shortfall. 
Advance Pricing Agreements In June 1995, the ATO released a taxation ruling (TR95/23) 
containing guidelines on the AP A process. Taxation Ruling 95/23 set out the factors that will 
be considered by the ATO in deciding whether to accept an application for an APA, including 
whether the taxpayer is seeking a bilateral AP A and whether the other country involved is a 
tax treaty partner (Rolfe, 1997). AP As may be unilateral or bilateral - such as involving tax 
authorities from foreign countries. There is a strong preference with the tax authorities for 
bilateral over unilateral APAs in the case of transactions involving entities in countries which 
have double tax agreements with Australia. The commissioner will generally not consider 
applications for bilateral APAs with non-tax treaty countries (Campos 1996; Rolfe, 1997). 
There is a formal application process for an AP A in Australia. To initiate the process, a 
taxpayer must apply to the ATO for a pre-lodgement meeting to discuss the requirements of 
the proposed AP A. Where an AP A is considered appropriate, the taxpayer will then be 
required to lodge a formal application providing details of the following: 
• the proposed methods; 
• the documentation supporting the chosen methods; 
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• the terms and conditions which govern the AP A; and 
• the duration of the APA (Rolfe, 1997). 
3.3 Summary 
The central purpose underlying Australian transfer pricing legislation is to ensure that the 
Australian tax base is not eroded by international profit-shifting arrangements. The ATO 
pennits the use of the traditional transaction methods (comparable uncontrolled price, resale 
price, cost plus) and transactional profit methods (profit split and transactional net margin). 
Traditional transaction methods are preferable to transactional profit based methods. Where 
there is adequate comparable data, the preferred traditional approach is the comparable 
uncontrolled price method. 
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Chapter 4 
The Regulatory Framework for Transfer Pricing in China 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the Chinese transfer pricing regulations. They include the definition of 
associated enterprises, the transfer pricing methods used, the burden of proof, the obligatory 
documentation, and AP As. 
4.2 Transfer Pricing Legislation in China 
China is a late-comer to the transfer pricing arena. In 1979 China stalied a policy of economic 
intercourse with the rest of the world. In the early years of this policy, transfer pricing was not 
a significant concern to the Chinese government because its energies were mainly focused on 
attracting FDIs and also because China lacked an institutional framework to deal with the 
issues involved in the country. 
Since then, however, China's enormous market potential and cheap labour costs, along with a 
series of preferential tax policies for foreign investors, have combined to encourage large 
numbers of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) to embark on investment opportunities in 
China. The wide range of related party transactions typically engaged in by FIEs with 
overseas affiliated companies, along with the fact that more than half of the FIEs reported an 
operating loss in the 1980s have, in tum combined to imply that the potential for transfer 
pricing manipulations in China have been immense. 
As a result, since the late 1980s the Chinese government has noted the phenomenon and has 
taken steps to combat tax avoidance through the use of transfer pricing abuses by FIEs in 
China. In November 1990, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) issued a set of 
provisional rules regarding the administration of taxation on transactions between FIEs and 
their associated enterprises. These rules set forth general guidelines on the transfer prices of 
these transactions and provided the basis for the subsequent legislation. 
The Chinese transfer pricing legislation was first introduced in 1991 by the National People's 
Congress under the Income Tax Law for FIEs. The transfer pricing legislation - Article 13 of 
the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises (Tax Law) - adopts the arm's length principle, which 
stipulates that the prices charged or paid in business dealings between the establishments of 
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FIEs within China and their associated enterprises5 should be the same as the prices charged 
. or paid in comparable uncontrolled transactions between independent, unrelated enterprises. 
Under Article 13 of the Tax Law, if the transactions are not carried out at mm's length and, 
thus, result in a reduction of taxable income, the tax authorities have the right to make 
reasonable adjustments (Chan and Chow, 1997a; Huang and Yu, 1997). 
Article 13 of the Tax Law is further supplemented by Articles 52 to 58 of the Detailed 
Implementing Rules of the Tax Law (DRR). The Tax Law has been in force since 1 July 
1991, and the Implementing Rules (DRR) since 30 June 1991 (Huang and Yu, 1997). 
On April 23 1998, the SAT issued comprehensive transfer pricing regulations entitled Tax 
Administrative Rules and Procedures for Transactions between Related Parties (SAT Circular 
No. 59). This Circular contains 52 articles aimed at setting criteria for selecting tax 
examination targets, standardising transfer pricing examination procedures, and strengthening 
internal co-ordination amongst the local tax bureaux and the SAT (Guo, 2000). 
The regulations explicitly indicated that, in addition to providing an attractive investment 
environment for foreign investors, the Chinese government also intends to ensure its fair share 
of tax revenue from MNEs undertaking business in the country (Guo, 2000). 
Unlike other countries' transfer pricing regulations which focus on corporate income tax, the 
Chinese transfer pricing regulations might be applicable not only to income tax, but also to 
other taxes, such as VAT, consumption tax and business tax. Additionally, as a result of 
China's tax-sharing system, not only cross-border transactions but also domestic transactions 
conducted between associated enterprises are targets for transfer pricing examination -
although it appears that the Chinese transfer pricing audits have focused mainly on cross-
border transactions (Rolfe, 1997; Guo, 2000). 
Associated Enterprises As with transfer pricing rules in other jurisdictions, the Chinese 
transfer pricing rules only apply to transactions that are conducted between or among related 
parties or controlled parties. A foreign enterprise and another company, enterprise or 
organisation will be considered as associated in the following circumstances: 
• where an enterprise directly or indirectly owns 25 percent or more of another enterprise; 
• where two enterprises are directly or indirectly owned by a third enterprise with 25 
percent or more capital interest; 
5 An associated enterprise is defined in Article 52 of the DRR as an association based on direct or indirect 
ownership or control in respect of capital, business operation, purchase or sales, direct or indirect ownership or 
control by a common third party and any other association with mutual benefits. 
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• where an enterprise borrows more than 50 percent of its loans from another enterprise, or 
where an enterprise guarantees 1 0 percent or more of another enterprise's loans; 
• where one of the managing directors or half or more of the board of directors or the 
executive managers of an enterprise is/are appointed by another enterprise; 
• where an enterprise's production can only been operated on the provision of proprietary 
technology owned by another enterprise; 
• where the provision of raw materials, parts, and semi-finished goods used by an enterprise 
in production are supplied or controlled by another enterprise; 
• where the sales of the commodities of an enterprise are controlled by another enterprise; 
and 
• where the production, trading activities and profits of an enterprise are effectively 
controlled by another enterprise having mutual benefits, such as the existence of family 
relationships. 
Transfer Pricing Methods Used As with the approaches to transfer pricing by both the 
OECD and the U.S, the Chinese transfer pricing regulations endorse and support the arm's 
length principle as the best approach to address transfer pricing issues. According to the rules, 
tangible assets must be priced based on a transaction basis, using one of three methods as 
follows: 
• the comparable uncontrolled price method; 
• the resale price method; or 
• the cost plus method . 
Owing to the lack of reliable public data in China, the tax authorities probably also consider 
other methods to price transactions as being appropriate. They are profit based methods, such 
as the comparable profit method, profit split method, transactional net margin method and 
deemed profit method. It should be noted that the circumstances under which these methods 
could be applied were not addressed in the regulations (Guo, 2000). 
As for transactions involving intercompany provisions of services, loans and the transfer of 
other assets, no particular methods are stipulated in determining their arm's length results. 
Arm's-length prices under such circumstances are broadly referred to as any payments or 
receipts that a third party would agree to for the same kind of transaction (Guo, 2000). 
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Burden of Proof In China, the burden of proof regarding the arm's length price in related 
. party transactions rests with the taxpayers. The tax authorities are not required to prove that 
the taxpayer intended to avoid Chinese tax. When the tax authorities suspect that an FIE's 
income has been reduced as a result of non-arm's length pricing, the tax authorities will 
require the FIE to provide relevant information regarding transfer pricing (Rolfe, 1997; Guo, 
2000). 
Documentation Unlike the practice in Australia, the u.s. and many other industrial countries, 
the Chinese transfer pricing regulations do not require contemporaneous documentation. 
However, in a transfer pricing audit, the Chinese tax authorities have the right to require that 
the taxpayer provides information to support its transfer pricing (Article 18 of SAT Circular 
No. 59, April 1998). The taxpayer assumes the burden of proof and provides the 
documentation to support its intercompany pricing policies (Article 24 of SAT Circular No . 
59, April 1998). The information that would then be requested includes the following: 
• detailed third-party transaction information for such variables as tangible property 
transactions, intangible property transactions, loans, provision of services and rent; 
• components of price determination, such as transaction volumes, locations, form or 
product, trade marks, and terms of payment; and 
• other relevant information associated with determining prices and charges. 
The following information might also be required for intercompany tangible property 
transactions. 
• functions performed by all related parties; 
• whether the sales of goods and selling prices will be affected by seasonal variations; 
• any intangible property involved; and 
• pricing methods used. 
Advance Pricing Agreements AP As are common in OECD countries and have also, in 
practice, been informally adopted in China. As indicated in Circular 59, APAs are acceptable 
avenues of negotiation with the tax authorities. To date, Circular 59 has not provided a 
prescription on the detailed procedures for an AP A application and what kind of information 
is required for this exercise. 
The FIE must provide relevant information and fill out the application form for using the 
advanced pricing method. After a review of the information and documents, the tax authority 
may sign an AP A with the enterprise and then supervise its implementation. 
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, Under the cunent Chinese transfer pricing regulations, taxpayers can negotiate AP As with 
provincial tax authorities, and no approval from the SAT is required. The fact that the 
provincial tax authorities are more likely to be familiar with the taxpayer's operations, and are 
also responsible for tax collection and audit, can accelerate the negotiation process, and 
facilitate the implementation of the APA (Guo, 2000). 
4.3 Summary 
The Chinese transfer pricing legislation adopts the arm's length principle and introduces 
similar methods commonly used in OECD countries for determining appropriate transfer 
prices. It acknowledges the need for taxpayer documentation of all related party relationships 
and the arm's length character of its transfer pricing. These signify the Chinese government's 
attempt to structure its transfer pricing rules in line with that of the OECD nations in order to 
harmonise its approach with international practices for its participation in world trade. 
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Chapter 5 
Theories of Foreign Direct Investment and International Transfer Pricing 
5.1 Introduction 
The theories of the MNEs and FDI have been advanced over several decades. The literature 
include contributions by a number of economists, including Coase (1937), Vemon (1971), 
Buckley and Casson (1976), Hymer (1976), Dunning (1980), Kindleberger (1984), Dunning 
and Rugman (1985), Corley (1992) and Caves (1996). Nowadays, the world economy has 
become significantly globalised and MNEs contribute a substantial portion ofthe world trade. 
MNEs have distinctive features that set them apart from their domestic counterparts. MNEs 
consider the global economy as a single marketplace. They integrate their production and 
trade on a global scale, rather than within individual countries, and intemalise trade and 
investment within a multinational system. Compared with domestic companies, MNEs have 
additional management problems. The noticeable issue is international taxation and its 
pervasive influence on MNEs operations. ITP is one of the most important intemational tax 
issues facing MNEs (Emst and Young, 1999). 
With the development of the global economy and the increasing worldwide reach of MNEs, 
ITP has become a central concern for managers ofMNEs (Cunningham, 1978; Itagaki, 1985). 
This chapter reviews the neo-classical economics literature on FDI, interprets the origin and 
nature oflTP. Linkages among market imperfections, FDI and ITP are also explored. 
5.2 Multinational Enterprises and Theories of Foreign Direct Investment 
The world economy has been significantly globalised since the end of World War II. As a 
result, a large percentage of the world's economic products is generated by international 
business activity, mostly undertaken by MNEs (Nobes and Parker, 2000). An MNE is an 
organisation that engages in production or service activities in two or more countries 
(Cunningham, 1978; Leitch and Barrett, 1992). As part of the increased globalisation of 
companies, MNEs have significantly expanded their intemational operations. MNEs engage 
in international operations mainly through FDI (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). In contrast with 
exporting and importing, where a stake is taken in an overseas business without operational 
control, FDI requires the establishment of a subsidiary or branch by a company from one 
country in the territory of another country, at which point the investing company becomes a 
parent company (Easson, 1991). FDI can take one of three forms: 
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• the establishment of a new enterprise in an overseas country - either as a branch or as a 
subsidiary; 
• the expansion of an existing overseas branch or subsidiary; and 
• the acquisition of an overseas business enterprise or its assets (Buckley, 1992). 
The theories of MNEs and FDI provide a conceptual framework for explaining the reasons 
why MNEs exist and what leads to their foreign investment decisions. Economists have 
developed the field around the following three key questions: 
• Why do firms move abroad as direct investors? 
• How can direct-investing overseas firms compete successfully with local firms in the host 
country, given the disadvantage of operating in an unfamiliar foreign territory? and 
• Why do firms choose to enter a foreign country via FDI instead of exporting or licensing? 
(Hymer, 1976; Root, 1978; Buckley, 1992). 
Hymer (1976) established his theory of imperfect competition and monopoly advantages to 
explain the reason for MNEs. In his dissertation on "The international operations of national 
firms: A study of direct foreign investment", Hymer argued that a perfectly competitive 
market is only possible in theory. In the real world, the market is imperfect. Because of their 
unfamiliarity with local market conditions, MNEs engaging in international production are at 
a disadvantage compared to local firms. In order to compete successfully with local finTIs in 
the host environment, MNEs must be able to exploit certain specific advantages not possessed 
by their local competitors. Market imperfections, created by the existence of some 
monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages for MNEs, offer them compensating advantages 
exceeding the disadvantages of being in a host country (Hymer, 1976; Buckley, 1992). 
Market imperfections offer MNEs competitive advantages over indigenous firms, and these 
advantages must be held monopolistically. In other words, these advantages cannot be 
purchased by their local competitors. Otherwise, their specific advantages may be duplicated 
over time. To survive in foreign markets, MNEs install effective barriers to competitive entry 
by internalising markets across national boundaries (Hymer, 1976; Buckley and Casson, 
1979; Corley, 1992). 
Hymer's theory is based upon the concept of structural market failure and, therefore, is 
restricted to the structural aspect of market imperfections. The elements of structural market 
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imperfections include scale economies, knowledge advantages, distribution networks, product 
. diversification, credit advantages (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). 
Dunning and Rugman (1985) noted that Hymer (1976) had ignored the distinction between 
structural (endogenous) and transaction-cost (cognitive or exogenous) market imperfections 
and, hence, had overlooked the work of Coase (1937) who emphasised the transaction-cost 
side of market imperfections and the importance of internal markets. Coase' s (1937) theory 
originally applied to multiplant indigenous firms. He suggested that because the external 
market mechanism inflicts higher transaction costs in areas such as defining and accepting 
contractual obligations, fixing contract prices, and taxes to be paid on market transactions, a 
firm may organise these activities internally, namely, in response to the transaction costs, the 
firm may create an integrated internal market. 
Buckley and Casson (1976) developed this into an explanation for MNE activities. They 
stressed the importance of market imperfections in intetmediate product markets, particularly 
those of patented technical knowledge and human capital, and further concluded that such 
imperfections provide an incentive for an MNE to internalise resource markets. 
Perhaps the most influential work on the subject of multinational international production is 
Dunning's (1980) eclectic paradigm. This paradigm is an attempt to synthesise the essential 
features of the MNEs and FDI theories. Dunning's 'eclectic theory of international 
production' has three dimensions, namely: 
1. Ownership specific advantages (competitive advantages): These advantages explain the 
'why' of international production. An MNE possesses owners!J1ip advantages that may 
be held temporarily or permanently, but are held exclusively. They are also called 
'monopoly advantages'. For example, securing a monopoly of intangible assets or 
economies of scale provides an organisation a competitive edge over the indigenous 
firms in the foreign market. 
2. Location specific advantages (configuration advantages): These advantages explain the 
'where' of international production. They consist of factors specific to a particular 
place. Therefore, the home or host country, rather than the MNEs, contributes to these 
advantages. Location advantages include, but are not limited to, sources of materials, 
market structure, provisions of infrastructure (for example, commercial, legal, 
educational, transport and communication), economic systems and government policies. 
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3. Internalisation specific advantages (coordinating advantages): These advantages explain 
the 'how' of international production. MNEs operating in the host countries inevitably 
face market imperfections caused by government regulations or natural externalities in the 
transfer of tangibles or intangibles (for example, technical know-how and information). 
The main advantage of an MNE is its ability to use its internal markets within the same 
firm to overcome market imperfections in the host environment (Dunning, 1980; Dunning 
and Rugman, 1985; Buckley, 1992). 
To summarise, Dunning's (1980) eclectic paradigm sets out a generalised framework for 
. explaining the level and pattern of international business activity of MNEs. Changes in the 
configuration of the ownership, location and internalisation advantages account for the rise, 
persistence or decline of MNEs' overseas production. These advantages contribute 
significantly to market imperfections in the host environment of MNEs, and determine the 
propensity for them to engage in international production (Leitch and Barnett, 1992; Nobes 
and Parker, 2000). 
5.2.1 Market Imperfections and Foreign Direct Investment 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm emphasises exogenous market imperfections, which are classic 
reasons for the internalisation of markets by MNEs and the motives for FDI. An MNE 
entering foreign markets has a choice of three approaches, namely, exporting, FDI or 
licensing. As international business increases, FDI is favoured more by MNEs. Why does an 
MNE choose to enter a foreign country via FDI instead of exporting or licensing? Market 
imperfections explain the need for FDI. In a perfectly competitive market, a firm can buy or 
sell goods and services at market prices, and foreign markets can be serviced by exports or 
licensing. Nevertheless, perfect competition is not common in practice. Rather, markets are 
imperfect. Imperfect markets often inflict high transaction costs on transfers of goods and 
services. In response to market imperfections in foreign countries, an MNE internalises its 
trade transactions by using a hierarchical structure to control its international production, 
thereby minimising transaction costs. Internalisation takes the form of FDI when there are 
barriers to trade which preclude exporting, or risk dissipating firm-specific advantages of the 
MNE (for example, technological knowledge, management skills or market know-how) which 
prevents licensing. It can be concluded that FDI occurs as a response to both natural and 
unnatural market imperfections (Dunning and Rugman, 1985; Benvignati, 1985; Rugman and 
Eden, 1985; Rugman, 1985b; Leitch and Barrett, 1992). In short, FDI is determined by the 
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need to intemalise a firm-specific advantage to overcome market imperfections which, as a 
. response, has greatly increased the volume of international trade. 
5.2.2 The Types and Magnitude of Intercompany Transactions 
The activities of MNEs have an important impact on intemational trade. Currently, a 
substantial part of international trade consists of high volumes of intercompany sales, or 
commercial transactions between parent companies and their foreign affiliates. These 
transactions may take various forms, i.e., transfers of goods and services, transfers or uses of 
intangible property, the use of tangible property, intercompany financing and licensing. The 
internal charges for these related party transactions may also take a variety of forms, such as 
management fees, service charges, royalties, licensing fees, franchise, rents, and interest 
(Tang, 1993). 
The WTO has estimated that intercompany transactions among MNEs now account for about 
one-third of total world trade (Rust and Graham, 2000). This amount of intercompany 
transactions has important tax implications for both the MNEs themselves and the agencies of 
governments of the countries in which they operate. Since a large proportion of intemational 
trade consists of transfers between related business entities located in different tax 
jurisdictions, a small change in the transfer prices adopted for such intercompany trade could 
have a huge potential for saving substantial tax payments for the MNEs involved but could 
also deny tax revenues to the govemments concemed. Consequently, tax authorities in many 
countries have intensified their surveillance and investigation of multinational transfer pricing 
practices to counter actual or suspected ITP manoeuvres. Hence, a major challenge facing 
MNEs today lies in the effective management of international transfer prices - an activity that 
has been, and continues to be, of central managerial concern for them (Dunning and Rugman, 
1985; Rugman, 1985b; Sun, 1999; Borkowski, 2001). 
5.3 International Transfer Pricing: Organisational Perspective 
The use of transfer pricing can occur both domestically as well as internationally. It is needed 
when a company structures itself into profit-making units, which are able to make 
independent decisions, and can sell their products or services to each other within the 
company. From a domestic company's point of view, transfer pricing is the price used for 
intemal sales of goods and services transferred from one profit centre to another within the· 
same firm. In this regard, transfer pricing is at the heart of inter-profit centre relations. The 
prices adopted for the transfer of goods or services between such related parts of the same 
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firm may be fixed at sharply different levels from that which would apply to the same 
transactions between umelated parties (Eccles, 1985; Rugman and Eden, 1985; Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998). At the domestic level, transfer prices are designed to accomplish the 
following objectives: 
• to provide each part with the relevant information required for determining the 
optimum trade-off between company costs and revenues; 
• to promote goal congruence; 
• to preserve divisional autonomy; 
• to enhance managerial motivation; and 
• to help in the evaluation of the perfOlmance of various profit centres (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998; Garrison and Noreen, 2000). 
If a company located wholly within a single national boundary, albeit in the form of numerous 
independent units, grows to the point of being able to contemplate the establishment of 
overseas units, the firm becomes, by definition, an MNE. The intercompany pricing processes 
which then take place between its constituent parts across national borders within the MNE 
group are critically different from those previously and exclusively conducted within a single 
national boundary. Compared with intracompany pricing practices for domestic firms, ITP is 
thus of great significance for MNEs. They are faced with an "economic environment ... much 
more complex and perplexing than that for domestic transfers ... " (Wu and Sharp, 1979, p. 83) 
and, therefore, "setting an international transfer price is more complex than domestic pricing" 
(Borkowski, 1992, pp. 33-34). At the international level, the objectives and motivations 
associated with transfer pricing revolve around issues of taxation and custom duties. Within 
the host country MNEs focus on minimising tax liability, reducing tariffs on imports and 
exports, avoiding restrictions on the repatriation of profits, minimising foreign exchange risks, 
enhancing the competitive position of subsidiaries in international markets and improving the 
relations between subsidiaries and foreign host governments (Cunningham, 1978; Garrison 
and Noreen, 2000). 
Dunning's (1980) theory stresses market imperfections and internalisation. His theory 
underlies the analysis of MNE transfer pricing motivations and behaviour. Since internal 
transfers of intermediate products take place within some multinational organisational 
contexts, a basic understanding of the nature of ITP can be gleamed from the analysis of the 
varied organisational structures of MNEs. 
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The core reason for the existence of an organisation can be identified in its vision and mission 
. statement, and can be defined, more specifically, by its corporate goals and objectives. 
Corporate goals and objectives can be directly and indirectly linked to different corporate 
strategies and, in tum, to different organisational structures (Ward, 1992; Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998). Since organisations exist in different shapes and sizes, their 
organisational structures can be categorised in different ways. The traditional organisational 
altematives are functional, divisional, and matrix forms. In a multinational context, cOlporate 
structures can be grouped into three categories: vertically integrated businesses, horizontally 
integrated businesses and conglomerates (Ward, 1992; Rugman, 1985b; Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998). Each of these organisational structures may be considered in association 
with its specific issues for multinational intercompany transfer pricing as follows. 
5.3.1 Vertically Integrated Businesses 
This is a common industrial structure for MNEs. In terms of Porter's (1980, 1985) strategic 
management concept of vertical integration, vertically integrated businesses tend to operate 
with a relatively undifferentiated product. This business strategy can be used as a competitive 
weapon against non-integrated firms. The vertical integration form enables an organisation to 
take advantage of economies of scale, and enables it to use an intemal market to minimise its 
transaction costs (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). 
For reasons of size, most of a vertically integrated company is broken down into a variety of 
geographic and functional divisional units located in different countries. The divisions often 
trade with each other within the integrated group, and each division is given responsibility for 
a specified set of activities in recognition of its superior information regarding resource use 
and labour effectiveness compared with central management. To measure financial 
performances effectively at the division level, the group must set transfer prices for those 
goods and services exchanged between any two divisions or between the divisions and their 
parent company (Ward, 1992; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). This regime is established 
in the case of the oil industry, which is normally a single focus industry, operating as a 
vertically integrated business. 
Aliber (1970, cited in Rugman, 1985a, p. 176) has presented the rationale for veliical 
integration structure for oil companies on an intemational scale: 
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Efficiencies may be realised by co-ordinating activities that occur in several 
different countries within the firm. Thus, an international oil company co-
ordinates the production, transpOlt, refining, and the distribution of petroleum at 
lower costs than individual firms at each stage might be able to by using the 
market. The economies of vertical integration involve reduction in transactions 
costs, the costs of search, and the costs of holding inventories (pp. 19-20). 
As illustrated above, there are four levels of vertical integration for the oil company -
extraction, transpOltation, refining and distribution. The upstream and downstream operations 
of the group are run separately by the four divisions. The corporate office coordinates and 
integrates their competitive strategies. Their performances are evaluated by a variety of 
financial indicators, such as profits and return on investment. This divisional structure within 
the vertically integrated firm enables divisional managers to focus attention on their own 
divisions. 
For intercompany trade between the divisions, internal transfer pnces are used by the 
upstream division to attach a price to products transferred to the downstream division, located 
in a different country. Thus, the crude oil to be processed by the division in the refining stage 
is supplied by the upstream transportation division. Because divisional managers are held 
responsible for both revenues and costs in their own profit centres, and are often evaluated 
and rewarded on the basis of divisional profits, they take considerable interest in the price 
they payor receive because this intercompany price plays a major part in showing a profit or a 
loss for their divisions (Eccles, 1985; Ward, 1992; Iqbal, Melcher and Elmallab, 1997; 
Hansen and Mowen, 2000). As an example, in the case of the oil company, when the 
upstream division sells a product to the downstream division, it would try to receive the 
highest possible price from the downstream division that will raise its operating income, and 
vice versa. To ensure objectivity, these prices are normally set at externally established and 
quoted spot market prices, or are negotiated between the managers of the two divisions. 
Otherwise, disputes and controversy between divisional managers over transfer prices may 
occur, with possible damaging effects on employee morale (Rugman, 1985b; Rugman and 
Eden, 1985; Ward, 1992). 
5.3.2 Horizontally Integrated Businesses 
An alternative structure to vertical integration for industrial MNEs is horizontal integration. 
Horizontal integration involves two or more subsidiaries located across national boundaries. 
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These subsidiaries operate in the same line of business and are controlled by the same parent 
company, headquartered in the home country. Like vertical integration, a horizontally 
integrated MNE has a transactional advantage in using a hierarchical administrative structure 
to control the allocation and distribution of resources and goods within the MNE group 
(Rugman, 1985b). 
Horizontal integration is common in many industries. An example of the horizontally 
integrated form of MNEs is in the pharmaceutical industry. The industry, characterised by 
high technology applications and expensive research, engages in horizontal integration to 
protect its technical know-how. A viable multinational drug company must engage in research 
and development to remain competitive with new products. High research and development 
costs contribute to the high costs of innovative drugs (Wiindisch, 2003). 
An alternative way to recover the costs would be to place a patent on the products. This gives 
the firm exclusive property rights over the manufacture and distribution of the products in the 
domain of the patent. However, in host nations where patents are not recognised, or when the 
firm fears that licensing or joint ventures can lead to the dissipation of its firm-specific 
advantage, the MNE will not risk collaborating with local firms if they are not certain that 
their intellectual property will be safe. Instead, the parent company has an incentive to keep 
the proprietary knowledge within the firm, rather than patent its products. This can be 
accomplished by creating an internal market through organising a horizontally integrated 
structure. Internal prices are set for the transfer of innovative pharmaceutical products from 
one subsidiary to another within the same horizontally integrated business. Another reason to 
set an internal price is that it is relatively difficult to establish the proper market price for 
intangibles involving research and development costs and intellectual property (Rugman, 
1985b; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998; Horngren, Foster and Datar, 1999). 
5.3.3 Conglomerates 
Distinct from the vertical integration and horizontal integration business structures is the 
conglomerate structure. This structure usually results from growth, which characterises many 
large MNEs. A conglomerate is the result of an action by an enterprise to acquire any number 
of distinct industries or types of business operations that are not organically related to one 
another as far as production and the market place are concerned. Each business is controlled 
from its parent company but operates as a relatively autonomous subsidiary. The connection 
between the subsidiaries is purely financial. A single conglomerate firm may operate in such 
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diverse businesses as wiring instruments, helicopters, chainsaws, air-craft engine components, 
. forklifts, machine tools, specialty fasteners, and gas turbine engines (Rugman, 1985a; Ward, 
1992; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). 
The organisational form of conglomerate is partly justified by the generation and use of 
economies of scale that are mostly gained through shared common services by the individual 
subsidiaries. These services include such assets as infOlmation technology, research and 
development, market research, and financial departments (Ward, 1992; Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998). The efficiency of these s~rvices is centrally controlled at the group 
level. However, the subsidiary managers can control the amount of services they receive. As 
these subsidiaries are autonomous businesses, they may be tempted to seek maximise their 
own benefits to the detriment of the MNE as a whole. For instance, if a subsidiary pays less 
than it should be charged, it may be motivated to use more of the service, in self-interest, than 
it should. This behaviour could then be disadvantageous to the company as a whole. In 
another instance, if a subsidiary is required to pay more than it should be charged, it might 
avoid using certain services that are worthwhile from the point of view of management. To 
achieve goal congruence and effectively evaluate their financial performances, senior 
management must devise an appropriate method of charging each subsidiary for its usage of 
such shared services. This is normally achieved by creating an ITP system to ensure the 
efficient allocation of resources within the MNE group (Plasschaert, 1979; Ward, 1992; 
Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). 
For trade transactions or non-trade payment flows between affiliates of an MNE group, an 
appropriate ITP policy can be established to fit the organisation's structure and industry 
character. From an organisation's perspective, the objectives of transfer prices are designed to 
provide reasonable measures of subsidiary economic performance, to motivate subsidiary 
managers and to promote goal congruence. These objectives focus on the behavioural effects 
of the pricing of an organisation'S internal transfers as is the case for domestic and 
international transfer prices (Plasschaert, 1979; Ward, 1992). 
On the other hand, at the international level, additional factors must be taken into account by 
MNEs. Compared with domestic firms, composed of a number of divisions that trade with 
each other within a single nation state, foreign affiliates of an MNE are usually further 
removed geographically from the central headquarters. Subsidiaries may face very different 
economic conditions, political forces and contrasting cultures from those of their home 
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countries. ITP policies of the MNE are, therefore, far more affected by differing foreign 
, enviromnental factors than by organisational variables such as size and internal structure. 
Among various areas related to multinational ITP objectives and motivations in the host 
countries, income tax tends to attract the greatest attention (Plasschaert, 1979; Hansen and 
Mowen, 2000). The following discussions focus on the examination of the nature of ITP with 
a tax perspective, regardless of the underlying organisational structure. 
5.4 International Transfer Pricing: Tax Management Perspective 
Multinational transfer pricing is a highly contentious international tax issue. From the point of 
view of taxation, ITP can be defined as the pricing process of goods and services transferred 
between related companies of a multinational system across different tax jurisdictions. The 
amount of taxes paid in each jurisdiction is, therefore, subject to the internal price that is 
assigned to the intermediate goods involved (Eden, 1985; Gresik, 2001). There are charges 
levied by the parent company for specific services rendered to its subsidiaries. Since corporate 
income tax rates vary across countries, and the foreign subsidiaries are theoretically subject to 
control by the parent company, the parent company may have considerable discretion in 
setting its transfer prices when one subsidiary - or the parent company itself - transfers an 
asset or provides a service to another subsidiary, and vice versa, as a means for manipulating 
tax liabilities. This process is modelled in Figure 5.1. 
In this simplified ITP model, the parent company in the home country has two Subsidiaries A 
and B, located, respectively, in the host countries a and p. Subsidiary A sells its product to 
Subsidiary B. The corporate tax rate in host country a is 20 percent, but 33 percent in the host 
country p. It follows, for example, that Subsidiary A can produce an intermediate product to 
be sold to Subsidiary B, the latter processing the intermediate goods into a final product for 
sale in its local market. The products transferred have an open market price. The parent 
company sets an ITP policy based on a chosen currency. 
In this case, with all other factors being equal, the parent company would like to allow its 
Subsidiary A in the low tax country a to sell its products to its related Subsidiary B in the 
high tax country p at a high price - one that exceeds the market selling price - ignoring 
constraints imposed by tax laws in the host country. Higher products prices would transfer 
profits from Subsidiary B to Subsidiary A. The resultant loss in Subsidiary B' s high tax 
jurisdiction country p is more than offset by the profits of Subsidiary A in a low tax 
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jurisdiction country a. The overall effect is that the MNE as a whole can minimise its total tax 
. payments by shifting its profits to the lower tax jurisdiction country a. 
Parent company 
headquarters in home country 
ITP Policy 
Subsidiary A 
in host country a 
(Low-tax country) 
r 
Sales Transfer payments 
Subsidiary B 
in host country p 
(High-tax country) 
Figure 5.1 Simplified International Transfer Pricing Model 
In addition to tax rate differences among nations affecting ITP decisions, and the resulting 
income shifting, the extent and magnitude of cross-border profit shifting though ITP also 
depends on which tax system - either the exemption system or the credit system -
governments in home countries use to avoid double taxation. 
The gains from profit shifts are largest if the MNE resides in a home country that uses the 
exemption system. Once the firm has been taxed abroad, foreign income is exempted from 
home-country taxation. Examples of countries that use the exemption system include Canada, 
France and the Netherlands. Japan, the u.K. and the U.S. are among those countries that use 
the credit system, which provides a tax credit for corporate taxes already paid abroad, and 
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defers home tax payments until income is repatriated from the source country - the host 
. country - to the resident countIy - the home country. Under the credit system, the gains from 
profit shifting primarily arise from deferring the timing of profit repatriations from foreign 
subsidiaries to a residence country with a higher tax rate (Bruielsman, 2000). 
5.4.1 Prior Empirical Evidence on Tax-Motivated International Transfer Pricing 
Practices of Multinational Enterprises 
As there are huge potential tax saving opportunities arising from the use of appropriate lTP 
strategies, considerable evidence have been accumulated concerning the tax-motivated ITP 
strategies adopted by MNEs. Studies have examined whether tax rates affect taxable income 
reported by MNEs operating in different foreign locations. Substantial attention has been 
given to income shifting activities by films with tax haven affiliates. Tax havens are often 
defined as locations with the following four attributes: low corporate tax rates; legislation that 
supports banking and business secrecy; advanced communications facilities; and self-
promotion as an offshore financial centre (Hines and Rice, 1994). Consistent research results 
show that reported incomes of foreign affiliates of MNEs are significantly higher in countries 
with low corporate income tax rates than those in countries with high tax rates. 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) examined the relationship between profit margins and tax rates to 
see whether profits were being shifted from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. They 
examined profit/equity and profit/sales ratios of affiliates of U.S. companies in 33 foreign 
countries. Their results revealed that before-tax profitability is negatively correlated with local 
tax rates, and that high taxes reduce the reported after-tax profitability of local operations. The 
fact that tax rates are a significant determinant ofreported profits may, indirectly, be evidence 
of international tax avoidance activities by the MNEs. 
Hines and Rice (1994) examined the ability of U.S. multinationals to shift their reported 
profits and real business activities between high-tax foreign countries and foreign tax havens. 
By analysing the 1982 aggregated reported profits of U.S. firms in different tax locations, 
they found that reported profit rates were sensitive to local tax rates. A one percentage point 
increase in tax rate reduced reported profits by three percent in their data. This elasticity may 
have been partly the consequence of profit shifting incentives. 
Grubert and Slemrod (1998) investigated the impact of taxation in the context of u.s. 
corporate investments in Puerto Rico, a foreign tax haven favoured by many u.s. 
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multinationals. Their results showed that income shifting advantages were the predominant 
reason for U.S. investments in Puerto Rico. This finding is an echo of the prevalent allegation 
that a significant role of tax havens is to facilitate international tax avoidance. 
The above studies focused on multinationals of U.S. origin. They provide evidence that U.S. 
multinationals shift profit out of high-tax countries into the U.S., and from the U.S. to low-tax 
countries or tax havens. Profit shifting can take place in two ways. One way to shift profits is 
through the capital structure of MNEs. For example, a multinational can use debt to finance 
foreign affiliates in high-tax countries and use equity to finance subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries. Another way is by the manipulation of transfer prices for cross-border 
intercompany deliveries of goods and services (Bartelsman, 2000). The second type of profit 
shifting activity - ITP - is the subject of this thesis . 
Most MNEs are headquartered in the wealthy, industrialised nations such as Germany, 
France, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. These countries have enacted sophisticated ITP 
regulations and have expertise to deal with the issues generated by this practice. 
In contrast, developing countries are often host countries. ITP is likely to be more detrimental 
to developing countries (typically the source countries) than to developed countries (typically 
the residence countries). It is generally easier to expropriate the profits that would accrue to 
the subsidiary than the parent company. This is simply because developed countries usually 
have, and can afford, more sophisticated administrative structures that are able to identify ITP 
abuses, whereas developing countries lack institutional and administrative structures to 
analyse complex ITP situations, and are, therefore, more vulnerable to ITP manipulations. 
Conceivably, the threat to fiscal sovereignty through multinational transfer pricing 
manoeuvres is more prominent and imminent for developing countries than for developed 
economies (Easson, 1991; Chan and Chow, 1997a, 1997b). 
5.4.2 The Adverse Effects of International Transfer Pricing Manipulations on the 
Economies of Host Nations 
With regard to ITP issues, both MNEs and host countries frequently have their own 
conflicting interests and philosophies. Typically, companies may regard their strategies for tax 
avoidance as a conventionally acceptable position to adopt, while host countries may regard 
such action as culpable tax evasion. ITP manipulation is more likely to be a more serious 
problem in developing countries (and especially the least developed countries) where the 
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governments do not have the capacity or resources to identify the profit-shifting effects of ITP 
practices. Another possible motive is that MNEs, as a risk-averse strategy, may consider it 
preferable to remit their profits out of a developing country to a developed country where the 
parent company domiciles. 
Recently, the number of MNEs operating in developing countries has significantly increased. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that MNEs operating in developing countries have considerable 
income shifting opportunities through ITP. One explanation for this is the lack of institutional 
and administrative structures in these countries to deal with the situation. Another important 
explanation is that some developing countries are so eager to attract FDI that they have little 
interest in ITP controls (Rahman and Scapens, 1986, Chan and Chow, 1997a, 1997 b, 1998). 
Some studies have provided empirical evidence as to the extent of income shifting out of 
developing countries through ITP manipUlation. These studies reveal significant overpricing 
of imports or underpricing of exports by MNEs in certain industries. Lall (1973) used data 
from the Colombian Planning Office and the Import Control Board to investigate the extent of 
ITP abuses in Colombia. The results showed that, compared with world market prices, MNEs 
in Colombia overpriced their imports by about 33 percent to over 300 percent in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and from 24 percent to 81 percent in the rubber and electrical 
industries. It could be suggested from the findings that the Colombian tax base had been 
eroded as a result of profit shifting by MNEs. Natke (1985) used data on imports collected 
from 141 manufacturing firms - both domestic and multinational - operating in Brazil during 
1979. These data were used to test the hypothesis that import prices paid by MNEs would be 
higher than those of Brazilian firms for the same products because of ITP behaviour. The 
findings revealed that, overall, all sampled MNEs paid higher prices than Brazilian films, 
with the degree of overpricing ranging from a high of 39 percent in the full sample (127 
products) to 21 percent in the narrow sample (26 products). The import prices of MNEs 
exhibited even greater variability. These results may be caused by multinational transfer 
pricing behaviour. Rahman and Scapens (1986) investigated the ITP practices of MNEs in 
Bangladesh. They compared the reported profits of the MNEs with those of their local 
counterparts. The results showed that MNEs were less profitable than local enterprises, a 
finding that was inconsistent with the relative market power of MNEs in Bangladesh. The 
authors concluded that ITP manipulation accounted for the low profitability of MNEs in the 
country. In order to get specific evidence, they further investigated the import prices of 10 
pharmaceutical items. They found that the overpricing of imports by MNEs from affiliates 
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varied by 78 percent to 600 percent in the pharmaceutical industry and could be cited as 
evidence of income shifting activities by MNEs in the country. Chan and Chow (1997a) 
examined the business environment in China and used import and expOlt data to test the 
hypothesis that MNEs in China overpriced their impOlts and underpriced their expOlts to shift 
profits out of the country. Outward profit shifting was detected in certain industrial sectors, 
such as the manufacture of audio/video equipment, garments, and plastics raw materials and 
products. Both the overpricing of impOlts and the underpricing of expOlts were detected in 
these three industries. This implies that MNEs shifted profits out of these businesses in China . 
While ITP may maximise profits or minimise operational risks for MNEs, its abusive nature 
has far-reaching implications for the economies of countries where MNEs operate. The 
conceivable costs of ITP manipulations to the host countries can, therefore, be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Tax losses. Through ITP manipulation, the host governments receive reduced revenue 
from taxes imposed on corporate income, import duties, and withholding taxes (Lin et 
aI., 1993). 
2. Difficulty in auditing and evaluating firms. ITP manipulations can distort a company's 
operating and financial results. To evaluate and audit the financial reports, the local 
government must attempt to identify and adjust for the effects of ITP. This can be very 
inefficient and costly especially in developing economies that are poorly equipped for 
this task (Lin et aI., 1993). 
3. Monopolised market. The ITP mechanism can be used by an MNE to protect its 
monopoly position as a supplier. It is often the case that a foreign subsidiary needs 
some components or parts from the parent company. The parent company could, 
therefore, use the ITP mechanism to keep its monopoly position as a supplier. For 
example, when there is no competition, the parent supplier can overprice, but as soon 
as competition appears, it can underprice the product or service (Lin et aI., 1993). 
5.5 Summary 
According to the neo-classical economics of 'perfect competition' or 'imperfect competition', 
in a frictionless world of perfect competition, the internal price within an MNE group will be 
equated with the market price, and transaction costs will never occur in this market condition. 
Therefore, the use of internal pricing mechanisms should be redundant. Unfortunately, perfect 
competition is not commonly seen in practice. The extent to which the environment in which 
the transfers occur is imperfect may inflict high transaction costs on intercorporate transfers of 
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goods and services. In response to market imperfections in the host countries, MNEs may 
create intemal markets through ITP to overcome transaction costs (Dunning and Rugman, 
1985; Benvignati, 1985; Rugman and Eden, 1985; Leitch and Barrett, 1992). 
With the speed in globalisation of economic activities and the intemalisation of the greater 
PaIt of world trade, more MNEs are engaging in transfers of larger monetary anl0unts with 
affiliates located in a number of countries. Such transfers also take place between the affiliates 
themselves. The prices at which goods, services or other assets are transferred detennine the 
profits of MNEs and, therefore, the tax base of the countries involved. Tax underpayments 
caused by the movement of profits out of a country can result in shortfalls in govemment 
revenue and in foreign exchange reserves. Developing countries "have long relied on 
corporate income taxes as a principal means of revenue. These taxes account for up to a third 
of revenue in some developing countries" (Cohen, 1995, p. 11). Therefore, the nature of ITP 
can have significant tax implications in developing economies. ITP methods can directly 
affect the amount of profit reported in a country by an MNE, which in tum affects the tax 
revenues of that country (Bartelsman, 2000). 
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Chapter 6 
Contingency Theory and International Transfer Pricing 
6.1 Introduction 
MNEs use a large variety of pricing methods to deal with intercompany transfers crossing 
intemational boundaries. The methods actually used in practice, however, may be very 
different from the theoretically based recommendations in the accounting literature. 
Contingency theory may offer an explanation of a firm's choice of transfer pricing methods in 
practice. The contingency theory approach presumes that firms are likely to choose the ITP 
systems that are perceived as optimal for their particular situation. In other words, each 
company selects a method that offers a best fit for its needs and circumstances (Borkowski, 
1980, 1990). 
6.2 Theoretical Frameworks of Alternative Transfer Prices 
In the transfer pricing literature, three different theoretical research frameworks have been 
developed to explain multinational transfer pricing strategies: economic models, mathematical 
programming, and behavioural approaches, respectively. 
6.2.1 Economic Model 
The economic model includes market and marginal (incremental) pricing. In the economic 
model, if the intermediate market is competitive, the transfer price should be the market price; 
but if the intermediate market is imperfectly competitive - as it always is in the real world -
then marginal pricing replaces market pricing (Hirshleifer, 1956). These methods, however, 
are open to criticism in that they ignore factors such as uncertainty and risk aversion by 
managers (Kanodia, 1979). Critics of these economic methods also cite their defects as 
ignoring both the divergence of preferences among division managers and information 
asymmetries. The latter occurs when upper management does not possess all the information 
available to lower management. A consequence of this is that upper management cannot 
choose an optimal ITP method for the firm as a whole (Borkowski, 1990). 
6.2.2 The Mathematical Programming Model 
The mathematical programming model equates transfer price to the opportunity cost of the 
intermediate product. It deals with multiple divisions and multiple products, and allows for 
the inclusion of realistic production constraints. In the study of the mathematical 
programming model, both linear and non-linear approaches are developed (AI-Eryani et aI, 
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1990). Critics of this method cite its defects as including the underlying assumption of 
celtainty, the neglect of managerial motivation and its complexity in implementation 
(Kanodia, 1979, Ismail, 1982, Borkowski, 1990). 
6.2.3 The Behavioural Model 
Both the economic and mathematical programmmg models place high importance on 
production efficiency, cost minimisation and profit maximisation. Although these economic 
analyses have provided useful insights, both models fail to take into account the human 
dimensions in transfer pricing decisions. To correct this deficiency, the behavioural model has 
been developed to incorporate the human dimension in ITP (AI-Eryani et aI, 1990). 
Rather than relying on market forces or cost structures for determining transfer prices, the 
behavioural model recommends the use of negotiated transfer pricing for achieving 
organisational goals. Waston and Baumler (1975, cited in Al-Eryani et aI, 1990, p.411) argued 
that successful firms resolve interdepartmental conflicts through negotiated transfer prices. 
Acklesberg and YukI (1979, cited in AI-Eryani et aI, 1990, p.41l) suggested that negotiated 
transfer prices could result in better relations and co-operation among divisions of an MNE. 
Cited defects of this method have included the necessity for a higher claim on management 
time, a possible increase in division conflict, and evaluations based more on a manager's 
negotiation ability and handling of the process and less on his or her ability to control 
economic factors (Kaplan, 1982, Borkowski, 1990). 
In contrast to these three alternative transfer pricing models, many firms are in favour of cost-
based methods in practice, although the cost-based methods do not have as much theoretical 
support as the three listed above. 
6.3 Findings of Initial Survey of Transfer Pricing Methods Used 
Three pricing models have been developed to explain the theoretical merits of various pricing 
methods in the literature. Empirical research on ITP has found a substantial difference 
between the actual methods used in practice and the theoretical models discussed above. 
Empirical studies of ITP methods concentrate on three major categories: market-based, cost-
based and negotiated prices (Chan and Chow, 2001). 
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Arpan (1972) investigated non-U.S. systems of transfer pricing by comparing their attitudes 
and experiences with those of their U.S. counterparts. The study found that the nationality of 
the parent company affected the transfer pricing system used by MNEs and the importance 
given to the various factors in selecting transfer pricing systems. For example, American, 
French, British and Japanese companies preferred cost-based transfer pricing systems, but 
Canadians, Italians and Scandinavians preferred market-based transfer pricing systems. This 
study also revealed a substantial correlation between a firm's size and its transfer pricing 
system orientation: the larger the parent company, the more likely it is to use a cost-oriented 
transfer pricing system. 
Tang (1979) reported on transfer pricing methods employed in the U.S. and Japan. Of the 133 
firms surveyed in the U.S., 56 percent used cost-based methods - rather than market, 
negotiated, mathematical programming or other noncost-based methods - as their dominant 
transfer pricing mechanisms. A relationship between firm size and transfer pricing method 
chosen was not found. 
Price Waterhouse (1984) surveyed the largest 148 of the Fortune 500 companies. Of the 74 
respondent firms, 51 companies (69 percent) used transfer pricing, with 16 (31 percent) using 
full cost methods and 22 (44 percent) using cost plus methods, adopted either alone or in 
conjunction with a market based technique. Larger firms tended to use what Price Waterhouse 
termed 'value added transfer pricing'. 
Benvignati (1985) used the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) data for 466 manufacturing 
firms in the U.S., organising the sample into 3,186 'lines of business', of which 674 reported 
undertaking foreign transfers. Benvignati investigated whether or not transfer pricing methods 
were associated with firm and, or industry characteristics. Her study found that a firm's 
features were more likely to influence internal pricing decisions than that of the type of 
industry. Of the firm's characteristic variables investigated, advertising intensity, volume of 
foreign transfers, and the number of different countries where firms operated, were found to 
be strongly associated with non-market pricing, while larger MNEs and those with a large 
number of foreign subsidiaries tended toward market-based methods. 
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AI-Eryani et al (1990) surveyed controllers, treasurers, financial vice presidents and vice 
presidents for international operations from 791 Fortune 500 and Fortune Second 500 films. 
They found that legal constraints and finn size were significantly associated with the use of 
market-based transfer pricing strategies of US MNEs. The study also found that large firms 
preferred market-based transfer pricing whilst there was no relationship between perfOlmance 
evaluation and market-based pricing. As for transfer pricing methods used, the research 
showed that the United States-based companies favoured cost-plus and market-based pricing 
that were the methods allowable under Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. 
Academic research has tended to focus on the pricing methods used from a managerial or 
motivational point of view. Surveys for academic purposes are directed at uncovering whether 
market-based, cost-based or negotiated prices are in operation (Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999). 
In contrast to academic research, Ernst and Young in their global survey of activity on 
transfer pricing, interviewed MNEs in 22 countries on the use of legally oriented transfer 
pricing as arm's length pricing methods6. The survey results show that cost plus and 
comparable uncontrolled price dominate the legally oriented pricing methods used by firms 
for all types of transaction. 
Comparable uncontrolled pricing method uses the market price for transferred goods and 
services and is often thought of as the 'best pricing method' (Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999, 
p.216). In practice, however, it can be extremely difficult to account for all the material 
differences in telms that are present between intergroup and third party transactions 
(Radebaugh and Gray, 1997, Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999). 
The cost plus method involves the costs of manufacturing the product plus a normal profit 
margin that would accrue from the sales of similar products. The cost plus method is 
generally simpler to administer and understand. Furthermore, the data are more readily 
available. The disadvantages are that the system does not create incentives for manufacturing 
companies to reduce costs and that, accordingly, it often reduces the profit margin for the final 
selling firm (Arpan, 1972, Radebaugh and Gray, 1997). 
6 An arm's length price is the price that an unrelated party would have paid under the same circumstances for 
sim ilar products/services (details see Atkinson and Tyrral, 1999, pp. 53). 
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The resale price method is used to determine the transfer price that a controlled sales and 
marketing company, as a distributor, should pay for goods which it sells on to unrelated 
parties; The resale price method works best when the distributor does little to add value to the 
product other than nOlmal sales, marketing and distribution activities. Hence, there is less 
concern with the comparability of products than in comparable uncontrolled pricing method. 
The method is probably most useful where it is applied to marketing operations (OECD, 
1995, Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999). 
The profit split method is based upon the economic notion of joint venture or partnership 
relationship. It divides profits between associated companies according to the relative 
economic value of each firm's contribution to that transaction. The profit split method 
depends on profit comparisons rather than price or transaction comparisons and functional 
analysis (OECD, 1995, Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999). 
Some studies examined the relationship between corporate size and industry on the one hand, 
and transfer price methods used on the other. However, their findings were inconsistent and 
differed regarding the strength of relationship between them. For example, Benvignati (1985), 
Borkowski (1990), and AI-Eryani et al (1990) found that larger firms tended to use market-
based transfer prices, but Arpan (1972) found that larger companies tended to use cost-
oriented transfer pricing system. Tang (1979) and Price Waterhouse (1984) found that there 
was no significant relationship between the size of American companies and the orientation of 
their transfer prices. However, Tang (1979) did find that larger Japanese firms tended to use 
noncost-oriented transfer prices.· 
The findings of previous empirical studies suggest that MNEs do not choose ITP methods 
based on theoretical recommendations, or solely based on their organisational characteristics. 
Instead, it seems that MNEs choose ITP systems that are perceived as optimal for their own 
pat1icular situations (Borkowski, 1990). The contingency theory literature provides possible 
explanations for the divergence of actual methods, in practice, from the theoretically 
recommended methods in the accounting literature. Contingency theory approach may also 
help to explain some inconsistencies in the previous studies. 
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6.4 The Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory originated from Lewin's (1935, cited in Borkowski, 1980, p. 48) field 
theory. As an alternative to Gestalt psychology which emphasises personality, motivation and 
social psychology, field theory stresses on perception, that is, it analyses people's behaviour 
in telms of the field at the time behaviour occurred, with the field defined as the total 
environment which exists for a person at that particular moment. The recognition of varying 
perceptions due to multiple fields led to the development of contingency theory. 
Based on the premise that "there is no universally appropriate accounting system that applies 
equally to all organisations in all circumstances" (Otley 1980, p. 413), contingency theory 
stresses that "management styles and organisational structures are situation specific for 
organisational effectiveness, and that no one universal set of management principles exists. 
Hence, different environments for a task situation necessitate different management practices" 
(Schweikart, 1986, p. 541 cited in Borkowski, 1992, p. 35). Otley (1980, p. 413 further 
concluded that "a contingency theory must identify specific aspects of an accounting system 
which are associated with certain defined circumstances and demonstrate an appropriate 
matching". In the management accounting literature, the contingency theory approach has 
been used in three ways: (1) prior to collecting data, a hypothesis is formulated to assess the 
impact of contingent factors; (2) after the research has been undertaken, contingency theory is 
used to explain the inconsistent or sometimes contradictory results of empirical research, and 
(3) as part of a theoretical formulation (Otley, 1980). 
Eccles (1985, p. 297) argued that "existing theory about transfer pncmg (bears) no 
relationship to the empirical phenomenon" because the theory addresses only specific 
variables rather than the transfer pricing environment as a whole (Borkowski, 1990). Section 
6.2 and 6.3 examined theoretically recommended transfer pricing methods and actual methods 
used in practice. This indicates that firms seem to arbitrarily choose transfer pricing methods, 
despite the guidance provided in the accounting literature. To date, there is no prevailing 
model which explains how these methods are chosen. Also, no "best method" exists that can 
satisfy the needs of all MNEs. 
The features of the main pricing methods are presented as follows: 
Cost-based methods have the advantage that they are simple to use, being based on readily 
available data. They are easy to justify to tax authorities and are easily routinised - features 
which make cost basis a commonly used method. However, a cost basis may not encourage 
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the units which transfer assets to control their costs as actively as they might, thereby 
imposing their inefficiency on the company to which the transfer of assets is made. For 
example, if the transfer price markup is to be 10 percent of cost where the total cost is 100 
then the subsidiary will pay 110. If subsequently the total cost rose to 120, the subsidiary 
would have to pay 132. A subsidiary which, for whatever reason, is tied to dependency on 
continued transactions with the transferring company, is at the mercy of the latter's capability 
and, or willingness to manage its costs. In other words, there is no incentive for the 
transferring firnl to reduce expenditure. Inefficiencies are passed from one company to the 
next. This is then an inequitable method for the transfer of goods between related companies 
(Radebaugh and Gray, 1997, Evans et aI., 1999). 
A market-based transfer pricing system is generally regarded as the most authentic method in 
transfer pricing. By using market prices, the firms concerned are acting almost as though they 
were independent companies. It is easier to defend a company's transfer pricing policy and 
practice on this basis to foreign governments and tax authorities for its reliability as opposed 
to various forms of arbitrary pricing, which inevitably raise the suspicions and possible 
investigations of host country authorities (Radebaugh and Gray, 1997, Evans et aI., 1999). 
However, a market-based system is not always possible. An arm's length market price can be 
established only if identical goods and services are traded among unrelated entities. One 
subsidiary may be the only outlet for the sale of goods of a multinational group, there being 
no buyers outside the multinational company itself. In such a situation, negotiated market/cost 
pricing between the selling and buying companies might be more appropriate (Radebaugh and 
Gray, 1997). 
The results of previous research indicate a void in existing transfer pricing theory and thus 
suggest that a contingency theory approach may be appropriate in explaining the differences 
between management's perceived optimal transfer pricing method and the theoretically 
prescribed method. To date, the major contingent factors identified by research as affecting 
the structure of an organisation's management accounting system are (1) the effect of 
technology; (2) the effect of organisation structure; and (3) the effect of environment (Otley, 
1980). According to contingency theory, managers are exposed to stimuli and information 
from the external environment and from the internal firm/organisation, defined as a field. If 
managers perceive and interpret their fields differently, then approach to decision making, 
such as choosing an ITP method, will differ. In other words, managers choose ITP methods 
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for their companies based on their attention to, and interpretation of, environmental and 
organisational factors. A variable which one manager perceives as important and uses in the 
decision-making process to choose a transfer pricing method may be considered unimpOliant 
by another (Borkowski, 1992). In order to effectively analyse management behaviour in a 
patiicular situation, the variables of potential impOliance in choosing a transfer price in a firm, 
therefore, must be identified, and the perception of their importance assessed. These variables 
will be classified according to two major constructs: external environmental factors and 
internal organisational factors (Borkowski, 1980, 1990). 
6.5 Factors Affecting International Transfer Pricing 
Evidence suggests that obtaining a tax advantage is not the primary reason for ITP abuses in 
some host countries, especially when these particular host countries are developing nations 
(Chan and Chow, 1997a). Non-tax factors probably play an equally important role. These 
non-tax factors, along with tax considerations themselves, are generally grouped together as 
environmental variables in the transfer pricing literature. 
Subsidiaries of an MNE family are geographically distant and operate in different 
jurisdictions and cultural environments. Their overseas operations are subject to the laws and 
regulations of the host countries. Apart from international tax differentials, many other 
environmental factors, both natural and government generated, need to be considered 111 
dealing with problems ofITP in the multinational environment (Leitch and Barrett, 1992). 
If the assumption is made that a parent company sells an intermediate product to its foreign 
subsidiaries, an ITP manoeuvre can take place in its simplest form by overpricing (also called 
overinvoicing or overcharging) or underpricing (also called underinvoicing or undercharging). 
The environmental factors likely to influence the parent company's pricing behaviour may 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
6.5.1 Differences in Income Tax Rates 
The disparity in tax rates across countries creates an incentive for the members of an MNE to 
try to minimise tax liability in the home or host countries, but, in tum, to maximise joint 
profits within the MNE as a whole. For an MNE, this effect can be accomplished by 
artificially shifting taxable income from affiliates incorporated in high-tax jurisdictions to 
subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions to reduce total worldwide tax payments (Grubert and 
Mutti, 1991, Ghosh and Crain, 1993, Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). 
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6.5.2 Rates of Customs Duties 
In industrialised nations, import and export duties serve as protective devices rather than 
distributive objectives. By contrast, governments of some developing countries still regard 
import duties as a major source of revenue, and as such are substantially higher than those in 
developed countries. Tariffs can be reduced by making transfers at an arbitrarily low price. If 
goods are transferred at low prices, the resulting tariffs they attract will be lower. In this case, 
there must be some inducement for the parent company to underprice goods by using ITP 
means to gain fiscal savings at the expense of the host governmene (Lecraw, 1985, Belkaoui, 
1991, Lin et al., 1993, Chan and Chow, 1997a, Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998) . 
6.5.3 Currency Fluctuation and Inflation 
A country with balance of payments problems may decide to devalue its national currency. 
Currency devaluation often results in an inflationary environment. The devaluation could 
substantially reduce corporate profits of foreign subsidiaries if they did not take measures to 
hedge against the devaluation. Furthermore, inflation in a host country weakens the 
purchasing power of any return on investment. By setting a high transfer price on goods 
imported into the host country, the parent company may transfer funds out of this uncertain 
environment (Plasschaert, 1985, Lin et al., 1993). 
6.5.4 Comply with Tax Law and Regulations 
Complying with tax law and government regulations play a significant role in formulating 
multinational transfer prices. A number of legal-related variables such as compliance with tax 
and custom regulations, anti-dumping and antitrust legislation and financial reporting rules of 
the host countries are important factors in multinational transfer pricing decisions. Such 
governmental counter-measures may constrain ITP manipulation behaviour of MNEs and, 
therefore, force MNEs to use market prices for internal dealings (Wu and Sharp, 1979, AI-
Eryani et al., 1990). 
6.5.5 Restrictions on Repatriation of Income 
Limits imposed on the remittance of profits create a strong inducement for an MNE to use the 
ITP mechanism. In some less developed countries, notably those that have balance of 
payment problems, governments introduce a number of regulations or policies to restrict 
7 Low import duties are often associated with high income tax rates. The savings resulting from underinvoicing 
for customs purposes may be more than offset by higher income tax liabilities because income taxes are, 
typically, a larger imposition than tariffs (Plasschaert, 1979). 
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profit and capital repatriations. When foreign subsidiaries face the difficulties of profit 
remittance to their home countries, they could plan to circumvent such constraints through the 
use of ITP. In this case, the parent company artificially raises its transfer prices to the foreign 
subsidiary to avoid the restrictions on the remittances. In addition, ITP could be used to 
minimise withholding tax on dividends. By atiificially setting high prices for transferred-in 
goods, cash is funnelled to the parent in the form of the sales price. This leaves less profit in 
the subsidiary's country, reducing the need to transfer funds to the parent through dividends 
(Plasschaert, 1985, Belkaoui, 1991, Lin et aI., 1993). 
6.5.6 Competitive Position of Subsidiary 
MNEs enter foreign markets through establishing subsidiaries or branches. Frequently, ITP is 
used as an instrument to facilitate the penetration of an overseas subsidiary into foreign 
markets, or to support an infant subsidiary abroad in its competition with local firms. In these 
cases, the parent company may temporarily underprice to provide support to its subsidiaries in 
another country where they want to increase market share (Plasschaert, 1979, Belkaoui, 
1991). 
6.5.7 Overall Profit to MNE 
The maximisation of global profit is a major objective for many MNEs. This objective can be 
partly facilitated through the shifting of income from higher to lower tax jurisdictions to 
minimise total tax liabilities and thereby maximise after-tax profits. However, while aiming to 
achieve this objective, MNEs also have to deal with other competing, and sometimes, directly 
conflicting factors such as governmental regulations, currency fluctuations, foreign exchange 
control and risks (Wu and Sharp, 1979, Chan and Chow, 1997). Their ability to balance these 
competing factors in their choice of ITP method is crucial and is likely to determine the level 
of overall profits that the MNEs is able to achieve. 
6.5.8 Import Restrictions 
When goods are transferred by a parent company to a subsidiary in a foreign country, the host 
government may impose anti-dumping charges on a multinational company, to protect its 
home industries against the dumping of excess production. Dumping is recognised as taking 
place when goods are sold at a lower price for expOli than for domestic consumption in the 
exporting country under comparable conditions of sale. In this case the parent company may 
overprice to escape charges of anti-dumping practices (Belkaoui, 1991). 
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6.5.9 Foreign Currency Exchange Controls 
In some developing nations, foreign exchange is stringently controlled by govenunents, local 
currencies being only semi-convertible. In this situation, an MNE would face problems in 
converting profits into its own currency. Moreover, when the local currency unit is devalued, 
exchange losses may rise. MNEs usually view exchange uncertainties as their most pervasive 
risk in foreign environments. In most cases, they tend to hedge this risk through changes in 
the timing of the payments, that is, by leading (anticipatory moves) or lagging (delaying 
techniques). For example, a buyer company may pay a selling company before the due date 
(leading) and thereby anticipate a fall in the currency of the buyer's country. In this way, an 
exchange loss may be averted. ITP practices can enhance the exchange-risk-avoiding 
strategies of leading or lagging. An MNE faced with exchange rate risks can use a higher 
transfer price to move funds out of countries with weak currencies into countries with strong 
ones. In this partiCUlar case, the perceived exchange loss risk may induce the parent company 
to transfer profits out of the host country through overpricing (Plasschaert, 1985, Lin et aI., 
1993). 
6.5.10 Good Relations with Host Government 
The practice of shifting profits out of host countries by MNEs has attracted considerable 
attention from govenunents. Concerned about the potential adverse effects on their 
economies, tax authorities of host countries have adopted an increasingly aggressive attitude 
towards the audit of multinational transfer pricing practices, and have placed some economic 
restrictions on their operations. These actions can impose intense pressures upon MNEs. If 
disputes with local tax officials arise, they can be costly to foreign subsidiaries. MNEs have 
realised the importance of maintaining positive relations with host governments. In justifying 
their ITP methods, some subsidiaries are even willing to sacrifice some profits by ITP in order 
to satisfy the host governments. Their end purpose is to forestall any government action that 
may have potential detrimental effects (Plasschaert, 1979). 
6.5.11 Pricing Controls of Host Government 
In some industries, host govenunents control prices in relation to the costs and profits of 
foreign companies, requiring that all price increases be approved by government agencies in 
advance. High import prices can reduce profits and increase costs, thereby justifying 
increased prices. In this case, the parent company may allow its subsidiaries to record a low 
profit by overpricing in order to resist the introduction of price controls (Lecraw, 1985). 
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6.5.12 Existence of Local Partner 
MNEs sometimes conduct business m foreign environments through joint ventures for 
political, legal or cultural reasons. For example, some host governments in developing 
countries require that a local firm must be a partner in the business venture of a foreign-based 
company. MNEs themselves may use the strategy of local presence for bridging cultural gaps 
and fostering local cultural understanding. In most arrangements of this type, both sides -
foreign investors (subsidiaries) and local partners in joint ventures - share the profits, costs 
and management. This means that a foreign investor has only a part profit share, the rest being 
distributed to the local partner who has legal rights to a fair share of the profit of the business. 
To restrict the profits accruing to the partner, and in return, to increase its own interest and 
benefit, the parent company has a high motivation to shift profits out of the joint venture by 
ITP (Lecraw, 1985, Lin et aI., 1993, Iqbal et aI., 1997). 
6.5.13 Performance Evaluation 
Corporate policies regarding ITP for tax purposes may be in conflict with the performance 
evaluation of subsidiary managers. For example, arbitrarily shifting profits from a foreign 
subsidiary through ITP while enhancing overall corporate profitability may affect the 
measured profitability of that subsidiary and, in tum, distort the performance of the 
subsidiary's managers. Performance is frequently evaluated on the basis of net income and 
return on investment. To resolve this conflict, MNEs often separate managerial performance 
from that of the subsidiary's performance. Another alternative is to set a 'fair' transfer price -
an intercompany price that managers can perceive as equity in performance evaluation, based 
on an externally established market price (Yunker, 1983, Hansen and Mowen, 2000). 
6.5.14 Political and Social Pressure 
Political and social pressures as determinants appear to be related to some of the 
aforementioned factors. For example, volatile fluctuations in the value of currencies, high 
inflation rates, foreign exchange controls, and restrictions on remittances increase financial 
risks and uncertainty. A lack of political stability increases the political risk for foreign 
subsidiaries. In some developing countries the threat of expropriation and nationalisation is 
often a concern for MNEs. All these factors impose political and social pressures on business 
operations. Consequently, MNEs tend to transfer profits out of the host country to avoid these 
risks (Plasschaert, 1985, Belkaoui, 1991, Lin et aI., 1993). In some countries, labour unions 
exercise a significant influence. They may impose pressures on subsidiaries to raise wages for 
local workers in response to high operating earnings of the foreign firms. In order to nullify 
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claims for higher wages by local labour unions, the parent company may overprice to reduce 
the profits of its subsidiaries (Belkaoui, 1991). In conclusion, a host country that tries to 
control or limit the activities of MNEs may be considered an undesirable place for retaining 
high profits with safety in the long-term. The multinational subsidiaries may use ITP 
mechanism to send profits abroad (Lall, 1973). 
6.5.15 Royalty Restrictions 
MNEs are organisations which have one or more subsidiaries operating in foreign markets. 
Internal prices are often set for the transfer of intangibles - such as research and development 
costs and intellectual property - from the foreign subsidiaries to their parent companies. Many 
host governments have imposed some restrictions on the amount of royalty or management 
fees the local subsidiaries can pay to their parent companies abroad. To avoid governmental 
royalty restrictions and, in tum, to facilitate the local subsidiary to remit more profits 
overseas, the parent company may set a high transfer price on goods sold to the subsidiary 
(Robbins and Stobaugh, 1973). 
6.5.16 Maintenance of Cash Flows 
An MNE may prefer to accumulate its funds to address the business' current financial needs, 
to ensure there is sufficient cash reserves to meet financial commitment and thus ensure 
financial stability. ITP could then be employed as a means of shifting funds into a subsidiary 
at that location. For example, a local manager may feel pressured to maintain adequate cash 
flows in the subsidiary. ITP manipulation may be caused by the cash flow requirements of the 
company (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the analysis of the 16 environmental factors as governing 
multinational transfer pricing decisions. This list of environmental factors is not exhaustive. 
The concepts of environmental factors (also called variables, determinants), transfer pricing 
motivations, and transfer pricing objectives are often used interchangeably in the ITP 
literature (Chan and Chow, 1997a). 
The foregoing analysis of the multinational transfer pricing motives adopts the deductive line 
of reasoning, that is, a parent company would have the incentive to shift profits out of the host 
country through the overpricing of its exports, if one or more particular condition applies, 
when all other factors remained the same. These conditions include when: 
• the effective tax rate in the host country is higher than in the home country; 
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• the exchange rates of the two currencies fluctuate frequently; 
• the host govenunent imposes restrictions. on foreign investors who are repatriating their 
share of profits to their home country; 
• the political and social situation is unceliain in the host country. 
An MNE would take advantage of market imperfections by using ITP as expressed in the 
words of one American MNE manager: 
If I cannot get my dividends out, and my royalty rate is fixed, and I want to remit more 
money, then I do this by an uplift [sic] of my transfer prices on commodities (Robbins and 
Stobaugh, 1973,p. 91) 
At first glance, the foregoing explanation is straightforward and intuitively obvious. And yet 
the deductive line in assessing multinational transfer pricing practice is debatable in the real 
world. Actual conditions are seldom as clear-cut as that shown in Table 6.1. ITP objectives 
are interactive. One motivation may conflict with other inducements during the fonnulation of 
multinational transfer pricing policies. Therefore, it is difficult to manipulate transfer prices to 
achieve all corporate objectives simultaneously. For instance, while overpriced exports reduce 
the taxes on profits in the importing country (the host country), it may enhance the burden of 
import duties of the foreign subsidiary. Another dilemma is that arbitrarily taking out profits 
from the foreign subsidiary for purely tax avoidance purpose may have a distorting effect on 
subsidiary perfOlmance evaluation (Plasschaert, 1979). The pros and cons of any particular 
level of transfer prices must, therefore, be considered. 
The general theoretical analysis of environmental factors affecting ITP is bound to be 
controversial in actual practice. MNEs are exposed to a wide variety of environmental 
conditions that affect their international operations. As the environment in the host country of 
an MNE remains in a state of flux, the transfer pricing objectives and policies must also 
change to adapt to changing environments in foreign countries, since the changing 
environments may affect management's perception of the relative importance of various 
factors of transfer pricing decisions in a foreign country over time (Cunningham, 1978, Tang, 
1993, Lin et aI., 1993, Borkowski, 1996b, Oyelere et aI., 1999). Empirical evidence 
concerning the number of factors considered in transfer pricing decisions and the relative 
importance of various factors in national settings are, therefore, of practical significance. 
59 
.~' 
Table 6.1 
I'"~ r'l 
!;\( 
i ,", 
I, 
I ,: 
1 
1 
Environmental Factors and Their Possible Effect on ITP Decisions 
A ~ ~- - -- - --- ---- - ----r~~~-J ----- -- ---- --- --0---- -Th 11 thefc bsid· 
Environmental Factors Scenarios Action Taken by Parent Company 
Differences in income rates Host country tax is lower Underpricing 
Host country tax is higher Overpricing 
Rates of customs duties High import duties in host country Underpricing 
Currency fluctuation and inflation Devaluation of the foreign currency Overpricing 
Comply with tax law and regulations Fair Pricing 
Restrictions on repatriation of income Overpricing 
competitive position of subsidiary UnderPricing 
Overall profit to MNE Host country tax is lower Underpricing 
Host country tax is higher Overpricing 
Import restrictions Overpricing 
Foreign exchange controls Overpricing 
Good relations with host government Underpricing 
Pricing controls of host government Overpricing 
Existence of a local partner Overpricing 
Performance evaluation Fair Pricing 
Political and social pressures Overpricing 
Royalty restrictions Overpricing 
Maintenance of cash flows Unde1"Qricing __ n ___ 
Source: Adapted from Plasschaert, 1985, p. 265, Chan and Chow, 1997a, p. 1278. 
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6.6 Summary 
Previous studies have provided some insight into ITP practices. Some studies have reported 
on ITP methods according to distinct categories such as full cost, variable cost, market, and 
negotiated, while others have grouped negotiated and market prices together as market-based 
methods. The finding of Emst and Young (2001) was that the cost plus and the comparable 
uncontrolled price dominated the use of arm's length pricing methods by firms for all types of 
transaction. Although economic theory suggests that the marginal cost pricing and 
mathematical programming are the most appropriate policies for many ITP situations, they are 
rarely used in practice (Tang, 1993). 
A joint study by the Business intemational Corporation and Emst and Young (1991, cited in 
Borkowski, 1996b) found that "transfer pricing is a complex function of the regulatory 
environment, organisational structure, corporate strategy, industry type, precedent, and a host 
of other political and economic factors". This broad view of the transfer pricing issue 
confirms contingency theory that transfer prices are chosen by MNEs based on the factors that 
confront their operations rather than on economic or accounting theory (Borkowski, 1980, 
1990). Contingency theory posits that MNEs will choose the optimal transfer price for a given 
situation. In other words, multinational transfer pricing method choices depend on the 
operating environments they involved (Borkowski, 1992, p. 35). 
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Chapter 7 
The Development and Formulation of Testable Hypotheses 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops hypotheses to test possible differences in the rankings of transfer 
pricing methods used, and influential environmental variables bearing on ITP among the 
samples of MNEs operating in the three research settings. To investigate the corporate 
attributes associated with ITP audits in a multivariate setting, a logit model is also developed 
in this chapter. 
7.2 Hypotheses Development and Formulation 
In this study, Dunning's (1980) theory of market imperfections and contingency theory are 
merged to provide a framework. Dunning's (1980) theory explains why MNEs establish cross-
border subsidiaries through FDI. According to Dunning's theory of market imperfections and 
internalisation, MNEs take a number of considerations into account when determining the 
degree of their FDI and international operations. These considerations generally include 
ownership advantages, location advantages and internalisation advantages. MNEs can exploit 
market imperfections to achieve ownership, location and internaisation advantages. 
Furthermore, MNEs can manage transfer pricies according to perspectives on how best to use 
various market imperfections. In the ITP literature, the elements of market imperfections are 
referred to as environmental factors. 
MNEs use a large variety of pricing methods to deal with intercompany transfers across 
international boundaries. Some methods - such as marginal cost, opportunity cost, and 
mathematical programming models - are theoretically effective but are rarely used in practice 
(Tang, 1993). The contingency theory approach presumes that firms choose the ITP systems 
that are perceived as optimal for their particular situation. In other words, each company 
selects a transfer pricing method that offers the best fit for its needs and circumstances 
(Borkowski, 1980; 1990). The contingency theory approach offers a theoretical foundation on 
which to analyse multinational transfer pricing behaviour. 
According to contingency theory, "management styles and organisational stmctures are 
situation specific for organisational effectiveness and ... no one set of universal management 
principles exists. Hence, different environments for a task situation necessitate different 
management practices" (Schweikart, 1986, p. 541 cited in Borkowski, 1992, p. 35). 
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Theoretically, transfer pricing methods used and factors affecting the choice of a transfer 
,pricing method in developing economies should be determined separately from those in 
developed economies. 
New Zealand and Australia, in developing their economies initially from a position heavily 
influenced by their British colonial history, have adopted the norms and practices of a 
European and, particularly, British nature. In many respects, these two nations tend to have 
similar features, which are different from Chinese culture and practices. Both New Zealand 
and Australia have enacted a free market system. Under this system, intellectual property 
rights are protected by laws, foreign currency is fully convertible, and the political situation 
has a relatively predictable, if not certain, quality about it in these two countries, compared to 
China. 
Given the recognised similarities in the New Zealand and Australian political, economic, 
legal, and cultural systems, and their apparent differences from those of China, they might be 
expected to determine the level of similarities and variations between MNEs located in these 
three countries. It is therefore conjectured that multinational transfer pricing practices in New 
Zealand and Australia should be similar as multinationals in these two countries take similar 
environmental factors into consideration, differing however from those of their Chinese 
counterparts. To verify the validity of this conjecture, eight hypotheses are formulated to 
investigate possible differences in the rankings of ITP methods used and the ratings of 
environmental factors affecting ITP in the three countries. For research convenience and 
consistency, all hypotheses are stated in the null form. 
Hypothesis Oa: 
There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in New Zealand, Australia 
and China 
Hypothesis Ob: 
There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in New Zealand and 
Australia 
Hypothesis Oc: 
There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in New Zealand and China 
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Hypothesis Od: 
There are no differences in lTP methods used by multinationals in Australia and China 
Hypothesis Oe: 
There are no differences in the ratings of environmental factors affecting lTP by 
multinationals in New Zealand, Australia and China 
Hypothesis Of: 
There are no differences in the ratings oj environmental factors affecting lTP by 
multinationals in New Zealand and Australia 
Hypothesis Og: 
There are no differences in the ratings of environmental Jactors affecting lTP by 
multinationals in New Zealand and China 
Hypothesis Oh: 
There are no differences in the ratings oj environmental factors affecting lTP by 
multinationals in Australia and China 
Previous studies have suggested that certain types of MNEs are more likely to manipulate 
transfer prices and therefore to be selected for transfer pricing audits by tax authorities. The 
characteristics of companies include industry (Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999), nationality 
(Buckley and Hughes, 2001, Borkowski, 2001), size (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Chan and 
Chow, 1997b, Feresa and Nancy, 2000), volume of interfilm transactions (Jacob, 1996), and 
the types of interfirm transactions (Chan and Chow, 1997b). This study, therefore, was based 
on the expectation that particular attributes of a company are likely to be associated with ITP 
audits by the tax authorities. 
These corporate attributes were expected to include: 
1. The industry of the company. In this study, the industries of companies were re-
categorised into two groups. Manufacturing firms formed one category and the remaining 
companies were combined into another category. The study hypothesised that 
manufacturing companies are more likely to be audited by tax authorities for their transfer 
pricing transactions. , 
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2. The nationality of the company. In this study, the nationalities of companies were re-
categorised into two groups. The Japanese and Hong Kong-based finns fOlmed one 
category and the remaining companies the other. Borkowski (2001), and Buckley and 
Hughes (2001) suggest that Japanese multinationals manipulate transfer pricing to avoid 
tax in the host countries and, therefore, were frequently audited by these countries' tax 
authorities. Given Hong Kong's generous tax system and low income tax rate, Hong 
Kong-based finns may have the incentive to try to minimise tax liability by artificially 
shifting profits from abroad to Hong Kong through transfer pricing mechanisms. As such, 
they would be more likely to be audited by tax authorities. Hence, the study hypothesised 
that Japanese-Hong Kong sourced companies are more likely to be audited by tax 
authorities for transfer pricing transactions. 
3. The size of the company. In this study, the firm's size is measured in tenus of total 
sales/total revenue. The study hypothesised that the large companies are more likely to be 
audited by tax authorities for transfer pricing transactions. 
4. The annual volume of intercompany transactions. In this study, the annual volume of 
intercompany transactions is measured as the percentage value of intercompany 
transactions out of total company transactions. The study hypothesised that companies 
with greater volumes of intercompany transactions are more likely to be audited by tax 
authorities for transfer pricing transactions. 
5. The types of intercompany transactions. In this study, the types of intercompany 
transactions include the payments arising from the transfer of tangible goods, intangibles, 
financing and services. The study hypothesised that companies with certain types of 
intercompany transactions are more likely to be audited by tax authorities for transfer 
pricing transactions. 
Hypothesis Oi is fonnulated for testing as follows: 
Hypothesis Oi: 
There is no relationship between ITP tax audits and MNEs' characteristics such as industry, 
nationality, company size, and the volume and types of intercompany transactions 
65 
. -- -' .- .~--]<-~-- ... -.-- ':.-~ 
'-rJ_ ... "J_';.-",;:"V,:, ..... r-:<_. 
7.3 Regression Model and Measurement of Variables 
, To test Hypothesis Oi in a multivariate setting, a logit model is developed as follows: 
ITPAUDIT 
Where: 
ITPAUDIT 
INDUSTRY 
Po+ P1INDUSTRY + P2NATIONALITY + P3SIZE + P4VOLUME + 
PsTANGIBLE + P6INTANGIBLE + P7FINANCING + Ps SERVICE 
+ P9HOST+8 
= ITP tax audit. The dependent variable assumes the value of 1 if the 
company has been subjected to an ITP audit and 0 if the company has 
not been subjected to an ITP audit yet; 
Industry type. Where a value of 1 is assigned if it is in manufacturing 
and 0 if it is in another industry; 
NATIONALITY= Nationality of companies. Where a value of 1 is assigned if it is Japan 
or Hong Kong and 0 if it is other countries; 
SIZE 
VOLUME 
TANGIBLE 
INTANGIBLE 
Company size. Where a value of 1 is assigned if total sales are less 
than $20 m, 2 if$20 m to $100 m, 3 if$101 m to $200 m, 4 if$201 m 
to $500 m, 5 if $50 1 m to $800 m, and 6 if more than $800 m; 
Volume of intercompany transfers. Where a value of 1 is assigned if 
the volume of intercompany transfers as a proportion of total 
company transfers is less than 5%, 2 if 5% to 20%, 3 if 21 % to 50%, 
4 if 51 % to 70%, 5 if71 % to 85%, and 6 if more than 85; 
The transfer of tangible goods. Where a value of 1 is assigned if 
transfer of tangible goods never happened, 2 if rarely, 3 if often, and 
4 if always; 
The transfer of intangibles. Where a value of 1 is assigned if transfer 
of intangibles never happened, 2 if rarely, 3 if often, and 4 if always; 
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FINANCING 
SERVICE 
HOST 
The transfer of financing. Where a value of 1 is assigned if transfer of 
intangibles never happened, 2 if rarely, 3 if often, and 4 if always; 
= The transfer of services. Where a value of 1 is assigned if transfer of 
intangibles never happened, 2 if rarely, 3 if often, and 4 if always; 
Control variable for host country. Where a value of 1 is assigned if it 
is China and 0 if New Zealand or Australia. 
As the dependent variable in the equation is binomial, the equation is estimated using logistic 
regression. To identify which corporate attributes are being associated with ITP tax audits in 
the multivariate setting, the analysis was conducted in two ways. First, data from the three 
countries were summed up and were, subsequently, used as input to the initiallogit model. To 
control for the potential effects due to the host countries (New Zealand and Australia and 
China), a HOST variable is incorporated in the statistical analysis as a control variable. 
Second, data from each country were used, respectively, as input to a reduced logit model 
(i.e., ignoring the control variable - HOST) to identify corporate attributes associated with tax 
audits in each individual country. 
7.4 Summary 
To investigate possible differences in the rankings of transfer pricing methods used, and 
environmental variables of ITP among the samples of MNEs operating in the three research 
settings, this research has developed eight hypotheses. The literature suggests that a number 
of variables may lead to the potential risk of tax audits. A logit model is built with the ninth 
hypothesis developed which will be tested for support. 
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Chapter 8 
Data Collection and Sampling Methods 
8.1 Introduction 
The results of this study are presented in this thesis using three approaches: 
1. the results of a questionnaire mailed to subsidiaries of MNEs that operate in New 
Zealand, Australia and China; 
2. the findings of interviews with four Chinese tax authorities; and 
3. survey results from canvassed 38 Chinese tax authorities. 
This chapter describes both the quantitative and qualitative approaches used in this study, 
discussing their cOlTesponding strengths and weaknesses and, why and how they were 
employed. This chapter also states how the data were collected and analysed. 
8.2 Study Design 
In contemplating how to collect the data required for a study of ITP involving New Zealand, 
Australia and China, a variety of possibilities were considered. The great distances, the 
disparate languages and the costs that are characteristic of such an undertaking created 
potential difficulties and affected the eventual choice of research methods from the panoply of 
methods potentially available. These consist of various instruments such as self-administered 
questionnaire surveys, personal or telephone interviews, field studies and analysis of archival 
information. There is no one best data collection approach. Each has its strengths and 
weaknesses but must be subjected to a consideration of its suitability as a method of data 
collection, depending on the research objectives and the physical factors involved (Czaja and 
Blair, 1996). 
The primary information about company characteristics, environmental variables and ITP 
methods used by companies were obtained by means of a questionnaire. Chapter 6 has 
examined the various environmental variables that are theoretically likely to determine the 
transfer pricing behaviour of MNEs. Based on previous research and an analysis of business 
environments in the three countries, seventeen environmental variables were selected in 
designing the data collection questionnaire. 
As part of the development of a questionnaire that would prove effective for the purposes of 
the research, a review of existing literature on the subject of ITP was first calTied out, with 
particular attention being paid to various management and tax issues relating to MNEs, such 
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as Issues concerning the administration of an ITP system, ITP method choices, and 
. environmental variables affecting ITP. 
Another information source for the research was archival data. This included finding transfer 
pricing regulations, guidelines or policies issued by govenunent agencies in the three 
countries. 
The primary data were gathered by two methods - direct from the subsidiary companies of 
multinationals in the three countries by questionnaire, from personal contact and in-depth 
interviews with Chinese tax officials. 
8.2.1 The Questionnaire Survey 
8.2.1.1 Choice of Research Instrument and Approach 
The choice of an appropriate research method (i.e., self-administered questionnaire survey, 
personal or telephone interviews, field studies and analysis of archival infonnation) depends 
on three conditions: (1) the type of the research questions; (2) the control an investigator has 
over actual behaviour events; and (3) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
phenomena (Yin, 1992, p.1). One major objective of this study is to investigate environmental 
differences and their impact on multinational transfer pricing decisions in the three countries. 
To provide an explanation regarding environmental factors influencing a transfer pricing 
method choice, a number of alternative research strategies and techniques had been carefully 
considered before a questionnaire survey approach was chosen. 
Certain approaches, such as archival and analytic research, were dismissed because they are 
inappropriate to the research objective of explaining multinational transfer pricing choice, 
which focuses on contemporary phenomena. While a case study via personal interviews 
would provide in-depth details on the environmental variables, conclusions drawn from case 
study findings of a limited number of firms, would not allow for the extension of any findings 
to other finns not participating in the study. Hence, a case study approach is likely to lack 
external validity on its own. Given the multi-location nature of this study, field studies were 
also considered inappropriate from a cost and practicality perspectives. Generalising findings 
beyond participating firms is always a major problem when case and field studies approaches 
are used for studies of this nature (Yin, 1992; Cooper and Schindler, 1998). 
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Drury (1997, p. 103) states that "surveys [of management accounting practice] provided a 
useful overview of current practices." Compared with other approaches, the obvious 
advantages of the mailing questionnaire survey include: 
1. it is the least expensive of the survey methods; 
2. they have been successful in the collection of data about sensitive topic; 
3. they encourage respondents to consult records rather than to answer from memory; 
and 
4. a mail survey is more likely to include the population of interest. Depending on the 
nature of the survey instrument, data from mail surveys can be used for statistical 
analysis, and results from sample findings can be generalised to a population (Czaja 
and Blair, 1996). 
Given these distinct advantages of the mailing survey approach, the reason for adopting the 
survey instrument (questionnaire) as the primary strategy to obtain data in this particular 
research can be explained as follows: 
First, mailing can enable the researcher to contact the financial controllers (i.e., the 
respondents) of each organisation who might otherwise be inaccessible in other ways. Second, 
foreign subsidiaries are geographically dispersed in the three research settings - New Zealand, 
Australia and China. Compared with other ways such as personal interviews, questionnaire 
surveys enable the sampling of a large population at lower cost. Third, this research required, 
in part, the "views, judgements or appraisals of other persons with respect to a research 
problem" (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p. 23). Since opinion research has the ability to 
"capture people's impressions about themselves, their environments, and their response to 
changing conditions" (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p. 23), the self-administered survey was 
highly appropriate to this research. Finally, data collected by a questionnaire survey can be 
analysed using rigorous statistical techniques to draw inferences on the extent of 
environmental factors affecting transfer pricing (Tang, 1993). 
Notwithstanding these obvious advantages, a survey instrument (questionnaire) does have 
limitations. The disadvantages of the questionnaire survey instrument are: 
1. Low response rate. Response bias is potentially greater in mail surveys than with other 
methods because respondents can more easily ignore mail questionnaires than a polite, 
but persistent, interviewer. Response bias occurs when one subgroup is more or less 
likely to cooperate than another. (Czaja and Blair, 1996). 
2. No assurance that questions were understood. A mail questionnaire must be 
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completely self-explanatory because the investigator is not present and cannot assist 
the respondent if ,something is confusing or complex. For this reason, the 
questionnaire cannot be very long, nor can it look complex or difficult to complete 
(Czaja and Blair, 1996). 
3. No assurance that the addressee was the respondent (Czaja and Blair, 1996). 
The typical disadvantage of the low response rate, along with the potential of response bias 
inherent in mail survey were carefully considered by the researcher and were addressed 
through various well-established techniques, including postage-paid self-addressed return 
envelopes, a short questionnaire, follow-up reminders, and non-response bias tests. 
8.2.1.2 Justifying the Selection of the Respondent Companies for Questionnaire Survey 
This is concerned with the impact of environmental factors according to a company's 
geographic area of operation, not the location of the firm's headquarters or home country. 
This approach to a study of ITP is based on the notion that MNEs generally adapt their 
foreign operations to local cultural environments rather than the firm's home country 
environment. Hence, the target research units of study for this thesis are foreign-owned 
subsidiaries operating in New Zealand, Australia and China. 
Previous studies of ITP practices have predominantly focused on the headquarters - the parent 
companies of MNEs. The rationale for their selection is based upon the notion that managers 
of the subsidiaries do not have freedom to take independent decision, and as a consequence, 
corporate policies, in general, and transfer pricing policies, in particular, are frequently set by 
the headquarters of the parent companies located in the home countries. Hence, the reasoning 
has prevailed that data about corporate transfer pricing practices should be taken directly from 
the headquarters of the parent unit (Yunker, 1983; Hansen and Mowen, 2000). However, it 
can be argued that corporate headquarters may not have all the facts about their foreign 
subsidiaries and that the information which they do have may be inaccurate, while managers 
of their subsidiaries may have different or more realistic perspectives of what business 
operations are intended to achieve and how they might be affected by the environmental 
factors prevailing in a host country (Arpan, 1972). 
As their overseas operations expand, large MNEs often become highly decentralised. A 
highly decentralised structure forces decision-making down to the local managers on the basis 
that they have more accurate information than their parent companies about the external 
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environments relevant to the local daily operations and management oftheir companies (Chan 
and Chow, 1998). For example, phillips, the global electronics company with its headqumters 
in the Netherlands, delegates marketing and pricing decisions for its television business in the 
Indian and Singaporean markets to its local managers (Homgren et aI., 1999). Members of 
senior management are obliged to use divisional reports to make policy decisions. In the 
establishment of corporate policies, such as transfer pricing policies, a parent company often 
relies heavily on the information that is, typically, supplied, and periodically reported, by the 
subsidiary firms that are located in the local markets of their host countries. 
Most importantly, an effective host country corporate policy should provide for timely 
responses to local economic conditions and changes in the political climate. Foreign 
managers of subsidiaries have keener perceptions and specialised knowledge of local 
environments than higher-level management. They are more familiar with the local political, 
economic and, cultural environment (Hansen and Mowen, 2000). In conclusion, while 
investigations calTied out on the headquarters of parent units in their home countries are valid 
in reflecting the impact of home country environmental variables on ITP policies, they fail to 
address the foreign host country environmental aspects of ITP, which should be registered by 
the subsidiaries located in overseas countries. Therefore, the study focuses on subsidiaries 
located in three host countries in the Asia-Pacific region - New Zealand, Australia and 
China. 
8.2.2 Developing the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections as follows: 
1) Section one: General information on the company and its related party transactions. 
2) Section two: ITP methods used. 
3) Section three: Environmental variables affecting ITP. 
The contents of sections two and three took account of and adopted or adapted items from 
previous studies, such as AI-Eryani et ai. (1990), Tang (1993), Borkowski (1997a, 1997b) and 
Chan and Chow (1998). The survey used closed structured questions in most cases. A five-
point Likert-like scale was used by the responding firms to rate the impOltance of each 
environmental variable. Copies ofthe questionnaires are presented in Appendices. 
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Section one of the questionnaire was designed to collect general information on the company 
. and related party transactions - its type of industry, nationality, size, and the volume, nature 
and frequency of intercompany international transfers, ITP auditing, and company status 
regarding APAs8• These are detailed as follows: 
Industry Classification The first question in the survey sought to establish the industry type 
of the respondent companies. The analysis later in this study will examine whether certain 
types of industry are more prone to investigation by host country tax authorities than others . 
The industry classes were based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial 
Classification (ANZSIC) codes with minor modification. There were initially 10 categories 
corresponding to the ANZSIC codes, with the respondents fitting into eight of the categories. 
The industry information of Chinese firms was obtained from archival sources. 
Nationality of Companies The second question sought to establish the nationality of the 
respondent companies. The analysis later in this study will examine whether certain 
companies are investigated more thoroughly by the host country tax authorities, on account of 
the nationality of their foreign parent companies, than others. For the New Zealand sample, 
information about nationality of companies was collected by asking where their ultimate 
parent companies were located. The same information was obtained from archival sources in 
the cases of the Australian and Chinese firms . 
Company Size The third question asked about the size of the respondent companies. The 
analysis in later chapters will examine whether larger companies tend to be subject to more 
attention by the tax authorities of host countries than smaller companies. The firm's size is 
measured in terms of total sales/total revenue. Information on the size of Australian and 
Chinese companies was obtained from archival data. 
Types of Transaction The fourth question addressed the nature and frequency of 
intercompany international transfers, which generally can involve up to four types of 
transaction. These are the payments arising from the transfer of tangible goods, intangibles, 
financing and services. 
8 An APA is a negotiated agreement between tax authorities and the taxpayer. It establishes a transfer pricing 
method to be applied to the allocation of income among associated units of an enterprise in advance of a 
transaction. One way for an MNE to reduce exposure to transfer pricing investigations is to establish an APA 
with tax authorities. 
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The respondents were asked to rank the frequency of the four types of intercompany transfers 
of their companies on a Likeli-like scale, assessed as being either 'always', 'often', 
'sometimes', 'rarely', or 'never'. The analysis in a later chapter will examine whether celiain 
types of intercompany transfers will attract more attention by the tax authorities in host 
countries than others. 
The Volume of Intercompany Transactions The fifth question asked the respondents to 
estimate the percentage value of intercompany transfers - the transfers of tangible goods, 
intangibles, financing and services involved in either New Zealand, Australia or China, as the 
case might be - out of total sales transactions for the entire company in 2002 (i.e., a 
company's worldwide transactions together with related or unrelated parties). The analysis in 
a later chapter will examine whether companies with greater volumes of intercompany 
transactions will be subject to greater attention by host country tax authorities than those with 
low volumes. 
International Transfer Pricing Tax Auditing The sixth question asked whether or not the 
respondent firms have been the subject of an ITP audit since 1998. The data gathered for this 
variable will be used to examine the relationship between a firm's tax auditing status and its 
type of industry, country of origin, and the volume, nature and frequency of intercompany 
transfers. 
Advance Pricing Agreements The seventh question therefore asked the respondents to 
indicate their status regarding AP As with local tax authorities. The data obtained for this 
variable will be used to examine the extent of use of APAs by MNEs in the three countries. 
International Transfer Pricing Methods Used Section two of the questionnaire dealt with 
ITP methods used by the respondent firms. This section contained two questions, numbers 
eight and nine. Question eight asked for the actual ITP methods used by the respondents from 
the point of view of managerial preference, while question nine related to the use of the 
legally oriented transfer pricing methods. 
Environmental Variables of International Transfer Pricing Section three of the 
questionnaire contained the final question which focused on the 17 environmental variables 
that could be held to influence the ITP method choices of MNEs. Most of the environmental 
variables listed in the questionnaire were identified and selected from extant literature, as 
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reviewed in chapter 6. A few modifications to the wording of some of the variables were 
, made as follows: 
1. This research differentiated from previous studies by focusing on ITP practices of foreign 
subsidiaries in three Asia-Pacific countries. The maximisation of global profit of a 
multinational group is the major objective ofMNEs. This objective may conflict with that 
of the corporate profit of the subsidiary and perfOlmance evaluation of subsidiary 
managers. The initial variable - 'overall profit to MNE' - indicated in chapter 6, was 
therefore replaced by two variables, 'overall profit to multinational group' and 'corporate 
profit of the subsidiary', in this study. 
2. At the time of the research, the price level in the three Asia-Pacific countries was stable, 
and their inflation was low. For this reason, the initial variable - 'currency fluctuation and 
inflation' - indicated in chapter 6, was not regarded as a major issue in transfer pricing in 
the research setting and, therefore, this variable was ignored in this study. 
3. The variable - 'tax authority transfer pricing audits' which previously had not been used, 
except by Borkowski (1997a, 1997b, 2001), was included in the questionnaire to test 
whether or not tax auditing is an important factor affecting multinational transfer pricing 
decisions. The 17 environmental variables used are shown, with their origins, in Table 
8.1. 
The development of the questionnaire consisted of drafting, pretesting and pilot testing it. In 
its draft form, containing previously identified ITP methods and environmental variables, it 
was checked by a manager and a Chinese member of staff of a New Zealand Company with 
long experience in both New Zealand and Chinese markets9. Contacts were also made with 
one tax consultant of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand, two staff 
members of an international firm of consultant accountants located in the U.S. and New 
Zealand, and two staff members of international professional services firms located in New 
Zealand and the U.K. Their comments and suggestions were incorporated into a revised 
questionnaire for a pilot test. Finally, the survey was approved both the Lincoln University 
Human Ethics Committee and the thesis supervisors prior to distribution. 
9 I wish to thank Dr. Alan Paisey for helping me to gain access to the site. 
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Table 8.1 
Environmental Variables Used in the Questionnaire and Their Sources 
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Variables Reference 
V AR 01 Differences in Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1982), Al-Eryani et al. (1990), Tang (1993), 
income tax rates Borkowski (1997a), Chan and Chow (1998) 
V AR 02 Rates of customs Tang (1981), Tang (1982), Rushinek and Rushinek (1988), Tang (1993), Chan 
duties and Chow (1998) 
V AR 03 Tax authority Borkowski (1997a, 1997b, 2001) 
transfer pricing audits 
VAR 04 Comply with tax Wu and Sharp (1979), Rushinek and Rushinek (1988), Al-Eryani et al (1990), 
law and regulations Chan and Chow (1998) 
V AR 05 Restrictions on Tang and Chan (1979), Al-Eryani et al (1990), Tang (1993), Borkowski 
repatriation of income (1997a), Chan and Chow (1998), Oyelere et al (1999) 
V AR 06 Competitive Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1981), Tang (1982), Tang (1993), Chan and 
position of the subsidiary Chow (1998) 
V AR 07 Overall profit to Tang and Chan (1979), Wu and Sharp (1979), Tang (1982), Yunker (1983), Al-
multinational group Eryani et al (1990), Tang (1993) 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of Oyelere et al (1999) 
the subsidiary 
V AR 09 Import restrictions Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1982), Rushinek and Rushinek (1988) 
VAR 10 Foreign currency Al-Eryani et al (1990), Chan and Chow (1998) 
exchange controls 
V AR 11 Good relations with Tang (1982), Rushinek and Rushinek (1988), Chan and Chow (1998) 
host government 
VAR 12 Price controls of Al-Eryani et al (1990), Chan and Chow (1998) 
host government 
V AR 13 Existence of local Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1982), Rushinek and Rushinek (1988), Chan and 
partner Chow (1998) 
V AR 14 Performance Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1982), Yunker (1983), Rushinek and Rushinek 
evaluation (1988), Chan and Chow (1998), Oyelere et al (1999) 
V AR 15 Political and social Al-Eryani et al (1990), Chan and Chow (1998) 
pressure 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions Tang (1982), Rushinek and Rushinek (1988), Chan and Chow (1998) 
V AR 17 Maintenance of Tang (1982), Oyelere et al (1999) 
cashflows 
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The questiomlaire was pilot tested in late 2002 by 30 financial controllers of subsidiaries 
. located in New Zealand and Australia, and 70 financial controllers of subsidiaries located in 
China. Based upon their responses, some modifications were made to the original 
questionnaire. 
International research frequently requires translation of survey instruments into a foreign 
language to ensure that recipients get an accurate understanding of the contents. To ensure 
that the final contents and the telminology of the questionnaire were appropriate for the 
Chinese context, it was important to invite a Chinese financial controller to evaluate the newly 
revised questionnaire. Contact for this purpose was made with such a person in a 
multinational company in Beijing. The controller made some constructive additional 
suggestions to improve the questionnaire'S applicability in China. Both the questionnaire and 
the letter of request to be used in China were checked by this financial controller in the 
Chinese language. Although the Chinese version of the questionnaire was essentially identical 
to that used in New Zealand and Australia, some non-substantive variations were necessary to 
eliminate cultural, institutional, and language differences. 
8.3 Sample Selection Method 
The sampling frame for the research of ITP in Chinese companies was the list of the foreign-
controlled subsidiaries in China as contained in the publication Foreign Investment 
Companies Operating in China (GuangDong World Publishing, 2001) - a directory listing 
22,000 MNEs located in China, together with another directory entitled The World Top 500 
Multinational Companies Operating in China (People's Publisher of ShangDong, 2003). In 
addition to the sample assembled from these two directories, additional 50 firms were 
randomly selected from a network of 1,000 multinationals located in Beijing, as listed by a 
consultancy firm in that city. The final Chinese sample, therefore, contained 500 companies lO. 
10 In recognition of China's entrenched cultural disposition for secrecy and reluctance to communicate 
information about a firm's activities to outsiders, it was anticipated at the start of the research that eliciting any 
responses from Chinese respondents would be difficult when compared with the approaches made to Australian 
and New Zealand firms. Hence, it was necessary to despatch an inordinate number of questionnaires in the hope 
of receiving enough returns to fulfil the research objectives. 
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For the survey of New Zealand and Australian practices, a total of 300 New Zealand and 250 
. Australian subsidiaries of foreign multinationals were randomly drawn from Dun and 
Bradstreet's Business Who's Who (2001, 2002, and 2003). To ensure the accuracy of the 
addresses of the intended respondents, the data from the directories were carefully cross 
checked on the Intemet database. The website addresses used were: 
http://www.yellowpages.co.nz and http://www.yellowpages.com.au for New Zealand and 
Australian respondents, respectively. 
8.4 Data Collection 
8.4.1 Administration of the Surveys 
A number of limitations are associated with survey-based research. They include sample bias, 
position bias, and respondent subjectivity. Nonetheless, one major weakness of a survey study 
is possible nonresponse error (Cooper and Schindler, 1998). To improve mail response, 
Cooper and Schindler (1998) suggested the following ten concurrent techniques, a variation of 
which was used in this research: (1) reduce questionnaire length; (2) survey sponsorship; (3) 
retum envelopes; (4) postage; (5) personalisation; (6) cover letters; (7) anonymity; (8) size, 
reproduction and colour; (9) incentives; and (10) deadline dates. 
Cooper and Schindler (1998, p. 306) state that "short questionnaires should obtain higher 
response rates than longer questionnaires". This survey questionnaire was designed to a short 
questionnaire while still enabling all relevant information to be collected. Cooper and 
Schindler (1998) also suggest that an "official" or "respected" sponsorship increases response 
rates. In the enclosed cover letter of the questionnaire survey, the present investigation made 
reference to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ) that provided 
scholarship for this research. 
Cooper and Schindler (1998) note that the inclusion of a stamped, retum envelope encourages 
response. In this survey, self-addressed postage-paid envelopes were provided. 
Personalisation of the mailing has no distinct advantage in terms of improved response rates 
(Cooper and Schindler, 1998). Since the names of individuals were not available, the surveys 
were addressed, commonly, to the financial controller in each company, who is most likely to 
be directly involved with ITP policy and administration (Borkowski, 1990). 
Although "the influence of the cover letter on response rates has received almost no 
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experimental attention", Cooper and Schindler (1998, p. 306) believe that "it is the most 
. logical vehicle for persuading individuals to respond". The surveys had a covering letter, 
which stressed the impOliance of the study, the confidentiality of the responses provided by 
each company, the support of the ICANZ, and when to return the questionnaire. Copies of the 
cover letters are shown in the Appendices. 
Experimental evidence shows that the promise of anonymity, questionnaire size, method of 
reproduction and colour have no significant effect on response rates (Cooper and Schindler, 
1998). The survey design allowed the completed questionnaire to be anonymously returned to 
the present investigator from New Zealand respondents - even the present investigator could 
not know who completed a particular questionnaire. Confidentiality was promised to the 
Chinese and Australian respondents while an ID number was fixed on the returned envelopes 
of these companies for the purpose of collecting archival data on each respondent firm. 
Cooper and Schindler (1998, p. 306) believe that "a monetary incentive sent with the 
questionnaire is very effective in increasing response rates". Surveys of professionals might 
need to include a larger amount (Rodeghier, 1996). Given the limitation of the research 
budget and the position of the potential respondents (i.e., financial controllers), the surveys 
did not offer any monetary incentives, rather, a nonmonetary incentive - providing a copy of 
the summary results from the survey (if requested) - was offered (Rodeghier, 1996). 
Cooper and Schindler (1998) note that deadline dates do not increase response rates, but they 
do serve to accelerate the rate of questionnaire return (Cooper and Schindler, 1998). In view 
of this, deadline dates were provided at every stage of the survey process. 
Cooper and Schindler (1998) also stress the importance of follow-ups to improve response 
rates. Two follow-ups were made to New Zealand and Australian respondents, while for the 
Chinese respondents a third follow-up was considered necessary. 
8.4.2 Questionnaire Distribution and Response Rates 
The final version of the questionnaire was sent by post with its explanatory letter, addressed 
to the financial controllers of 300 subsidiaries operating in New Zealand, 250 subsidiaries 
operating in Australia and 500 subsidiaries operating in China. The sample was reduced to 
274 New Zealand firms, 216 Australian firms and 435 Chinese firms, respectively, by the 125 
envelopes that were returned unopened as a result of incorrect addresses or changes of 
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personal employment without forwarding addresses. To secure a viable number of returns, it 
was necessary to send two follow-up letters to New Zealand and Australian companies and 
three to Chinese firms. The last two follow-ups to Chinese firms are combined into one in the 
analysis of these survey data as presented in Table 8.2, Panel A. 
The first follow-up was sent three or four weeks after the initial mail out. It consisted of a 
short cover letter, a copy of the questionnaire, and a return stamped envelope. The response 
rates, which resulted from the first follow-up, are shown in Panel B of Table 8.2. The second 
follow-up was sent three weeks after the first follow-up. It included a copy of the 
questionnaire, a return stamped envelope, and a non-response sheet to be completed by the 
respondents if they do not intend to respond. The latter requested for the reasons why the 
recipients do not want to complete the questionnaire. As a result of the second follow-up, 
additional completed questionnaires were received. The response rates from the second 
follow-up are shown in Panel C of Table 8.2 . 
The overall response rates for the survey are shown in Panel D of Table 8.2. The overall 
response rates for the New Zealand and Australian respondents are 52.55 percent and 41.20 
percent, respectively. These response rates are reasonably good, considering the highly 
sensitive nature of the information requested in the survey. The overall response rates for 
Chinese companies (20 percent) are relatively lower than those for New Zealand and 
Australian companies. The possible reason for the lower response rates from China may be 
explained as follows. First, in Chinese society, which has a culture of conservatism and 
secrecy over matters concerning the holding, retention and disclosure of infOlmation, people 
are afraid to disclose corporate data to third parties. Western society has grown used to 
surveys but Chinese people are far from being accustomed to such practices. Second, Chinese 
businesses are traditionally secretive about their finances. The topic of ITP is not only 
extremely sensitive but very secretive. The data on ITP are related to the commercial 
information of companies. Many Chinese companies may prohibit their employees from 
disclosing any sensitive information to an outside party. Third, the first mailing was sent out 
at the time that year-end financial reports were being prepared. It was close to the Chinese 
New Year festivities. Some Chinese financial controllers may have been too busy to reply. 
Fourth, and most importantly, the lower response rate of Chinese companies may have been 
significantly influenced by the recent investigations by Chinese tax authorities and customs 
houses into the ITP practices of MNEs. There has been a national campaign against tax 
evaSIOn. 
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Table 8.2 
Questionnaire Response Rates from the Mailings 
Panel A: First Mailing Survey Total % of sample Unusable % of sample Usable % of sample Non-response 
mailed responses res~onses 11 responses sheet 
New Zealand 274 42 15.33 2 0.73 40 14.60 ---
Australia 216 29 13.43 1 0.46 28 12.96 ---
China 435 27 6.21 7 1.61 20 4.60 ---
Subtotal 925 98 10.59 10 1.08 88 9.51 ---
Panel B: Second Mailing 
New Zealand 274 23 8.39 2 0.73 21 7.67 ---
Australia 216 23 10.65 1 0.46 22 10.19 ---
China 435 22 5.06 5 1.15 17 3.91 ---
Subtotal 925 68 7.35 8 0.86 60 6.49 
Panel C: Third Mailing 
New Zealand 274 77 28.10 0 0 14 5.11 63 
Australia 216 37 17.13 0 0 10 4.63 27 
China 435 38 8.74 0 0 10 2.30 28 
Subtotal 925 152 16.43 0 0 34 3.68 118 
Panel D: Overall Response Rates 
New Zealand 274 144 52.55 4 1.46 77 28.10 63 
Australia 216 89 41.20 2 0.93 60 27.77 27 
China 435 87 20.00 12 2.76 47 10.81 28 
_T~tal_ 925 320 34.59 18 1.95 184 19.89 118 
,-- -- -- - - -, -- -- - - - ,- --- - -
11 Either partially completed or not completed. 
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The SAT has tightened regulations seeking to prevent foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) 
. from escaping taxes by passing liabilities between related business units. Shortly before this 
study was undertaken, the Chinese tax authorities and customs offices were investigating tax 
avoidance through multinational transfer pricing abuses and alleged dumping violations by 
intercompany underpricing transfers. 
Though the response rate from China is lower than desired, the number of usable responses, 
however, is still large enough for an analysis of Chinese ITP practices. Moreover, when early 
respondents were compared to late respondents no significant differences were found between 
the early and late respondents. 
Previous studies had experienced differing return rates for mailed questionnaire, which range 
from 14 percent to 56 percent. Yunker's (1993, p. 56) study had a low response rate of 14.5 
percent (i.e., 52 firms responding from the sample of 358). She justified the low response rate 
by argues that "while a higher response rate would certainly have been desirable, the fact is 
that response rates below that achieved in this project are often observed in published 
research. Moreover, the sample size in absolute number is quite substantiaL .. (and) is 
sufficiently large for purpose of statistical inference". Similar argument can be made for the 
current study. 
All in all, the overall usable response rate for the three countries combined is 19.89 percent 
(28.10 percent of New Zealand respondents, 27.77 percent of Australian respondents, and 
10.81 percent of Chinese respondents). The combined overall rate is not as would have been 
desirable yet it is comparable to prior studies. Divulging information on corporate internal 
pricing policies is an extremely sensitive issue that most companies will like to avoid, 
especially multinational firms, which is also compounded in the case of China due to cultural 
factors. 
The sensitivity of internal pricing information has been heightened by national govemment 
agencies and the growing concerns and interests in the subject matter by groups inside and 
outside a firm, namely, stockholders, investors, competitors, local partners, and pressure 
groups. Corporate managers are not inclined to share information about their pricing policy 
with outsiders. It could not be expected, therefore, that firms would welcome and freely 
respond to an outsider's request of such information. However, a satisfactory number of 
respondents eventually cooperated with the present investigator because of the importance of 
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ITP, their expectation of the results of the research, and the pledge of confidentiality. 
One hundred and twenty-four respondents to the survey declined to participate in the study 
Majority of these respondents (52) said that they do not engage in international transfers or 
that the volume of their international transfers is insignificant. Other reasons cited for 
declining participation in the study include company policy (25), time constraint (22), and 
confidentiality issues (16). 
8.4.3 Non-Response Bias 
A chi-square test of homogeneity was calTied out as a test for non-response bias on the rate of 
return data of the New Zealand, Australian and Chinese respondents. This test seeks to 
ascertain whether or not there are significant differences between early and later respondents 
in each country on the basis of type of industry and the ITP methods used. Early responses in 
each country were compared with late responses of the same country on those bases. Early 
respondents are those who responded to the first wave of questionnaire mail outs, while those 
who responded to the second and third waves of mail outs are proxies for late respondents 
(Wallace and Mellor, 1988). The results of the test are shown in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 
A Chi-Square Test on the Questionnaire Non-Response Rate 
New Zealand Australia China 
Basis Chi-square Df Significance Chi-square Df Significance Chi-square Df Significance 
Industry 5.686 7 0.577 7.586 7 0,371 4.293 3 0.232 
Methods 0.251 1 0.616 0,361 1 0.545 1,349 1 0.246 
Df: Degree of freedom. 
The test results shown in Table 8.3 indicate that there were no significant differences between 
early and late respondents in each country. These results diminish the possibility of the 
presence of significant non-response bias. 
8.5 The Qualitative Evidence 
In this study, there are four research objectives. While a questionnaire survey was designed to 
address the first three objectives, an interview method was considered the appropriate 
technique to address the final research objective, that is, to investigate the ITP monitoring 
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system in China. 
Previous literature argues that developing countries are more vulnerable to transfer pricing 
manipulations than developed countries. This could be due to the fact that developing 
countries generally lack institutional frameworks, information, expertise, and staff to tackle 
the ITP issue (Brean, 1979, Lall, 1979, Plasschaet, 1985, Rahman and Scapens, 1986). While 
the a priori proposition is, perhaps, self-evident, it is not necessarily true and even if available 
cannot be statistically tested. Hence, the use of a survey instrument (questionnaire) was 
considered inappropriate. China is a latecomer to the ITP arena. Compared to transfer pricing 
auditing systems of developed economies, it is considered rudimentary in China. The 
investigation of the ITP audit practices in China - the world's largest developing country -
through interview the Chinese tax officials would provide enhanced evidence to support this 
proposition, or may lead to reconsideration and modification of this argument. This further 
justifies the selection of the interview approach. To obtain the data needed for this part of the 
research, in-depth personal interviews with officials of the four state tax authorities in China 
were undertaken. They took place in two contrasting city venues - one, a major coastal city, 
the other, a medium-sized inland provincial capital in a different part of China. 
The first of these cities is a popular destination for foreign investment and has a municipal 
state tax authority with a sound tax auditing system to prevent its tax base being eroded. In the 
second city foreign investments are much less in evidence. The tax authorities in inland 
China, in general, and in this city, in particular, are relatively ineffective. These two cities 
may be considered as representing the developed and developing parts of China. Data about 
tax authority transfer pricing auditing from these two areas may be taken as representing the 
range of practices of ITP auditing in China. 
8.5.1 Gaining Access to the Inland City State Tax Bureaux 
When endeavouring to undertake personal interviews, one must obtaining commitment from 
the organisation to participate in the study over a period of time. Under the habitual practices 
of Chinese culture it is difficult for an outsider to be allowed to interview someone directly 
who holds any office in government. Furthermore, since the data on ITP auditing issues are 
related to the commercial information of companies, and tax officers are prohibited by law 
from disclosing any sensitive information obtained from audited companies to a third party. 
But even if China has opened its doors to the outside world, most Chinese people - especially 
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government officers - remam sceptical regarding the intentions of foreigners, including 
. overseas Chinese, Who are collecting data from China. Zhu (1997) found that the most typical 
concern of Chinese respondents is that of disclosure of their views owing to past political 
purges when people had suffered as a result of revealing their views. 
For the above reasons, it would normally be almost impossible to have direct access to any 
tax officer in China. This applies literally in the physical sense as well as at the interpersonal 
level. On one occasion an attempt was made to enter the inland city tax authority's building. 
The guard on duty denied entry, and remained adamant in spite of all the explanations put to 
him. To achieve the goal of obtaining personal interviews, it seemed that the only way was to 
find an intermediary to facilitate access to the Chinese tax authorities. 
In the inland city, a tax officer of the city tax authority was contacted privately, in order to 
explain the nature and specific objectives of the academic research involved. Once these 
matters were understood, this officer agreed to a visit to her office by the researcher with a 
view to being able to speak with other officers who were working in the field of ITP auditing. 
An introduction to the chief tax officer of the inland city tax authority followed. This officer 
supplied a general overview of the province's ITP auditing policy and practice. Another tax 
officer who was responsible for auditing ITP cases, provided detailed information about 
auditing practice and the current concerns the authorities had about it. In response to careful 
questioning, this officer answered such questions as to how effectively the inland city transfer 
pricing auditing system worked and how the inland city tax authority administered transfer 
pricing tax audits. Another tax officer could not be personally contacted but agreed to respond 
to a written version of the interview questionnaire - a contract that was duly fulfilled. 
8.5.2 Gaining Access to the Major Coastal City State Tax Bureaux 
In the major coastal city, the assistance of a person, who happened to know three tax officers 
at a district tax authority, was solicited. On being acquainted with the purpose of the research, 
the person invited the tax officers for the interview. The researcher started by introducing the 
purpose of the survey, authenticating his claims with proof of his status and commitment as a 
PhD student, and offering a description of his study areas. Then the researcher explained the 
nature of the academic research in detail and guaranteed the confidentiality of the information 
the interviewee would disclose. These efforts alleviated concerns about the potential misuse 
of survey data. Each interviewee answered questions one by one in terms of the unstructured 
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interview questions. When their answers raised a fmiher question, the researcher asked the 
interviewees to clarify their answers more fully. The interview was calTied out in a friendly 
manner and the researcher was careful not to influence the interviewees' responses by giving 
the researcher's own opinions or by prompting. 
Richardson, Dohrenwend and Klein (1965) noted that the use of a tape recorder to record 
interviews could influence respondents' answers so, to hold these interviews in an 
unrestrained and open way, it was decided not to use tape recordings in China. It took one and 
a half hours to finish the interview with these three tax officers. 
Another tax officer, as a specialist of many years experience in the ITP tax auditing field, was 
also interviewed. With an explanation of the purpose of the study and a guarantee that all the 
data supplied would only be used for research, the interviewee answered all the questions in 
detail about ITP auditing issues. 
8.5.3 Collecting and Assessing the Evidence 
The interviews were recorded in note form in Chinese and were later transcribed into English 
form to facilitate an analysis of the data. During this portion of the investigation, intensive 
inquiries were made into the following four main questions. 
1) What is the present extent of transfer pricing abuse in China? 
2) How do the Chinese tax authorities administer a transfer pricing tax audit? 
7) How adequate are the existing Chinese ITP control measures? 
8) What factors constrain the ITP monitoring system in China? 
9) How can the Chinese ITP monitoring system be improved? 
As a questionnaire survey 01' structured interview is nanow in scope and content, this part of 
the investigation was designed as semi -structured interviews that would enable complex 
information to be collected. All interviews were conducted in an infOlmal way, so that 
advantage could be taken of new areas that were uncovered as the interviews progressed. A 
common concern about qualitative method is that they provide little basis for scientific 
generalisation (Yin, 1992, p.l 0). To overcome this flaw and to permit the generalisation of the 
main findings from these interviews, a survey was initiated, based on part of the findings from 
these interviews, together with items from an archival analysis. They were edited into a short 
semi-structured questionnaire and sent to 80 Chinese tax authorities covering most of the 
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provincial and main city jurisdictions in China, supported by a letter of explanation about the 
research, and with a promise of research findings feed-back. 
Twenty-four questionnaires were returned after the first mailing. Four weeks later, a follow-
up letter with a copy of the questionnaire were sent to non-respondents. This resulted in the 
return of another 14 completed questionnaires. Overall, thirty-eight usable questionnaires 
were obtained, representing a response rate of 48 percent. 
A t-test was carried out to assess any possible non-response bias. Early responses were 
compared with late responses about their concerns over ITP abuses by MNEs through their 
related-party transactions. The results indicated that there were no significant differences 
between the two groups. 
8.6 Data Analysis 
Since the design of research includes both quantitative and qualitative data, procedures 
relevant for the analysis of both types of data are used. While the questionnaire survey data 
are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis, data gathered from answers in interviews to 
open-ended questions are edited and organised into interview reports. 
8.6.1 Quantitative Analysis 
All data have been coded and analysed using computer programs available in the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). A number of statistical methods were used to analyse 
the data collected through the questionnaire survey. They are briefly described as follows: 
1. Ratios, means and standard deviations were calculated to describe the nature and 
characteristics of variables; 
2. An R-type, varimax-rotated, common factor analysis was performed using programs 
available in the SPSS; 
3. Given the categorical or ordinal nature of the data collected in this research, non-
parametric statistics were used as the main test technique for the analyses. They 
include The Chi-Square and the Spearman's Correlation Coefficient Tests, the Mann-
Whitney U Test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, and the logistic regression analysis. 
8.6.2 Qualitative Analysis 
The major source of the qualitative data was the face-to-face interviews with the Chinese tax 
authorities. They involved in-depth discussion on transfer pricing tax audit issues with 
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different respondents to gain a broad perspective on the issues from different points of view . 
. Data analysis consisted of two phases: first, the interview data was summarised based on the 
research objectives and questions. The aim of this phase was to develop a summary repOli 
identifying key information directly relevant to the research questions. This process was 
assisted by using notes and memos, containing all relevant information. The second stage was 
to analyse the data to provide explanation using applicable and valid analytical techniques. 
The objective of this phase is to address the research questions. Maximum care was and is 
being taken to protect the identity of organisations used in these studies and in other 
constituent parts of the research . 
8.7 Summary 
A sound and effective research methodology is the bedrock of every successful research 
study. These need to be carefully designed, based on a theoretically well-grounded framework 
and practically tested for internal and external validity. In this study, the development of the 
questionnaire consisted of drafting, pretesting and pilot testing. Pretest and pilot tests 
produced a survey form that was more usable and reliable. Variables of the questiollilaire 
were drawn from previous studies and, samples were randomly drawn from directories. Data 
from questionnaire were subjected to rigorous statistical analysis. A chi-square test was 
carried out as a test for non-response bias. Results indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the two groups, suggesting that there was no significant non-response 
bias. The objectives of the qualitative study are to describe the Chinese ITP auditing system 
and to illustrate its effectiveness in restricting ITP practices. The analysis has been limited to 
the research questions addressed within this study. Validity of the findings was insured by 
asking respondents to review a draft interview report to correct any misunderstanding or 
inconsistency. 
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Chapter 9 
Survey Results of International Transfer Pricing Methods 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the statistical analysis performed on the data of 
the study. Specifically, this chapter begins by presenting the data about these respondent 
companies, with suitable analyses of the data for its significance for the practice of ITP. This 
is followed by the findings from the survey on transfer pricing methods used by the 
respondent firms in the three countries. 
9.2 Profile of the Respondent Firms 
Table 9.1 presents the industry and sales/revenue classifications of the respondent companies 
in the three countries, listed in descending order by the proportions of New Zealand 
respondents. The size of the participating films is classified according to their total sales/total 
revenue as of 2002. It can be seen, in Panel B of Table 9.1, that the distribution for sales of 
the respondent companies is unevenly divided among the six categories in all three countries. 
9.2.1 Industrial Classification 
As can be seen in Panel A of Table 9.1, a wide range of industries is represented in all three 
countries. In New Zealand, the largest industry of the respondent firms is Wholesale and retail 
trade (44.2 percent). In contrast, in Australia and China Manufacturing is the highest 
proportion of the respondent firms - 41.7 percent in Australia and 53.2 percent in China. 
Between 85.8 percent to 90 percent of the respondent firms, in total, in each of the three 
countries fall into three categories - Wholesale and retail trade, Manufacturing, and Services 
industries. The remaining five industries -Finance and Insurance, Mining, Transport and 
Storage, Construction, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing - altogether account for barely 14.3 
percent of the respondent firms in New Zealand, 10.1 percent of those in Australia and 10.7 
percent of those in China. 
9.2.2 Size of the Respondent Companies 
It can be seen, in Panel B of Table 9.1 that New Zealand companies are, on average, smaller 
than the respondent firms in Australia and China. For example, about 93.6 percent of the New 
Zealand respondents had total sales of $200 million or less. Of these, 46.8 percent of the firms 
reported total sales of under $20 million. In contrast, 83.3 percent of Australian companies, of 
which 40 percent reported total revenue of under $20 million, and 80.9 percent of Chinese 
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films, of which 36.2 percent reported total revenue of under $20 million, are in the same 
category. 
The size of New Zealand films in 2002 is measured in terms of total sales, whereas the size of 
Australian and Chinese companies is measured by total revenue from sales and other sources. 
This difference in approach to the measurements of company size need to be bome in mind 
with respect to the New Zealand firms. 
Table 9.1 
Industrial and Size Classification of Respondent Companies 
New Zealand Australia China 
Panel A: Industry Type # affirms % # affirms % # offirms % 
Wholesale and retail trade 34 44.2 21 35 12 25.5 
Manufacturing 20 26 25 41.7 25 53.2 
Services 12 15.6 8 13.3 5 10.6 
Finance and insurance 7 9.1 1 1.67 0 0 
Mining 1 1.3 1 1.67 0 0 
Transport and storage 1 1.3 0 0 0 0 
Construction 1 1.3 3 5 3 6.4 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 1.3 1 1.67 2 4.3 
Total 77 100* 60 100* 47 100* 
Panel B: Total sales/total revenue 
Less than $20m 36 46.8 24 40 17 36.2 
$20m to $100m 24 31.2 21 35 13 27.7 
$101m to $200m 12 15.6 5 8.3 8 17 
$201m to $500m 2 2.6 4 6.7 3 6.4 
$501m to $800m 1 1.3 1 1.7 5 10.6 
More than $800m 2 2.6 5 8.3 1 2.1 
Total 77 100* 60 100* 47 100* 
Note: * Percentage totals are rounded. 
All values are stated in New Zealand dollars; the Australian and Chinese data were 
converted from the Australian dollar and the Chinese Yuan, respectively. Currency 
conversion rates used as at September 2003, New Zealand $l=Australia $0.8778 and 
Chinese Yuan 4.9478. 
9.2.3 The Nationality of the Respondent Companies 
The home countries of the respondent subsidiary companies are shown in Table 9.2. A wide 
range of nations are involved for all three countries. In the case of New Zealand, subsidiaries 
of the U.S., Australian and Japanese parent companies make up the largest group (71.5 
percent). In Australia, subsidiaries of the U.S., Japanese and the U.K. parent companies make 
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up the largest group (66.6 percent), while in China, subsidiaries of Hong Kong, the U.S., 
,Japanese and Taiwanese parent companies make up the largest group (61.7 percent). 
The home countries of the respondent companies are the major trading partners of each of the 
three countries. Table 9.3 shows the nationalities of the Chinese respondent firms and the top 
fifteen sources of FDI in China. There is a consistency between the national distribution of the 
sources of FDI in China and the home country of the respondent companies. The sources of 
FDI in New Zealand and Australia are predominantly from OECD countries. All the New 
Zealand and Australian sample finns are owned by parent companies in these industrialised 
nations, except for one Australian subsidiary that is controlled by a Korean parent company. 
Table 9.2 
The Home Countries of the Respondent Subsidiary Companies 
New Zealand Australia China 
Home country # affirms % # offirms % # offinlls % 
USA 21 27.3 17 28.3 8 17 
Australia 20 26.0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 14 18.2 14 23.3 6 12.8 
UK 6 7.8 9 15.0 2 4.3 
Switzerland 4 5.2 1 1.67 0 0 
Germany 3 3.9 6 10 1 2.1 
Canada 2 2.6 1 1.7 0 0 
France 2 2.6 2 3.3 3 6.4 
Sweden 2 2.6 1 1.7 1 2.1 
Finland 1 1.3 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 1 1.3 1 1.7 0 0 
Ireland 1 1.3 1 1.7 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 4 6.7 1 2.1 
New Zealand 0 0 1 1.7 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 1 1.7 0 0 
Ita!y_ 0 0 0 0 1 2.1 
Korea 0 0 1 1.7 3 6.4 
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 10 21.3 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 5 10.6 
Virgin islands 0 0 0 0 1 2.1 
Macao 0 0 0 0 1 2.1 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 3 6.4 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 1 2.1 
Total 77 100* 60 100* 47 100* 
Note: * Percentages may not add up to totals because of round mg. 
9.2.4 Volume, Nature and Frequency of Intra-company International Transactions 
To determine the importance of intercompany international transfers to the respondent 
companies, each respondent was asked to estimate the levels of their particular subsidiary's 
intercompany transfers that cross international boundaries, as a percentage of the company's 
total transfers - total company transfers mean a company's worldwide transactions with 
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related or unrelated parties, both domestic and international. The results are shown in Table 
9.4. 
Table 9.3 
The Nationality of Respondent Companies and Top 15 Sources ofFDls in China 
Nationality of Percentage Top 15 Percentage 
respondent firms Country/Region * 
Hong Kong 21.3 Hong Kong 45.7 
United States 17.0 United States 8.9 
Japan 12.8 Japan 8.1 
Taiwan 10.6 Taiwan 7.4 
Virgin Islands 2.l Virgin Islands 5.4 
Singapore 6.4 Singapore 4.8 
Korea 6.4 Korea 3.4 
UK 4.3 UK 2.4 
Germany 2.1 Germany. 1.8 
France 6.4 France 1.2 
Macao 2.1 Macao 1.1 
Netherlands 2.l Netherlands 1.0 
Sweden 2.1 Cayman Islands 0.9 
Italy 2.1 Canada 0.8 
Thailand 2.1 Malaysia 0.6 
Others 6.6 
Total 100 Total 100** 
Note: 1) Shaded items are the countries not represented in the two categones. 2) Percentages may not add up to 
totals because of rounding. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China's website. The website address is 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn 
On average, the Chinese respondents engaged in a relatively wider range of related party 
transactions with overseas associates than their New Zealand and Australian counterparts. 
However, the results also reveal that nearly a third of New Zealand respondents - 26 or 35.1 
percent - and Australian respondents - 19 or 31.7 percent are heavily engaged in 
intercompany international transfers with a volume of more than 85 percent, while only a 
small proportion of Chinese respondents - three or 6.4 percent - fall into the same category. 
Given the mixed information revealed, it cannot be concluded that Chinese companies are 
more/less heavily engaged in international intercompany transfers than the New Zealand and 
Australian respondents in the sample. The respondents were further asked to indicate the 
nature and frequency of their international transfers with their foreign associates. The 
responses are shown in Table 9.5. It can be seen that there is a similar ranking of response for 
all three countries. The transfer of tangible goods is the most common business activity for 
multinational intercompany transfers in the three countries. The transfer of service is the 
second most common activity, while the transfer of financing is the third. The least common 
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business activity in the three countries is the transfer of intangibles. Additionally, it can be 
. observed that the Chinese firms are relatively more heavily engaged in intercompany 
international transfers of financing and intangibles than companies in New Zealand and 
Australia. 
Table 9.4 
Intercompany Transfers as a Proportion of Total Company Transfers in 2002 
New Zealand Australia 
The volumes of transfers # offilms % # of firms % 
Less than 5% 22 29.7 10 16.7 
6% to 20% 7 9.5 12 20 
21% to 50% 7 9.5 8 13.3 
51%to 70% 5 6.8 6 10 
71%to 85% 7 9.5 5 8.3 
More than 85 26 35.1 19 31.7 
Total 74* 100** 60 100** 
. . 
Note: * Three compames failed to supply mfonnatlOn on theIr mter-company transfers . 
** Percentages did not add up to 100 due to rounding error. 
Table 9.5 
China 
# offirms 
9 
12 
13 
6 
4 
3 
47 
The Frequency of the Different Types of Intercompany Transfers 
New Zealand Australia China 
Type of transaction Mean SD Mean SD Mean 
Tangible goods 3.95 1.34 4.28 1.106 3.86 
Services 3.18 1.39 2.94 1.28 3.14 
Financing 2.37 1.23 2.55 1.316 2.76 
Intangibles 1.98 1.19 1.89 1.23 2.38 
% 
19.1 
25.5 
27.7 
12.8 
8.5 
6.4 
100** 
SD 
1.15 
1.23 
1.39 
1.32 
Note: A number of compames declIned to provIde mformatlon on the percentages of mtercompany transfers on 
intangibles. 
The profiles of the respondent companies are featured and elaborated upon this section. Data 
on major characteristics such as industry types, sales/total revenue, nationality, and the 
volume, nature and frequency of intercompany transactions of the respondent companies are 
presented. The sample firms represented a large variety of industries. A number of the 
respondent firms reported having a significant amount of intercompany transfers crossing 
international boundaries. Therefore, ITP may be an important issue for those companies. The 
rest of this chapter reports on transfer pricing methods used by multinational subsidiaries 
operating in the three countries. 
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9.3 International Transfer Pricing Methods 
9.3.1 Numbers of International Transfer Pricing Methods Used 
Panel A of Table 9.6 shows the number of transfer pricing methods used by the respondent 
firms. About 58.1 percent and 55.2 percent of New Zealand and Australian respondent 
companies, respectively, used one pricing method, and those remaining (41.9 percent in New 
Zealand and 44.8 percent in Australia) used more than one pricing method in each country. In 
China, only 18.2 percent of respondents used one method, while 47.7 percent of Chinese 
firms used three methods. Noticeably, one New Zealand subsidiary in the Wholesale and 
retail trade industry used seven pricing methods. 
9.3.2 Market-Based Versus Nonmarket-Based ITP Methods Used 
Panel B of Table 9.6 was prepared (in descending order) using the propOliions of New 
Zealand firms (giving the number and percentage of the respondent companies) that are using 
nonmarket versus market-based methods for ITP. Note that, with regard to the negotiated 
method, there is no consistent conclusion. AI-Eryani et al (1990) and Tang (1993) treated 
negotiated pricing as a nonmarket-based method but others grouped negotiated and markets 
together, as market-based methods (Chan and Chow, 2001). In this research, negotiation 
pricing approaches such as negotiation based on costs, negotiation based on method market 
price and unrestricted negotiations were classified in the market-based method group. 
9.3.2.1 International Transfer Pricing Methods Used by New Zealand Companies 
Panel B of Table 9.6 shows that 56.8 percent of the New Zealand respondent firms use 
nonmarket-based methods and 43.2 percent use market-based methods for all groups. In terms 
of percentage, it appears that the New Zealand firms tend to use nonmarket-oriented transfer 
prices. As for the use of individual transfer pricing methods, 'full plus fixed profit' (21, 28.4 
percent) is most widely used by the respondent companies. Following, in descending order of 
frequency of use, are 'negotiation based on costs' (9, 12.2 percent), 'full actual cost' (9, 12.2 
percent), 'adjusted market price' (7, 9.5 percent), 'negotiation based on market prices' (7, 9.5 
percent), 'full standard cost' (6, 8.1 percent), 'full market price' (6, 8.1 percent), 'variable 
plus fixed contribution' (4, 5.4 percent), 'umestricted negotiations' (3,4.1 percent), 'variable 
actual cost' (2, 2.7 percent). The 'variable standard cost' is not used by companies in the 
sample. 
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9.3.2.2 International Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Australian Companies 
Panel B of Table 9.6 shows that 61 percent of the Australian firms use norunarket-based 
methods and 39 percent use market-based methods for the combined groups. Similar to their 
New Zealand counterparts, the Australian firms tend to use norunarket-oriented transfer 
prices. As for the used of individual transfer pricing methods, 'full plus fixed profit' (19, 32.3 
percent) is most widely used by the respondent companies. This is followed, in descending 
order of usage frequency, by 'negotiation based on market prices' (13,22 percent), 'full actual 
cost' (6, 10.2 percent), 'full standard cost' (5, 8.5 percent), 'variable plus fixed contribution' 
(4, 6.8 percent), 'adjusted market price' (4, 6.8 percent), 'full market price' (3, 5.1 percent), 
'negotiation based on costs' (3, 5.1 percent), 'variable actual cost' (2,3.4 percent). 'Variable 
standard cost' and 'unrestricted negotiations' are not used by companies in the sample. 
Table 9.6 
ITP Methods Used by the Respondent Companies 
New Zealand Australia China 
Panel A: Number of methods used # of firms % # offirms % # of firms % 
One 43 58.l 32 55.2 8 18.2 
Two 21 28.4 19 32.8 7 15.9 
Three 5 6.8 6 10.3 21 47.7 
Four 3 4.l 1 1.7 5 11.4 
Five 1 1.4 0 0 2 4.5 
Six 0 0 0 0 1 2.3 
Seven 1 1.4 0 0 0 0 
Total 74 100* 58 100* 44 100* 
Panel B: Pricing Methods 
Nonmarket-Based Methods 
Full~lus fixed profit 21 28.4 19 32.2 3 6.8 
Full actual cost 9 12.2 6 10.2 7 15.9 
Full standard cost 6 8.l 5 8.5 1 2.3 
Variable plus fixed contribution 4 5.4 4 6.8 3 6.8 
Variable actual cost 2 2.7 2 3.4 0 0 
Variable standard cost 0 0 0 0 1 2.3 
Subtotal for nonmarket-based methods 42 56.8 36 61.0 15 34.1 
Market-Based Methods 
Negotiation based on costs 9 12.2 3 5.l 8 18.2 
Adjusted market price 7 9.5 4 6.8 6 13.6 
Negotiation based on market price 7 9.5 13 22 7 15.9 
Full market price 6 8.l 3 5.l 8 18.2 
Unrestricted negotiations 3 4.l 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal for market-based methods 32 43.2 23 39 29 65.9 
Total- all methods 74* 100** 59* 100** 44* 100** 
Note: *Three New Zealand firms, one Australian firm and three Chmese firms failed to supply information on 
their transfer pricing methods used. 
** Percentages may not add up to totals because of rounding. 
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9.3.2.3 International Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Chinese Companies 
. Panel B of Table 9.6 shows that 34.1 percent of the Chinese films use nonmarket-based 
methods and 65.9 percent use market-based methods for the combined groups. Compared 
with their New Zealand and Australian counterparts, Chinese companies tend to use market-
oriented methods. As for the use of the individual pricing methods, 'full market price' (8, 18.2 
percent) and 'negotiation based on costs' (8, 18.2 percent) are most commonly used by 
respondent companies. Following, in descending order of frequency of use, are 'full actual 
cost' (7, 15.9 percent), 'negotiation based on market prices' (7, 15.9 percent), 'adjusted 
market price' (6, 13.6 percent), 'full plus fixed profit' (3, 6.8 percent), 'variable plus fixed 
contribution' (3, 6.8 percent), 'full standard cost' (1,2.3 percent), and 'variable standard cost' 
(1, 2.3 percent). 'Variable actual cost' and 'unrestricted negotiations' are not used by the 
Chinese respondents in the sample. 
The transfer pricing methods used by the respondent firms have been reported in this section. 
A number of companies used two or more pricing methods, with one New Zealand firm using 
as many as seven pricing methods. Those companies using a variety of pricing methods may 
do so for different types of international dealings (Tang, 1981). In percentage terms, ITP 
methods of the Chinese respondent firms are more market-oriented than their New Zealand 
and Australian counterparts. With regard to the individual transfer pricing methods, 'full plus 
fixed profit' was most widely used by both the New Zealand and Australian respondent 
companies, whereas Chinese firms preferred to use 'full market price' and 'negotiation based 
on costs'. 
The next section reports on a cross-national comparison of transfer pricing methods used by 
the New Zealand, Australian and Chinese respondent companies. In chapter 7, four 
hypotheses were developed for comparing ITP methods used by the respondent firms in the 
three countries. The following section provides descriptive statistics about the relevant survey 
responses and then tests the hypotheses using a variety of statistical techniques. 
9.4 A Cross-National Comparison of International Transfer Pricing Methods Used 
This section presents important findings on the different methods of ITP which are currently 
in use by companies in New Zealand, Australia and China, which are subsidiaries located in 
these three host countries, but are owned by parent companies located in other countries, as 
indicated in Table 9.2. 
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The order of use of each of the 11 possible methods by respondents in each of the three 
. countries is presented in Table 9.6, Panel B. The 11 methods are then classified and re-
analysed in two ways to test for variation in the different classifications. The first of these two 
supplementary analyses classifies the eleven methods as either cost-based methods, market-
based methods or negotiation-based methods. The second way of classifying the eleven 
methods for supplementary analysis is to use only two categories - cost-based methods and 
market-based methods - since the negotiated method is combined identified with the market-
based method. The negotiated method includes negotiation based on costs, negotiation based 
on market price and unrestricted negotiations. In this study, it is re-classified into the market-
based method group for the second of the two supplementary analyses. 
Hypothesis Oa: 
There are no differences in ITP methods used by MNEs in New Zealand, Australia and China 
To test the hypothesis that there are no differences in ITP methods used by MNEs in New 
Zealand, Australia and China, the respondents were asked to state the method most often used 
to price transfers of goods or services with their related parties across international 
boundaries. The responses are shown in Panel B of Table 9.6. The descriptive statistics 
provide preliminary evidence that international transfer pricing methods used by MNEs are 
different in the three countries. The noticeable differences between the three national groups 
were in the pricing methods most commonly used in each of the three countries. For example, 
'full plus fixed profit' was most commonly used by both New Zealand (21,28.4 percent) and 
Australian companies (19, 32.2 percent), while only 3 (6.8 percent) of Chinese firms used 
'full plus fixed profit'. In contrast, 8 (18.2 percent) of Chinese companies used 'full market 
price', while only 6 (8.1 percent) of New Zealand firms and 3 (5.1 percent) of Australian 
companies used that pricing method. 
In Table 9.7, Panel A the 11 individual pricing methods are classified into three method 
groups, that is, cost-based, market-based and negotiation-based. It can be observed that 'cost-
based methods' were predominantly used in New Zealand and Australia, while all three 
method groups (i.e., cost-based methods, market-based methods and negotiation-based 
methods) were evenly used by Chinese companies. The descriptive statistics provide evidence 
that at the aggregated levels ITP methods used by multinationals are different in the three 
countries. 
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Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among the companies of the 
three national groups in choosing ITP methods were significant at the aggregated levels. The 
results in Table 9.7, Panel B show that there is statistically a significant difference in 
responses in respect of ITP methods used at aggregated levels in the three national groups. 
The difference is significant at the 5% level. 
The 11 individual pricing methods were further classified into two groups: nonmarket-based 
and market-based methods. Panel A of Table 9.8 shows that 56.8 percent and 61 percent of 
the New Zealand and Australian respondent firms, respectively, used nonmarket-based 
methods, while only 34.1 percent of Chinese firms used nonmarket-based methods. Compared 
to their New Zealand and Australian counterparts, Chinese companies tended to use market-
based methods. The descriptive statistics provide support that, at the market-based versus 
nonmarket-based levels, ITP methods used by multinationals are different in the three 
countries. 
Table 9.7 
A Comparison of Classified Methods Used by New Zealand, Australian and Chinese Companies 
- Descriptive statistics 
New Zealand Australia China 
Panel A: Pricing Methods # offinns % # offinns % # offirms % 
Cost-Based Methods 42 56.8 36 61.0 15 
Market-Based Methods 13 17.6 7 11.9 14 
Negotiation-Based Methods 19 25.7 16 27.1 15 
Total- all methods 74 100 59 100 44 
Panel B: A Chi-square test of 
Classified Methods Used 
Chi-Squared value Degree of freedom Significance. (2-tailed) 
10.042** 4 .040 
Note: **Slgmficant at the 5% level. 
Table 9.8 
A Comparison of Market-Based and Nonmarket-Based Methods Used by 
New Zealand, Australian and Chinese Companies - Descriptive Statistics 
New Zealand Australia China 
Panel A: Pricing Methods # offinns % # offinns % # offirms 
Nonmarket-Based Methods 42 56.8 36 61.0 15 
Market-Based Methods 32 43.2 23 39.0 29 
Total- all methods 74 100 59 100 44 
Panel B: A Chi-Square Test 
of Classified Methods Used 
Chi-Squared value Degree of freedom Significance. (2-tailed) N 
8.234** 2 0.016 177 
Note: **Slgmficant at the 5% level 
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100 
N 
177 
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34.1 
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Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among the companies of the 
. three national groups in choosing ITP methods were significant for market-based versus 
nonmat'ket-based levels. The results in Table 9.8, Panel B show that there is a statistically 
significant difference at the 5% level, in responses in respect of ITP methods used in the three 
national groups. 
The results in Table 9.7 and 9.8 provide evidence that there are statistically significant 
differences in ITP methods used across the three country groups at both individual and 
aggregated levels. Therefore, the hypothesis of no differences in ITP methods used by 
multinationals in New Zealand, Australia and China can be rejected. 
Hypothesis Ob: 
There are no differences in ITP methods used by MNEs in New Zealand and Australia 
In comparing the ITP methods used by companies in New Zealand and Australia it was 
expected a priori that there would be no differences between them. Panel B of Table 9.6 
contrasts transfer pricing methods used by the New Zealand and Australian firms. The 
descriptive statistics provide indications that there are few differences in the ITP methods 
used by multinationals in the two countries. 'Full plus fixed profit' is the most common 
pricing method used by multinationals in both countries. 'Variable standard cost' is used in 
neither of the two countries. 
Table 9.9 
A Chi-Square Test on Pricing Methods Used by New Zealand and Australian Companies 
Chi-Squared Degree of Significance. (2- N 
value freedom tailed) 
Panel A: Cost-, market- and 0.838 2 0.658 133 
negotiation-based methods 
Panel B: Nonmarket Method and 0.101 1 0.750 133 
Market Method 
In Panel A of Table 9.7, the 11 individual pricing methods are classified into three method 
groups - cost-based, market-based and negotiation-based - with a view to discovering any 
variation in such a basis. However, the descriptive statistics indicate that at the aggregated 
level, the ITP methods used by multinationals, when subject to such a classification, do not 
differ in the two countries. 
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Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among the companies of the 
. two national groups in their choice of ITP methods, on the basis of this classification, were 
significant at the aggregated levels. The results in panel A of Table 9.9 show that there is no 
statistically significant difference in responses in respect of ITP methods used at the 
aggregated levels in the two national groups. 
The 11 individual pncmg methods are further classified into two different groups -
nonmarket-based and market-based methods. The descriptive statistics shown in Panel A of 
Table 9.8 provide support that for the market-based versus nonmarket-based levels the ITP 
methods used by multinationals show a similar pattern in the two countries. 
Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among the companies of the 
two national groups in choosing ITP methods were significant for the market-based versus 
nonmarket- based levels. The results in Panel B of Table 9.9 show that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the responses on ITP methods used in the two national groups. 
The results in Table 9.9 provide evidence that there are no statistically significant differences 
across the two country groups regarding ITP methods used at both individual and aggregated 
levels. Therefore, the expectation of similarities arising from the assumption of common 
cultural factors over the adoption of particular ITP methods used by multinationals in New 
Zealand and Australia has some validity. 
Hypothesis Oc: 
There is no difference in ITP methods used by MNEs in New Zealand and China 
Panel B of Table 9.6 contrasts transfer pricing methods used by New Zealand and Chinese 
firms. The descriptive statistics provide evidence that there are differences in ITP methods 
used by multinationals in the two countries. 
Table 9.10 
A Chi-Square Test on Pricing Methods Used by New Zealand and Chinese Companies 
Chi-Squared Degree of Significance. (2- N 
value freedom tailed) 
Panel A: Cost-, market- and 6.062** 2 0.048 118 
negotiation-based methods 
Panel B: Nonmarket Method and 4.805** 1 0.028 118 
Market Method 
Note: **Slgmficant at the 5% level. 
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In Panel A of Table 9.7, the 11 individual pricing methods are classified into three method 
, groups - cost-based, market-based and negotiation-based. The descriptive statistics provide 
evidence that at the aggregated levels ITP methods used by multinationals are different in the 
two countries. 
Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among companies of the two 
national groups in choosing ITP methods were significant at this aggregated level. The results 
in Table 9.10, Panel A show that there are statistically significant differences with respect of 
the ITP methods used in the two national groups at the aggregated level. 
The 11 individual pncmg methods were further classified into two different groups -
nonmarket-based and market-based methods. The descriptive statistics indicate that for the 
market-based versus nonmarket-based level ITP methods used by multinationals in the two 
countries show differences, as shown in Table 9.8, Panel A. 
Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among companies in the two 
national groups in choosing ITP methods were significant at the market-based versus 
nonmarket-based level. The results in Table 9.10, Panel B show that there are statistically 
significant differences in the responses of companies with respect to the ITP methods used in 
the two national groups. The result is significant at the 5% level. 
The results in Table 9.10 provide evidence that there are statistically significant differences 
across the two country groups with regard to the ITP methods used at both individual and 
aggregated levels. Hence, MNEs located in China use ITP methods that are different from 
those used by MNEs based in New Zealand. 
Hypothesis Od: 
There is no difference in ITP methods used by MNEs in Australia and China 
Panel B of Table 9.6 contrasts transfer pricing methods used by Australian and Chinese firms. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that there is a difference in the ITP methods used by 
multinationals in the two countries. 
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Table 9.11 
A Chi-Square Test on Pricing Methods Used by Australian and Chinese Companies 
Chi-Squared Degree of Significance. (2- N 
value freedom tailed) 
Panel A: Cost-, market- and 9.019** 2 0.011 103 
negotiation-based methods 
Panel B: Nonmarket Method and 6.272** 1 0.012 103 
Market Method 
Note: **Slgmficant at the 5% level. 
In Table 9.7, Panel A, the 11 individual pricing methods are classified into three method 
groups - cost-based, market-based and negotiation-based. The descriptive statistics indicate 
that, at the aggregated level, ITP methods used by multinationals in the two countries may be 
different. 
Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among companies of the two 
national groups in their choice of ITP methods were significant at an aggregated level. The 
results in Table 9.11, Panel A show that there is a statistically significant difference in the ITP 
methods used by respondents in the two national groups. The difference is significant at the 
5% level. 
The 11 individual pricing methods were further classified into a further two groups -
nonmarket-based and market-based methods. The descriptive statistics as shown in Table 9.8, 
Panel A indicate that at the market-based versus nonmarket-based levels, the ITP methods 
used by multinationals in the two countries are different. 
Pearson's chi-square test was used to test whether differences among companies of the two 
national groups in choosing ITP methods were significant at the market-based versus 
nonmarket-based level. The results in Table 9.11, Panel B show that there are statistically 
significant differences with respect to the ITP methods used in the two national groups. 
The results in Table 9.11 provide evidence that there are statistically significant differences 
across the two national groups with regard to the ITP methods used by companies at both the 
individual and aggregated levels. Therefore, an expectation that the cultural contrasts between 
Australia and China might be subordinate to the imperatives of shared commercial interests, 
resulting in no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in Australia and China, can 
be discarded. 
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9.5 Summary 
,This chapter started by describing some essential characteristics of the tlU'ee national groups 
of respondent finTIs and the ITP methods used in each country. This was followed by 
conducting a cross-national comparison of transfer pricing methods used by New Zealand, 
Australian and Chinese respondent companies. Table 9.12 summarises the statistical test 
results. The survey results reveal statistically significant differences between the transfer 
pricing methods used by New Zealand and Australian companies on the one hand, and 
Chinese companies on the other. The next chapter examines policy determinants for the 
choice of multinational transfer pricing methods in the three countries. 
Table 9.12 
Summary of Statistical Results 
Regarding the Methods Used by New Zealand, Australian and Chinese Companies 
Country Cost-Based Methods, Nonmarket-Based Methods 
Market-Based Methods and and Market-Based Methods 
Negotiation Based-Methods 
New Zealand and Australia and China ** ** 
New Zealand and Australia NS NS 
New Zealand and China ** ** 
Australia and China ** ** 
Note: ** Slgmficant at the 5% level. 
NS: Not significant. 
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Chapter 10 
Survey Results of Environmental Factors Affecting International Transfer 
Pricing 
10.1 Introduction 
Chapter 9 reported on the ITP methods used by companies in New Zealand, Australia and 
China. This chapter reports on the environmental factors of ITP in the three countries, and 
includes a comparative study of the environmental factors affecting ITP policies of MNEs, 
with an emphasis on the identification of differences in pricing strategies of the New Zealand 
and Australian respondent companies on one hand, and Chinese respondent firms on the 
other. 
10.2 Environmental Variables of International Transfer Pricing 
Given the wide range of unstable conditions prevailing in the global trading market, it is only 
to be expected that the factors which actually govern the policies adopted about ITP would 
vary. A single, invariably efficacious method of ITP does not exist. If it did, the governments 
of host countries could marshal their defences with greater effectiveness and the whole issue 
ofITP would be less ofa controversial subject and major concern. 
In the studies undertaken for this thesis, therefore, it was expected that variety would prevail, 
but that some trends may be discovered. Hypothetically, and in particular, there was the 
possibility that the determinants of ITP might reveal major variations according to country 
location. 
Therefore, to discover the realities in practice, seventeen environmental variables were 
selected in designing an instrument for data collection. A 5-point scale was used by 
respondent companies to rate the importance of each of these possible determinants of the 
methods adopted for ITP. In this chapter, Table 10.1 shows the relative importance attached 
by the sampled companies, in the three countries, for all these variables. The rankings of 
importance were made according to the mean scores of the variables. The mean for each 
variable was based on a 5-point scale using 1 for extremely important; 2 for very important; 3 
for important; 4 for slightly important and 5 for not important. In using the recode function in 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), the original Likert-like code was reversed. 
That is, on the 5-point scale, a 1 is recoded as a 5, a 2 is recorded as a 4, a 3 as a 3, a 4 as a 2 
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and a 5 as a 1. Thus, the higher the number, the greater the level of their importance. The 
standard deviation of responses is also presented in the Tables, indicating the extent of 
agreement in the rating of individual variables among the respondents. 
A final return of 184 usable responses was achieved from the three countries. Table 10.1 and 
subsequent tables record the assessment of the importance these companies attached to the 17 
environmental variables as determinants of their decisions regarding ITP, together with 
analytical treatments of the results. 
It can be seen that 'comply with tax law and regulations' was perceived by the respondent 
firms as the most important variable in transfer pricing decisions. The low standard deviation 
for this variable indicates that there was relatively significant agreement among respondents 
on the importance of legal considerations. Other variables considered very important included 
'corporate profit of the subsidiary', 'competitive position of the subsidiary' and 'overall profit 
to multinational group'. Eleven variables were considered to be moderately important by the 
respondent firms. They were 'maintenance of cashflows', 'tax authority transfer pricing 
audits', 'performance evaluation', 'differences in income tax rates', 'good relations with host 
government', 'restrictions on repatriation of income', 'rates of customs duties', 'foreign 
Table 10.1 
Environmental Variables Ranked by their Importance by Respondent Companies (n=184) 
Environmental Variables Mean Rank Standard Deviation 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 3.99 1 1.11 
VAR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 3.47 2 1.12 
V AR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 3.46 3 1.28 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 3.25 4 1.23 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cashflows 2.90 5 1.38 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 2.86 6 1.27 
V AR 14 Performance evaluation 2.73 7 1.26 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 2.69 8 1.40 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 2.57 9 1.35 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 2.49 10 1.28 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 2.48 11 1.38 
VAR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 2.34 12 1.33 
V AR ] 3 Existence of local partner 2.30 13 1.33 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 2.23 14 1.27 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government 2.13 15 1.25 
V AR 15 Political and social pressure 2.08 16 1.17 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 2.03 17 1.16 
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Table 10.2 
CorreIa 'lion M'atrix of E nvironmental Variables 
- - -
Yariab l VaL No. 2 3 ,I 5 6 7 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 
YAROI 
YAR02 2 .62 
YAR 03 3 .35 .31 
YAR 04 4 .3 1 .24 A6 
YAR05 5 A7 .53 A2 .::0 
YAR 06 6 .16 .36 .26 .19 .34 
YAR07 7 .36 A4 Al .:'7 A7 A4 
YAR 08 8 .26 A7 .30 .:~7 .29 A7 .51 
YAR09 9 .29 .55 .25 n .57 A) A8 .43 
YAR )0 )0 .37 .57 .24 .n 53 .35 A5 .38 .76 
YAR II I I .35 .52 A2 :18 A9 .51 .52 .44 .55 .53 
YAR )2 12 .35 A4 .34 .n .54 .34 A~ .37 .62 .59 .66 
YAR 13 13 .33 .51 . 16 . 12 .54 AI A6 .34 .58 .57 .55 .53 
YAR 14 14 .27 A9 .35 .3 I A6 .53 A9 .5 .52 .51 .54 A6 .57 
YAR 15 15 .34 A7 A3 :!6 .60 .39 A9 .34 .57 .61 .61 .59 .54 .6 1 
YAR 16 16 .36 A8 .36 .:W .64 .31 .5 J .32 .62 .58 .51 .59 .56 .50 .65 
YAR 17 17 .34 .47 .33 .33 .57 A3 .56 .45 A9 .56 .55 AO .5 ) .60 .54 .57 
-.----
Note: Shaded items highlight those variables that are highly c rrelated, which are statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
currency exchaIlge controls', 'existence of local partner' , ' import restrictions', 'price controls 
o f host government'. Variables \vhich were considered only slightly important included 
'l:olitical and sccial pressure', and ' royalty restric tions'. 
17 
T,) overcome be potential problem of multicoi linearity and to identify a relatively small 
number of underlying dimensions or behaviour traits, an R-type, principal components factor 
analysis that is Jrthogonally rotated based on the Varimax procedure was performed on these 
cbta. Since factor analysis is concerned with re lations amorg observations, it commonly starts 
with a matrix of correlations as its input (Tang, 1982). The cOITelation matrix of 
environmental 'variables in Table 10.2 shows that some ariables are highly correlated . For 
iT stance, Variable 9 il?1port restrictions and Variable 10 foreign Clmency exchange controls 
have a correlation coefficient of 0.76. Variable 11 good relations with host govemment and 
Variclble 12 price controls of host government, have a cOlTelation coefficient of 0.66, while 
Variable 15 poli tical and social pres:;;ure and Variable 16 royalty restrictions, have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.65. The high correJati n f t e variables provided justification for 
p'~rforminG, a factor analysis. 
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The matrix shown in Table 10.3 and 1004 is the product of a varimax rotation. Three factors 
,(or dimensions) were extracted and labelled as follows: 
Factor 1: Govemment restrictions. 
Factor 2: Corporate competitive position. 
Factor 3: Tax and legal considerations. 
In Tables 10.3 and 10.4, the communality column shows the degree to which the factors 
account for or explain each of the variables. For a given variable, the three factors summarise 
between 54.7 percent (VAR 07) and 69.9 percent (VAR 9). 
The eigenvalue of each factor is the sum of squares of the factor's unrotated loadings and is 
normally used to compute the fraction of total variance in the variable explained by the factor 
(Tang, 1982, p. 185). The percentage of total variance summarised by each factor is equal to 
its eignvalue divided by 17 (the number of variables). For example, Factor 1 summarises 
410.3 percent of the total variance, Factor 2 summarises 7.8 percent of the total variance and 
Factor 3 summarises 6.8 percent of the total variance. Together, the three factors summarise 
62.9 percent ofthe total variance in the seventeen variables. 
Cronbach's coefficient alphas for reliability were estimated for each of the factors to ascertain 
the extent to which variables making up each factor shared a common core and the extent to 
which items in the questionnaire related to each other. Cronbach's alpha is based on the 
average inter-item correlation. Panel B of Table lOA shows the high reliability held for item 
that comprised Factor 1, while the rest of the two factors were satisfactory or better. A 
consideration of the dimensionality of each of the factors follows. 
Factor 1 is the most dominant factor. Within this factor, 'foreign currency exchange controls' 
is the most important variable, followed, in descending order, by 'royalty restrictions', import 
restrictions', 'existence of local partner', 'restrictions on repatriation of income', 'price 
controls of host govemment', 'political and social pressure', 'rates of customs duties', 'good 
relations with host governrnent' and 'maintenance of cashflows'. This means that the 
respondents who placed a great deal of importance on 'foreign currency exchange controls' 
also tended to regard other variables that loaded highly on Factor 1 as important. 
Factor 2 has very high loadings on 'competitive position of the subsidiary' and 'corporate profit of 
the subsidiary'. These two variables together form another important dimension of 
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environmental variables. Factor 3 has a high loading on 'tax authority transfer pricing audits' 
,and 'comply with tax law and regulations'. 
Table 10.3 
Factor Analysis of Environmental Variables 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 h2 (communality) 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 0.486 -0.098 0.600* 0.605 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 0.628* 0.228 0.332 0.557 
VAR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 0.151 0.242 0.759* 0.657 
VAR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 0.029 0.241 0.751* 0.623 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 0.719* 0.133 0.358 0.663 
V AR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 0.206 0.780* 0.045 0.653 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 0.407 0.535* 0.309 0.547 
VAR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 0.184 0.725* 0.214 0.606 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 0.761 * 0.346 0.026 0.699 
V AR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 0.788* 0.267 0.059 0.695 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 0.524* 0.503 0.313 0.626 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government 0.689* 0.250 0.212 0.582 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner 0.722* 0.359 -0.063 0.654 
V AR 14 Performance evaluation 0.441 0.666* 0.164 0.666 
V AR 15 Political and social pressure 0.682* 0.333 0.232 0.631 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 0.771 * 0.197 0.172 0.663 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cashflows 0.510* 0.502 0.251 0.575 
Sum of squares (Eigenvalue) 8.210 1.329 1.160 
Percentage of trace (Variance) 48.3 7.8 6.8 62.9 
Note: * IndIcates hIghest factor loadmg for varIables. 
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Table 10.4 
A Summary of Three Dimensions of Variables and Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Analysis 
Panel A: Dimensions and Variables Rotated Factor Loadings Communality Eigenvalue Variance summarised (eignvalue/no. of variable) 
Factor 1 Government restrictions 
, 
8.210 0.483 
V AR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 0.788 0.695 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 0.771 0.663 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 0.761 0.699 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner 0.722 0.654 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 0.719 0.663 
V AR 12 Price controls of host government 0.689 0.582 
V AR 15 Political and social pressure 0.682 0.631 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 0.628 0.557 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 0.524 0.626 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cashflows 0.510 0.575 
Factor 2 Corporate competitive position 1.329 0.0782 
VAR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 0.780 0.653 
VAR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 0.725 0.606 I 
V AR 14 Performance evaluation 0.666 0.666 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 0.535 0.547 
Factor 3 Tax and legal considerations 1.160 0.0683 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 0.759 0.657 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 0.751 0.623 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 0.600 0.605 
Total 0.629 
Panel B: Factors Variables Cronbach's Alpha 
Factor 1 Government restrictions VAR02, VAR05, VAR09, VAR 10, VAR 11, VAR 12, VAR 13, VAR 15, VAR 16, VAR 17 0.9257 
Factor 2 Corporate competitive position VAR06, VAR07, VAR08, VAR 14 0.7947 
Factor 3 Tax and legal considerations VAROl, VAR03, VAR04 0.6318 
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10.3 A Multinational Comparison 
,In chapter 9 a comparison of the ITP methods actually used by the respondent companies 
showed that those for whom China was the host country different methods were adopted from 
those whose host countries were New Zealand and Australia. The sharp cultural differences 
between New Zealand and Australia on the one hand and China on the other might suggest 
that the respective business enviromnents involved played an impOliant determining influence 
and might be the origin for explaining the differences. 
To discover any such determining influences from this source, the companies in the study 
were asked to assess the relative impOliance of each of a range of environmental factors that 
could affect their ITP decisions. This section, therefore, contains the responses from the 
multinational subsidiary companies operating in the three host countries, New Zealand, 
Australia and China, together with the results of statistical tests that were applied to the results 
to establish if any significantly different valuations were placed on the environmental 
variables according to the host country. 
Hypothesis Oe: 
There are no differences in the rating of environmental factors affecting ITP by 
multinationals in New Zealand, Australia and China 
The ranking of the importance of each of a range of environmental variables by the 
respondent companies in New Zealand, Australia and China is given in Table 10.5. The 
ranking of impOliance is according to the mean scores of the variables. The standard deviation 
indicates the extent of agreement in the rating of individual variables among the respondents. 
It can be seen that the Chinese companies place more emphasis on nearly all of the 17 
environmental variables than the New Zealand and Australian firms. 
To investigate possible differences in the ranking of the environmental variables, A Kruskal-
Wallis test was used for analysis. The results ofthe test are presented in Table 10.6. There are 
statistically significant differences in the ranking of these variables in the three countries, the 
environmental measure being significant at the 1 % level. 
To investigate further possible differences in the ranking of individual environmental 
variables, a Kruskal-Wallis test was employed to test each individual variable. The results of 
the test are presented in Table 10.7. Differences are found in the case of 15 environmental 
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variables, fOUlieen being significant at the 1 % level, while that of 'competitive position of the 
,subsidiary' is significant at the 5% level. No differences are recorded in the case of the 
ranking of two environmental variables, 'comply with tax law and regulations' and 'tax 
authority transfer pricing audits'. 
Hypothesis Of: 
There are no differences in the rating of environmental factors affecting ITP by 
multinationals in New Zealand and Australia 
The ranking of the importance for the environmental variables by the respondent firms in 
New Zealand and Australia is given in Table 10.5. The rankings are according to mean scores 
of the variables. The standard deviation indicates the extent of agreement in the rating of 
individual variables among the respondents. 
To investigate possible differences in the ranking of environmental variables, a Mann-
Whitney U Test was used for analysis. The results of the test are presented in Table 10.8. 
There are no statistically significant differences in the ranking of these variables by members 
of the two national groups, the scores for environmental variables being not significant at 
even the 10% level. 
To investigate further possible differences in the ranking of individual environmental 
variables, a Mann- Whitney U test was employed to test each individual variable. The results 
of the test are presented in Table 10.9. The scores of 16 environmental variables were not 
even significant at the 10% level. Only one environmental variable, 'restrictions on 
repatriation of income' was found to be significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 10.5 
- - -- -- J - -- --------7 ---- ---- -- ~- - ------ - - - - -r --- -
Comparison of Ratings of the Importance of Environmental Variables for 
ITP bv New Zealand. Australian and Chinese Comnanies - Descrintive Statist" 
New Zealand Australia 
, 
" , 
{ , 
1 
China 
Environmental Variables Mean Rank SD Mean Rank SD Mean Rank SD 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 3.96 1 1.069 4.05 1 1.166 3.96 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 3.38 2 1.089 3.14 3 1.206 4.04 
V AR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 3.31 3 1.369 3.28 2 1.335 3.91 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 3.05 4 1.157 2.86 4 1.317 4.07 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 2.82 5 1.254 2.79 5 1.321 3.00 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cash flows 2.71 6 1.422 2.55 6 1.404 3.65 
VAR 14 Performance evaluation 2.51 7 1.242 2.41 8 1.298 3.50 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 2.47 8 1.363 2.43 7 1.464 3.37 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 2.43 9 1.261 1.97 12/13 1.169 3.26 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 2.18 10 1.262 2.26 9 1.292 3.59 
V AR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 2.09 11 1.248 2.12 10111 1.326 3.04 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner 2.07 12 1.258 1.84 15 1.203 3.24 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 2.00 13114 1.147 2.12 10/11 1.312 3.74 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 2.00 13/14 1.192 1.97 12/13 1.199 2.96 
V AR 15 Political and social pressure 1.96 15 1.094 1.71 16/17 0.975 2.74 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government 1.95 16 1.210 1.95 14 1.300 2.65 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 1.82 17 1.109 1.71 16/17 0.973 2.78 
-- ---
Table 10.6 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Ratings of the Importance of 
--.----------~~- - ---------- --- --- - _.- .. ----------7---~-~- ----~- ----- -------- - ---- - --
New Zealand Australia 
Mean Rank 76.87 71.47 
N* 76 55 
Chi-Squared value 40.172*** 
Degree of freedom 2 
Significance. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Note: * One New Zealand fIrms, fIve Australian fIrms and one Chinese fIrm failed to supply information on their transfer pricing methods used. 
***Significant at the 1 % level. 
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3 1.134 
2 0.842 
4 0.905 
1 0.827 
13 1.229 
6 0.971 
8 0.863 
9 1.162 
10 1.084 
7 1.045 
12 1.228 
11 1.119 
5 0.999 
14 1.246 
16 1.273 
17 1.320 
15 1.134 
-- ----
China 
130.00 
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A Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Ratings ofthe Importance of the Individual Items of 
Environmental Variables Affecting ITP by New Zealand, Australian and Chinese Companies 
Mean Rank Test Statistics 
:, . 
:: 
t T " 
Environmental V ariab les New Zealand Australia China Chi-Squared value Significance (p) 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 
VAR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cash flows 
V AR 14 Performance evaluation 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 
V AR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 
VAR 15 Political and social pressure 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 
Note: **Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
89.02 95.63 
86.08 76.71 
86.94 84.25 
81.95 75.69 
89.81 88.44 
84.20 78.21 
81.73 77.99 
83.13 81.16 
88.47 69.58 
75.91 78.85 
81.25 81.54 
80.87 71.63 
73.68 77.32 
81.77 80.00 
84.82 73.41 
82.71 84.38 
81.40 77.73 
-
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90.36 0.621 0.733 
117.26 17.95 0.000*** 
107.93 6.73 0.035** 
125.46 28.87 0.000*** 
96.23 0.67 0.714 
118.51 18.40 0.000*** 
122.92 24.54 0.000*** 
116.59 15.54 0.000*** 
122.25 27.93 0.000*** 
129.28 36.23 0.000*** 
119.24 19.34 0.000*** 
125.52 34.40 0.000*** 
137.25 51.50 0.000*** 
120.33 21.16 0.000*** 
116.58 20.71 0.000*** 
111.09 10.85 0.004*** 
123.80 27.65 0.000*** 
- --- --------
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Hypothesis Og: 
There are no differences in the rating of environmental factors affecting ITP by 
multinationals in New Zealand and China 
The rankings of importance for the environmental variables by the respondent firms in New 
Zealand and China are given in Table 10.5. The rankings are according to the mean scores of 
the variables. The standard deviation indicates the extent of agreement in the rating of 
individual variables among the respondents. 
To investigate possible differences in the ranking of the environmental variables, a Mann-
Whitney U Test was employed. The results of the test are presented in Table 10.10. There are 
statistically significant differences in the ranking of these factors by members of these two 
national groups, the differences being significant at the 1 % level. 
To further investigate possible differences in the ranking of individual environmental 
variables, the Mann-Whitney U Test was employed to test each individual variable. The 
results of the test are presented in Table 10.11. There are statistically significant differences in 
the case of 15 environmental variables. There are no significant differences in the case of the 
other two environmental variables, 'comply with tax law and regulations' and 'tax authority 
transfer pricing audits' . 
Hypothesis Oh: 
There are no differences in the rating of environmental factors affecting ITP by 
multinationals in Australia and China 
The rankings of the importance for the environmental variables by the respondents of 
Australia and Chinaare given in Table 10.5. The rankings are according to the mean scores of 
the variables, while standard deviation indicates the extent of agreement in the rating of 
individual variables among the respondents. 
114 
Mean Rank 
N 
z-value 
Significance. (p) 
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Table 10.8 
---- -------~-~--- --------~- --- --- - - - .. -~---~~--- ---- -------------- - ~--- -------
AMann-Whitney U Test of the Ranking of the Importance 
fEnvironmental Variables for ITP bv New Zealand and Australian C 
New Zealand 
67.76 
76 
-0.626 
0.5320 
Table 10.9 
'. I. , 
I .. 
i: 
i' ~ 
Australia 
63.56 
55 
Individual It 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of the Ratings of the Importance of the 
fEnvironmental Variables for ITP bv New Zealand and Australian C 
{:' 
,I' 
',.: 
Mean Rank Test Statistics 
Environmental Variables New Zealand Australia Z-value Significance (p) 
VAR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 66.18 71.53 -0.832 0.405 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 71.25 63.68 -1.163 0.245 
V AR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 68.80 66.94 -0.282 0.778 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 70.48 64.71 -0.876 0.381 
VAR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 68.44 67.41 -0.156 0.876 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cashflows 69.89 65.49 -0.668 0.504 
VAR 14 Perfonnance evaluation 69.34 66.22 -0.476 0.634 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 68.71 67.05 -0.254 0.800 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 74.08 59.92 -0.2189 0.029** 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 66.59 68.69 -0.324 0.746 
V AR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 68.00 68.00 0.000 1.000 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner 69.53 62.38 -1.157 0.247 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 67.14 69.14 -0.313 0.755 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 68.65 67.14 -0.239 0.811 
VAR 15 Political and social pressure 70.06 61.52 -1.368 0.171 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government 66.88 68.32 -0.231 0.818 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 69.03 66.64 -0.393 0.684 
Note: **Significant at the 5% level. 
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To investigate possible differences in the ranking of the environmental variable, a Mann-
,Whitney U Test was employed. The results of the test are presented in Table 10.12. There are 
statistically significant differences in the ranking of these factors by members of the two 
national groups, the scores for the environmental variables being significant at the 1 % level. 
To further investigate possible differences in the ranking of individual environmental 
variables, a Mann-Whitney U Test was employed to test each individual variable. The results 
of the test are presented in Table 10.13. There are statistically significant differences in the 
case of 15 environmental variables. There are no significant differences in the case of the 
remaining two environmental variables, 'comply with tax law and regulations' and 'tax 
authority transfer pricing audits'. 
This section reported on a comparative study of environmental factors affecting the ITP 
policies of MNEs, with an emphasis on the identification of differences in ITP strategies of 
the Australian and New Zealand respondent companies on the one hand, and Chinese 
respondent firms on the other. Statistically significant differences are indicated between the 
two sets of companies regarding the degree of emphasis they, respectively, place on 
environmental factors affecting their ITP policies. The statistical test results are summarised 
in Table 10.14 . 
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Table 10.10 
AMann-Whitney U Test of the Ranking of the Importance 
~ fEnvironmental Variables for ITP bv New Zealand and Chinese F· 
New Zealand China 
Mean Rank 47.61 84.46 
N 76 46 
z-value -5.580 
Significance. (2) 0.000*** 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 10.11 
A M ann-Whitney U Test of the Ratings of the Importance of 
-- --_ .. - ~~- ~ - - - ---- - ~ - -he Individual Items of Environmental Variables for ITP bv New Zealand and Chinese C --- - ~ 
Mean Rank Test Statistics 
Environmental Variables 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 
V AR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cash flows 
V AR 14 Performance evaluation 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 
VAR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 
V AR 13 Existence oflocal partner 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 
V AR 15 Political and social pressure 
V AR 12 Price controls of host government 
V AR 16 Royalty restriction~ ___ 
Note: ** Significant at the 5% level; 
***Significant at the 1 % level. 
-_._-
New Zealand 
61.84 
53.82 
57.14 
50.47 
60.36 
53.31 
51.39 
53.42 
53.38 
47.82 
52.25 
49.84 
45.53 
52.12 
53.76 
54.34 
51.37 
-
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China Z-value Significance (p) 
62.26 -0.066 0.947 
75.68 -3.450 0.001 *** 
71.29 -2.219 0.026** 
81.30 -4.824 0.000*** 
64.74 -0.677 0.498 
76.54 -3.591 0.000*** 
79.76 -4.425 0.000*** 
76.37 -3.542 0.000*** 
76.42 -3.566 0.000*** 
84.10 -5.626 0.000*** 
78.32 -4.048 0.000*** 
80.77 -4.836 0.000*** 
89.57 -6.808 0.000*** 
78.54 -4.119 0.000*** 
75.79 -3.448 0.001 *** 
73.34 -3.035 0.002*** 
79.79 -4.488 0.000*** 
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z-value 
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Table 10.12 
A Mann-Whitney U Test of the Ranking of the Importance of 
Environmental Variables for ITP bv Australian and Chinese F· 
Australia 
35.91 
55 
-5.663 
0.000*** 
Note: ***Significant at the 1 % level. 
Table 10.13 
AMann-Whitney U Test of the Ratings of the Importance 
( . 
~ 
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China 
69.04 
46 
-- ---- ---fthe Individual Items of Environmental Variables for ITP bv Australian and Chinese C --- ------
Mean Rank Test Statistics 
~ -~ 
,~ 
~' 
~ 
fl 
~ 
Environmental V ariab les Australia China Z-value Significance (p) 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations 54.09 51.60 -0.443 0.658 
V AR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary 46.81 60.64 -2.407 0.016** 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary 42.53 65.08 -3.926 0.000*** 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group 40.48 67.65 -4.702 0.000*** 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits 50.53 54.99 -0.768 0.442 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cash flows 42.22 65.47 -4.015 0.000*** 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates 43.60 63.72 -3.453 0.001 *** 
VAR14 Performance evaluation 41.27 66.66 -4.390 0.000*** 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government 39.66 68.68 -4.982 0.000*** 
VAR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls 43.04 64.42 -3.692 0.000*** 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties 37.68 71.18 -5.763 0.000*** 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income 39.16 69.33 -5.206 0.000*** 
V AR 09 Import restrictions 42.36 65.28 -3.979 0.000*** 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government 45.56 61.25 -2.749 0.006*** 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner 37.74 68.25 -5.371 0.000*** 
V AR 15 Political and social pressure 39.89 64.28 -4.356 0.000*** 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions 40.59 67.51 -4.725 0.000*** 
-
Note: **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 10.14 
Summary of Results ofthe Relative Importance of 
Environmental Variables Attached by National Groups for ITP 
New Zealand and New Zealand 
Australia and China 
V AR 01 Differences in income tax rates NS *** 
V AR 02 Rates of customs duties NS *** 
V AR 03 Tax authority transfer pricing audits NS NS 
V AR 04 Comply with tax law and regulations NS NS 
V AR 05 Restrictions on repatriation of income ** *** 
VAR 06 Competitive position of the subsidiary NS ** 
V AR 07 Overall profit to multinational group NS *** 
V AR 08 Corporate profit of the subsidiary NS *** 
V AR 09 Import restrictions NS *** 
V AR 10 Foreign currency exchange controls NS *** 
V AR 11 Good relations with host government NS *** 
VAR 12 Price controls of host government NS *** 
V AR 13 Existence of local partner NS *** 
VAR 14 Performance evaluation NS *** 
VAR 15 Political and social pressure NS *** 
V AR 16 Royalty restrictions NS *** 
V AR 17 Maintenance of cashflow NS *** 
Note: ** Slgmficant at the 5% level; *** Slgmficant at the 1 % level; NS = Not slgmficant. 
10.4 A Cross-National Analysis of key Determinants 
Australia and 
China 
*** 
*** 
NS 
NS 
*** 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
It can be seen in Table 10.1 and 10.5 that four important variables affected ITP policies in the 
three countries. They are 'comply with tax law and regulations', 'corporate profit of the 
subsidiary', 'competitive position of the subsidiary' and 'overall profit to multinational 
group'. These shared factors vary in importance with the nature of the ITP in the three 
countries. For example, 'comply with tax law and regulations' was considered the most 
important variable by both the New Zealand and Australian respondent companies, whereas 
'overall profit to multinational group' was considered as the most important variable by the 
Chinese respondent firms. In addition, differences exist in the rankings of each pair of the 
three countries on some of the enviromnental variables. The sharply different variables are 
'rates of custom duties', 'tax authority transfer pricing audits' and 'restrictions on repatriation 
of income'. For example, the variable 'rates of custom duties' is ranked fifth by the Chinese 
respondents but thirteen/fourteen and tenth/eleventh by the New Zealand and Australian 
respondents, respectively. This section provides a brief discussion and analysis of these seven 
key individual enviromnental variables as they affect ITP policies in New Zealand, Australia 
and China. 
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Table 10.15 
Comparison of the Ratings of Variables for ITP by New Zealand, Australia and China 
Panel A: Variable 02 - Rates of customs duties 
Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N % 77 100 58 100 46 ]00 181 100 
Extremely important 3 3.9 5 8.6 10 21.7 18 9.9 
Very impOltant 5 6.5 4 6.9 21 45.7 30 16.6 
Important 17 22.1 11 19.0 9 19.6 37 20.4 
Slightly important 16 20.8 11 19.0 5 10.9 32 17.7 
Not important 36 46.8 27 45.0 1 2.2 64 35.4 
Rank 13/14 10/11 5 11 
Mean 2.00 2.12 3.74 2.48 
Standard Deviation 1.147 1.312 0.999 1.38 
Panel B: Variable 03 - Tax authority transfer pricing audits 
Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N % 77 100 58 100 46 100 181 100 -- ._. 
'--'-'-:-"':'.---':'-":'-'-::-
Extremely important 7 9.1 7 12.1 6 13.0 20 11.0 
Very important 16 20.8 10 17.2 11 23.9 37 20.4 
Important 27 35.1 19 32.8 11 23.9 57 31.5 
Slightly important 10 13.0 8 13.3 13 28.3 31 17.1 
Not important 17 22.1 14 24.1 5 10.9 36 19.9 
Rank 5 5 14 6 
Mean 2.82 2.79 3.00 2.86 
Standard Deviation 1.254 1.321 1.229 1.27 
Panel C: Variable 04 - Comply with tax law and regulations 
Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N % 77 100 59 100 46 100 182 100 
Extremely important 31 40.3 26 44.1 21 45.7 78 42.9 
Very important 20 26.0 21 35.6 9 19.6 50 27.5 
Important 21 27.3 5 8.5 9 19.6 35 19.2 
Slightly important 2 2.6 3 5.1 7 15.2 12 6.6 
Not important 3 3.9 4 6.8 0 0 7 3.8 
Rank 1 1 3 1 
Mean 3.96 4.05 3.96 3.99 
Standard Deviation 1.069 1.166 1.134 1.11 
Panel D: Variable 05 -Restrictions on repatriation of income 
--~ .••• , •. ~ .• -...... ' .. '~:,<-.. '. Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N %. 77 100 58 100 47 100 182 100 
Extremely important 6 7.8 2 3.4 6 13.0 14 7.7 
V ~ important 7 9.1 5 8.6 15 32.6 27 14.8 
Important 27 35.1 11 19.0 11 23.9 49 26.9 
Slightly important 11 14.3 11 19.0 13 27.7 35 19.2 
Not important 26 33.8 29 50.0 1 2.1 56 30.8 
Rank 9 12/13 10 10 
Mean 2.43 1.97 3.26 2.49 
Standard Deviation 1.261 1.169 1.084 1.28 
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Panel E: Variable 06 - Competitive position of the subsidiary 
Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N % 77 100 58 100 47 100 182 100 
Extremely imp0I1ant 15 19.5 11 19.0 13 27.7 39 21.4 
Very important 28 36.4 18 31.0 21 44.7 67 36.8 
Important 14 18.2 15 25.9 9 19.1 38 20.9 
Slightly_ in~ortant 6 7.8 4 6.9 4 8.5 14 7.7 
Not impol1ant 14 18.2 10 17.2 0 0 24 13.2 
Rank 3 2 4 3 
Mean 3.31 3.28 3.91 3.46 
Standard Deviation 1.369 1.335 .905 1.28 
Panel F: Variable 07 - Overall profit to multinational group 
Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N % 77 100 58 100 47 100 182 100 
Extremely important 7 9.1 7 12.1 15 32.6 29 15.9 
Very imp0I1ant 21 27.3 13 22.4 21 45.7 55 30.2 
ImJlortant 29 37.7 15 25.9 8 17.0 52 28.6 
Slightly impo11ant 9 11.7 11 19.0 2 4.3 22 12.1 
Not important 11 14.3 12 20.7 0 0 23 12.6 
Rank 4 4 1 4 
Mean 3.05 2.86 4.07 3.35 
Standard Deviation 1.157 1.317 .827 1.23 
Panel G: Variable 08 -C01porate profit of the subsidiary 
Country New Zealand Australia China Overall 
N % 77 100 58 100 47 100 182 100 
Extremely imp0I1ant 12 15.6 8 13.8 15 32.6 35 19.2 
Very important 22 28.6 15 25.9 20 43.5 57 31.3 
Important 33 42.9 19 32.8 9 19.6 61 33.5 
Slightly important 3 3.9 9 15.5 2 4.3 14 7.7 
Not important 7 9.1 7 12.1 0 0 14 7.7 
Rank 2 3 2 2 
Mean 3.38 3.14 4.04 3.47 
Standard Deviation 1.089 1.206 .842 1.12 
10.4.1 Rates of Customs Duties 
Panel A of Table 10.15 indicates the importance ofthe variable 02 - 'rates of customs duties' 
- as it affects the ITP policies of respondent firms operating in New Zealand, Australia and 
China. Compared with New Zealand and Australian companies, Chinese films placed 
significantly greater importance on this variable. The mean rating of 3.74 for the variable 
given by the Chinese respondents is considerably higher than that of New Zealand companies 
at 2.00 and Australia at 2.12. The variable is ranked fifth by the Chinese respondents but 
thirteen/fourteen and tenth/eleventh by the New Zealand and Australian respondents, 
respectively. Overall, this variable is ranked eleventh by the three countries. 
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Partly because the possible savings are small, or partly because costly litigation can result 
. (Caves, 1996, p.21 0), minimising customs duties is not considered to be as impOliant for New 
Zealand and Australian firms as it is for Chinese firms. Traditionally, the customs duty is an 
impOliant source of the financial revenue for the Chinese central government. However, since 
1992 China has cut its customs tariffs on several occasions. These tariff rate cuts are in line 
with its commitment to reduce average impOlis as pati of its WTO membership. In China, the 
current tariffs for the exports and imports of FIEs are quite preferential, with exports 
effectively being tariff free. Imports by FIEs which are used as investment goods and for 
producing exp0l1s are also tariff free. Only those impOlis by FIEs that are to be used in 
producing goods to be sold in the domestic mat'ket are subject to some import tariffs. 
Therefore, tariffs applied to export oriented FIEs in China are generous, and should generate 
no particular incentive for MNEs to practise transfer pricing manoeuvres (Chan and Chow, 
1998; Sun, 1999). 
When goods are transferred from a parent company abroad to a subsidiary in a host country, 
the host government may impose anti-dumping charges on the multinational group. This is 
done to protect its home industries against the dumping of excess production by companies in 
other countries (Belkaoui, 1991). Shortly before this study was undertaken, the Chinese 
customs offices had been investigating tax avoidance through multinational transfer pricing 
abuses and for alleged dumping violations as a result of underpricing intercompany transfers. 
The high importance of this variable by the Chinese respondents might be the result of the 
investigative action of CUlTent Chinese customs houses over the ITP practices of MNEs. 
10.4.2 Tax Authority Transfer Pricing Audits 
Panel B of Table 10.15 indicates the importance of the variable 03 - 'tax authority transfer 
pricing audits' - as it affects ITP policies of respondent firms operating in New Zealand, 
Australia and China. Transfer pricing auditing by tax authorities is not a significant concern 
for the Chinese respondents in formulating their ITP policies. Thirty-nine percent of the 
Chinese respondents considered the variable as only slightly important or not important at all. 
The mean rating 3.00 of the variable given by the Chinese respondents is slightly higher than 
that of their New Zealand and Australian counterparts, whose ratings are 2.79 and 2.82 
respectively. Nevertheless, this variable is ranked fourteenth by the Chinese respondents but 
fifth by both the New Zealand and Australian respondents. Overall, this variable is ranked 
sixth by the three countries. 
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Literature (Brean, 1979, Plasschaet 1985, AI-Eryani, et aI, 1990, Lin, et aI, 1993) suggests 
. that a great number of developed countries have enacted sophisticated tax regulations and 
own highly qualified professional tax expe11s to deal with the issue ofITP. On the other hand, 
although they may have become aware of the losses of tax revenues as a result of ITP 
manipulation, developing countries' governments find it difficult to deal with the problem as 
they lack the institutional framework and administrative expertise to analyse the complex set 
of factors at work. The governments of developing countries may find it even difficult to 
detect it at all, or when they are able to do so they simply do not have the resources to control 
and monitor it effectively. 
The Chinese government has constituted a primary legal framework to deal with the taxation 
of foreign firms on ITP. The extant law and regulations of China grant the tax authorities 
power to perform tax aUditing and to take legal action against multinational transfer pricing 
manipulation behaviour. In practice, however, tax auditing on transfer pricing by Chinese tax 
authorities is far from being fully implemented. This is due to the shortage of well-trained 
personnel to conduct tax auditing and pricing surveillance (for details, see the interview 
results in chapter 12). Hence, the threat of transfer pricing auditing by Chinese tax authorities 
might not be conceived as an imminent and realistic threat by the Chinese respondent 
multinationals. 
10.4.3 Comply with Tax Law and Regulations 
Panel C of Table 10.15 indicates the importance of the variable 04 - 'comply with tax law and 
regulations' - as it affects rTP policies of respondent firms operating in New Zealand, 
Australia and China. Respondents of the three national groups consistently consider the 
variable as highly important. Seventy-eight respondents consider this variable to be extremely 
important. The mean rating of 4.05 for the variable given by the Australian respondents is 
slightly higher than that of their New Zealand and Chinese counterparts, whose mean ratings 
are both 3.96. The variable is ranked first by both the New Zealand and Australian 
respondents and third by the Chinese respondents. Overall, this variable is ranked first by the 
three countries. 
Burns (1980) showed that both legal and tax variables are important factors to consider when 
selecting pricing strategies. AI-Eryani et al (1990) suggested that market-based methods are 
used more intensively by companies that are concerned about satisfying legal requirements. 
Chan and Chow (1998) found that U.S.'s MNEs operating in developing countries perceive 
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compliance with tax and customs regulations as the most important variable in ITP decision . 
. The findings of this survey cOl1'0borate those of previous studies. Comply with tax law and 
regulations is considered to be highly important to respondent firms when they are 
formulating their ITP policies. 
10.4.4 Restrictions on Repatriation of Income 
Panel D of Table 10.15 indicates the importance of variable 05 - 'restrictions on repatriation 
of income' - as it affects ITP policies of respondent firms operating in New Zealand, 
Australia and China. It is of moderate importance in the three countries. The mean rating 1.97 
given by the Australian respondents is much lower than that of New Zealand at 2.43 and 
China at 3.26. This variable is ranked ninth and tenth by the New Zealand and Chinese 
respondents, respectively, but twelfth/thirteenth by the Australian respondents. Overall, this 
variable is ranked tenth by the three countries. 
As with other countries, New Zealand, Australian and Chinese governments do not impose 
restrictions on foreign subsidiaries against the repatriation of their share of profits to their 
parent firms abroad. However, remittances of dividends, interests and royalties are subject to 
withholding tax. Most of the overseas investing countries in the world such as the U.S., the 
U.K., Japan and Germany adopt a system under which credit is allowed in respect of 
withholding tax charges levied by the host countries. Withholding tax in New Zealand, 
Australia and China on the payments of interest, rentals, and royalties to affiliated companies 
is levied at between 10 and 20 percent. Given that such withholding tax rates are lower than 
the home country income tax rate, a host country's withholding tax on the payments can be 
waived or taken into account as a charge on the home country's income taxes under bilateral 
tax treaties. Thus, 'restrictions on repatriation of income' is not considered important by all 
three countries. 
It is worth noting, however, that, among China's major investors, Hong Kong adopts a system 
of source based taxation whereby corporate taxes are charged only on income sourced in 
Hong Kong. Profits or revenues repatriated by foreign subsidiaries are exempt from Hong 
Kong taxation. For Hong Kong based FIEs, withholding taxes charged by Chinese fiscal 
authorities become an additional burden on the corporation's tax charge (Chan and Chow, 
1997b, p. 1274). Hence, Hong Kong based firms may placed greater importance on this 
variable. 
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10.4.5 Competitive Position of the Subsidiary 
. Panel E of Table 10.15 indicates the importance of variable 06 - 'competitive position of the 
subsidiary' - as it affects ITP policies of respondent firms operating in New Zealand, 
Australia and China. 'Competitive position of the subsidiary' is given fairly high ratings by 
the three national groups. The mean rating 3.91 given by the Chinese respondents is 
moderately higher than that of New Zealand at 3.31 and Australian at 3.28. The variable is 
ranked fOUlih by the Chinese respondents but third and second by New Zealand and 
Australian respondents, respectively. Overall, this variable is ranked third by the tlU'ee 
countries. 
Australia is vast country where lucrative oppOliunities exist but in a tough marketing 
condition. As a small economy, New Zealand has a comparatively low level of market 
competition. Until 1984 New Zealand was something of a command economy, but since then, 
the New Zealand government has freed prices, wages and interest rates, floated the exchange 
rate, progressively removed tariffs and subsidies, deregulated the financial system, introduced 
the GST and the Fringe Benefit Tax, reduced income tax rates, and encouraged overseas 
investment in the country. These New Zealand developments are observed as being more 
radical than those carried out in any other industrialised country (Lamminmaki and Drury, 
2001, p.330). The pervasive liberalisation and deregulation of the New Zealand economy 
pursued over the past decade have engendered a competitive commercial environment in New 
Zealand, and thus dramatically increased the competitive pressure on New Zealand firms. 
Hence competitive position is now regarded as an impOliant variable by the New Zealand 
respondents, as well as by their Australian counterparts. 
As with their New Zealand and Australian counterparts, in the Chinese market, foreign 
companies also face tough competition from local producers. FDI is attracted to China in part 
because of China's enormous domestic market (Chan and Chow, 1998). Because of their 
unfamiliarity with local market conditions, MNEs engaging in business are at a disadvantage 
compared to local firms. To compete successfully with local firms in China, MNEs must be 
able to exploit certain specific advantages, not possessed by their local competitors. A 
multinational group may use the ITP mechanism to enhance its subsidiary'S competitive 
position in the Chinese market to redress the balance. For instance, a foreign manufacturing 
firm may charge its related Chinese distributor a below market price as part of a market 
penetration strategy. 
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5.4.6 Overall Profit to Multinational Group 
Panel F of Table 10.15 indicates the importance of variable 07 - 'overall profit to 
multinational group' - as it affects ITP policies of respondent firms operating in New 
Zealand, Australia and China. The Chinese respondents consider this variable to be very 
important. The mean rating of 4.07 given by the Chinese respondents is much higher than that 
of New Zealand at 3.05 and Australian at 2.86. The variable is ranked first by the Chinese 
respondents and fourth by both New Zealand and Australian respondents. Overall, this 
variable is ranked fourth by the three countries. 
Twenty-nine companies consider this variable to be extremely important. It is understandable 
why so many subsidiaries pay great attention to the overall profit of their multinational group. 
The maximisation of global profit is the major objective of a multinational group. MNEs have 
often been accused of shifting income between different geographic regions to minimise 
global taxes, and, in tum, to maximise overall profit to multinational groups. 
In China, foreign subsidiaries are heavily dependent on their overseas parent companies for 
supplies of materials and components. Subsidiary production and operational decisions are 
often controlled by their parent companies (for details, see chapter 12). Corporate policies in 
general and transfer pricing policies, in particular, are frequently set or directly affected by the 
parent companies, located overseas. For this reason, these companies may be more concerned 
with the overall group profitability than the corporate profits for themselves. 
10.4.7 Corporate Profit of the Subsidiary 
Panel G of Table 10.15 indicates the importance of variable 08 - 'corporate profit of the 
subsidiary' - as it affects ITP policies of respondent firms operating in New Zealand, 
Australia and China. Corporate profit of the subsidiary is given very high ratings by the three 
groups. The mean rating of 4.04 given by the Chinese respondents is higher than that of New 
Zealand at 3.38 and Australian at 3.14. The variable is ranked third by the Australian 
respondents and second by both New Zealand and Chinese respondents. Overall, this variable 
is ranked second by the three countries. 
It is clear to see that 'corporate profit of the subsidiary' is consistently given very high ratings 
by all three national groups. The arbitrary shifting of profits from a foreign subsidiary through 
ITP, while enhancing overall corporate profitability, may affect the measured profitability of 
that subsidiary and, in tum, distort the performance of the subsidiary managers. Managers of 
foreign subsidiaries may have a stronger incentive to establish good profit records and, 
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therefore, would not want to establish prices that would reduce the profits of their own 
. companies. In designing transfer pricing systems, local managers are likely to seek to balance 
the interests of the overall profit to the multinational group and that of the corporate profit of 
the subsidiary (Caves, 1996). 
10.5 Summary 
This chapter reported the findings on environmental factors of ITP in the three countries, and 
conducted a comparative analysis of environmental factors affecting ITP policies of MNEs, 
with emphasis placed on the identification of differences in ITP strategies of the New Zealand 
and Australian respondent companies on one hand, and Chinese respondent firms on another. 
'Tax authority transfer pricing auditing' is an important concern in transfer pricing decisions 
for New Zealand and Australian companies. By comparison, it is regarded as relatively 
unimportant by the Chinese firms. The next chapter reports on ITP tax audits and factors that 
are likely to trigger ITP audits by tax authorities in the three countries. 
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Chapter 11 
Survey Results of Audit of International Transfer Pricing 
11.1 Introduction 
Surveys prior to the mid-1990s tended to focus on the methods used from a managerial or 
motivational perspective. These sorts of surveys were directed at uncovering whether market-
based, cost based or negotiated prices were in operation. In chapter 9, the managerial 
incentive transfer prices used by the respondent firms have been reported. This chapter begins 
by reporting on the survey results from respondent companies on their use of legally oriented 
transfer pricing methods and the extent of use of AP As by MNEs in the three countries. This 
is followed by reporting on corporate attributes associated with ITP tax audits. 
11.2 The Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods used 
The respondents were asked to select one or more method (s) used in calculating/adjusting 
the value of transactions with their related parties, outside their local operations, for tax 
purposes. The results of an analysis of their responses are shown in Panel A and B of Table 
11.1. 
11.2.1 The Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods Used by New Zealand 
Companies 
Eleven companies used more than one ITP method. As shown in Table 11.1, Panel B the two 
most frequently used ITP methods were cost plus method and comparable uncontrolled price, 
which, together, accounted for 65.1 percent of the respondent companies. Resale price 
method, profit split method and comparable profit method were each used by nine firms. One 
company used the transactional net margin method. Two companies were using other methods 
- 'agreed price' , and 'contract manufacturer approach', which are not specified by the IRD. 
11.2.2 The Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Australian Companies 
Nineteen companies used more than one ITP method. As shown in Table 11.1, Panel B the 
three most frequently used ITP methods were cost plus method, comparable uncontrolled 
price and transactional net margin method, which together accounted for 80.3 percent of the 
respondent companies. Three companies used the profit split method and one company used 
the comparable profit method. 
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11.2.3 The Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Chinese Companies 
. Twelve companies used more than one ITP method. Similar to their New Zealand and 
Australian counterparts, the two most frequently used ITP methods by Chinese firms were 
cost plus method and comparable uncontrolled price, which together accounted for 52.8 
percent of the respondent companies. Ten companies used deemed profit method and seven 
companies used resale price method. The profit split method and comparable profit method 
were each used by six firms. Three companies were using transactional net margin method. 
Two companies used other methods - 'global formulary apportionment' and 'going-rate 
pricing', which are not specified by the SAT. 
Table 11.1 
The Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods Used by the Respondent Companies 
New Zealand Australia China 
Panel A: Number of # of firms % # of firms % # of firms % 
methods used 
One 67 85.9 44 78.6 25 58.1 
Two 10 12.8 11 19.6 13 30.2 
Three 1 1.3 1 1.8 4 9.3 
Four 0 0 0 0 2 4.7 
Total 78 100 56 100 43 100 
Panel B: Pricing Methods 
Cost plus method 42 48.8 33 46.5 21 29.2 
Comparable uncontrolled 14 16.3 12 16.9 17 23.6 
price 
Resale price 9 10.5 10 14.1 7 9.7 
Profit split 9 10.5 3 4.2 6 8.3 
comparable profit method 9 10.5 1 1.4 6 8.3 
The transactional net 1 1.2 12 16.9 3 4.2 
margin method 
Deemed profit method 0 0 0 0 10 13.9 
Others 2* 2.3 0 0 2* 2.8 
Total 86** 100*** 71** 100*** 72** 100*** .. 
Note: *Other pncmg methods include 'Agreed pnce', and 'contract manufacturer approach' for two New 
Zealand firms. 'Global formulary appOltionment' and 'going-rate pricing' for two Chinese companies. 
** Some of firms used more than one ITPmethod. 
* * * Percentages may not add up to totals because of rounding. 
11.2.4 Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Industry 
Table 11.2 classifies pricing methods used by industry. It can be seen that the cost plus 
method is used predominantly in all industries. The resale price method is generally viewed as 
the most suitable pricing method used by sales and marketing companies (distributors), 
however, only 10 out of 88 companies in Wholesale and retail trade industries were using that 
method. Three Manufacturing and one Agriculture firm used other methods such as 'agreed 
price', 'contract manufacturer approach', 'global formulary apportionment' and 'going-rate 
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pricing', which are not specifically defined by the tax authorities. These methods, which 
,differ from the recommended methods, could be as a result of the unique nature of their 
intercompany transactions. 
Table 11.2 
The Legally Oriented Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Industry 
Industry Cost CUP Resale 
plus 
Wholesale & retail trade 31 17 
Manufacturing 41 16 
Services 11 8 
Finance & insurance 5 2 
Mining 1 0 
Construction 5 0 
Agriculture 2 0 
Total 96 43 
Note: CUP = Comparable Uncontrolled Price; 
TNMM = Transactional Net Margin Method; 
CPM = Comparable profit method. 
11.3 Advance Pricing Agreements 
price 
10 
10 
4 
1 
0 
1 
0 
26 
Profit TNMM CPM Deemed 
split profit 
6 10 11 3 
9 3 3 6 
2 2 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
18 16 16 10 
Others 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
4 
In this study, the survey respondents were asked to state their status regarding APAs. The 
responses are shown in Table 11.3. Overall, seven respondents (4 percent) had signed off an 
APA with local tax authorities. Three respondents (1.7 percent) were currently negotiating 
with the local tax authorities for an AP A. Sixteen respondents (9.1 percent) had not used an 
AP A previously but would consider it in the future, while 96 respondents (54.5 percent) had 
no plans to apply for an AP A, and the remaining 54 respondents (30.7 percent) had not 
considered the issue at all. The results of this survey are consistent with Borkowski's findings 
that multinational firms typically appear uninterested in participating in AP A programmes. 
Table 11.4 shows the home country of the respondent firms that are currently using or 
considering APAs. It can be seen that Japanese-based subsidiaries paid greater attention to the 
use of APAs. 
130 
Tote 
88 
91 
28 
8 
2 
9 
3 
22<; 
~~ u 
Table 11.3 
The AP A Status of Respondent Companies 
New Zealand Australia 
Status regarding AP A # offirms % # of firms % 
Have concluded an AP A with the local tax authority 2 2.7 4 6.9 
Are currently negotiations with the local tax authority for an APA 0 0 1 l.7 
Plan to apply for an APA with the local tax authority 5 6.7 3 5.2 
Have no plans to apply with the local tax authority 37 49.3 38 65.5 
Uncertain 31 41.3 12 20.7 
Total 75* 100** 58* 100** 
., 
: 
'" j:i( 
1" (, 
China 
# of firms % 
1 2.3 
2 4.7 
8 18.6 
21 48.8 
11 25.6 
43* 100** 
t 
":1 
: 
i 
Note: * Two New Zealand firms, two Australian firms and four Chinese firms failed to supply information on their transfer pricing methods used. 
* Percentages may not add up to totals because of rounding. 
Table 11.4 
Home Country of the Respondent Companies that are Currently Using or Considering APAs 
Home country of respondent firms New Zealand Australia China 
USA 1 1 3 
Australia 1 0 0 
Japan 4 5 2 
UK 1 0 0 
Korea 0 1 1 
Germany 0 1 0 
Hong Kong 0 0 2 
Taiwan 0 0 2 
France 0 0 1 
Total 7 8 11 
-
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Overall 
# of firms % 
7 4.0 
3 1.7 
16 9.1 
96 54.5 
54 30.7 
176 100** 
Total 
5 
1 
11 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
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11.4 Corporate Attributes Associated with ITP Tax Audits 
,Respondents to the study's survey were asked if they had been the subject of an ITP audit 
since 1998. These responses are summarised in Table 11.5. Overall, 45 companies (26 
percent) had been subject to ITP tax audits. The Table also shows that 33 percent of Chinese 
fimlS had been audited - a higher rate than companies from New Zealand (18 percent) and 
Australia (28 percent). 
Table 11.5 
Frequencies ofITP Audits Reported 
by Respondent Companies in New Zealand, Australia and China Since 1998 
Audit No audit Overall 
# offirm % # of firm % # of firm % 
New Zealand 13 18 58 82 71* 100 
Australia 17 28 43 72 60 100 
China 15 33 30 67 45* 100 
Total 45 26 131 74 176 100 
Note: * SIX New Zealand films and three Chinese firms did not provide mformatlOn on ITP audIts. 
In chapter 7, the following hypothesis was formulated to test the relationship between ITP tax 
audits and a number of corporate attributes. For research convenience and consistency, this 
hypothesis was stated in the null form. 
Hypothesis Oi: 
There is no relationship between ITP tax audits and MNEs ' characteristics such as industry, 
nationality, company size, and the volume and types of intercompany transactions 
11.4.1 The Chi-Square and the Spearman's Correlation Coefficient Tests 
This hypothesis is tested on both bivariate and multivariate levels. First, the bivariate Chi-
square and the Spearman's correlation coefficient tests were conducted to test the impact of 
the individual corporate attributes on ITP audits. The test results in Table 11.6 indicate that 
overall, except for two variables - Industry and Volume, all other six variables - Nationality, 
Size, Tangible, Intangible, Service and Financing - are significant at the 1 %, 5% or 10% 
levels, and the signs (+/-) of the coefficients are positive. In the case of New Zealand, Size 
and Tangible are significant at the 1 % and 10% levels, respectively, and the signs (+/-) of the 
coefficient are positive. In the case of Australia, Size, Nationality, Volume and Intangible are 
significant at the 1 %, 5% or 10% levels, respectively, and the signs (+/-) of the coefficients 
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Table 11.6 
Bivariate Test of Rela t io nships between ITP Tax Audits a nd MN E C ha ra cteristics 
~ -_._- - . - -. - - _ . . - _ . ---
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I I Industry ,- Nationality -
Overa ll f~e ·Vv· ZCuland A ustrali;) China Overall New Zealand Australia China 
Chi-Squared value 0. 161 0.995 0.847 1.879 10.838 0.522 5.728 "') f) ,I O .::... V ..,. / 
Degree 01 Ireedom 1 I I I I I I 1 
Significance 0.689 0.3 18 0.358 0.170 O.OO i ,~ ** 0.470 0.017* * 0.1 52 
Phi f\ "II 1 0161 -0.156 -0.251 0.263 0.1 3 1 0.353 0.263 -v .v, ' 
Sign i ficance 0.562 0.175 0.226 0.092 0.000"''''''' 0.260 Ii (\(\t::*** 0.078 V . v vv 
N 176 71 60 45 176 71 60 45 
Panel B: Correlation Anal   ysis 
Overali n:sults Company size The volumes of transfers Tangible Intangible Fini1/l~ilJg, I Se:-v!ce 
Correlation Coefficient 0.225 0.071 0.111 O. i 15 0.134 0.113 
Significance (I-tailed) 0.001 *** 0.177 0.073* 0.081 * 0.048** 0.074* 
N 176 174 171 150 156 164 
New Zealand resuits- I 
, 
Con"elation Coefficient 0.306 0.007 0.167 -0.056 0.002 i 0.096 
Sign ifi cance (I -tailed) 0 .005*** 0.478 0.088* 0.333 0.493 0.220 
N 71 69 67 62 63 ! 67 
Australia results r-::-' --" -
Corre lat ion Coeffic ient 0. 57 1 0 .190 0.006 0.220 0.098 0.161 
SignifiCance ( I-tailed) O.OOO**"" .072* 0.48 1 0 .071 " 0.247 0.123 
N 60 60 60 46 5 1 54 
China results 
-
Correlation Coeffic ient -0 .345 0. 118 0.2 5 1 0.181 0.255 0.120 
Significance (I-tailed) 0.0 1 *"'* 0 .22 1 0.050** 0.125 0.052* 0.221 
, N 45 45 44 42 42 43 
Note: * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the I % level. 
12 Companies were re-categorised into two groups. Manufacturing firm s fo nned one category and the rema ining compan ies were combined into another category_ 
13 The Japan and Hong Kong-based firms formed one category and the remaining companies were combined into another category (for detail s, see chapter 7). 
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are positive. In the case of China, Size, Tangible and Financing are significant at the 1 %, 5%, 
. or 10% levels, respectively, but the sign (+/ -) of the coefficient of Size is negative. 
11.4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis 
In chapter 7 a logit model has been developed to investigate the corporate attributes 
associated with ITP audits in a multivariate setting. 
11.4.2.1 Correlation Matrixand Multicollinearity Issues 
Multicollinearity exists when independent variables are highly correlated. Therefore, the 
simplest way of checking for multicollinearity is to run a correlation and check the strength of 
the correlations among the independent variables of interest. As a rule of thumb, correlations 
up around 0.8 or higher are generally reason for concern (Pallant, 2001). A correlation matrix 
of independent variables in Table 11.7 shows that the correlations between the independent 
variables of the model used are generally low (less than 0.4). Hence, multicollinearity does 
not appear to be a problem in the initial model. 
11.4.2.2 Overall Results 
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the significance of corporate attributes from 
the aggregated data of the New Zealand, Australian and Chinese respondent firms are shown 
in Panel A of Table 11.8. The model is significant at the 1 % level. It has an overall predictive 
accuracy of 75.34 percent, indicating a good fit for the model. In the logit model, the 
Nationality variable is statistically significant at the 1 % level, Size is statistically significant at 
the 10% level, and Financing is statistically significant at the 5% level. Referring to the results 
of the Chi-square and the Spearman's correlation coefficient tests for individual variables, the 
results of logistic regression confirm that the origin of the respondent firms, the size of the 
company and the transfer of financing are the most important variables in tax authorities' ITP 
auditing decisions. Hence, it can be concluded that the influences of these three variables on 
tax audits are significant both directly and interactively. The signs (+/ -) of coefficients are 
positive, implying that all three variables are positively related to the dependent variable. The 
results indicate that tax authorities in New Zealand, Australia and China tended to focus their 
ITP tax audits on Japan or Hong Kong-based, large-sized subsidiaries, with greater volume of 
intercompany transactions in financing. 
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INDUSTRY 
NATIONALITY 
SIZE 
VOLUME 
TANGIBLE 
INTANGIBLE 
FINANCING 
SERVICE 
HOST 
INDUSTRY NATIONALITY 
1.000 
-0.072 1.000 
0.093 0.200 
-0.100 0.145 
0.186 0.256 
0.002 0.030 
-0.050 -0.033 
-0.003 -0.082 
0.183 0.l39 
Table 11.7 
Corn-elation Matrix of the Corporate Attributes 
SIZE VOLUME TANGIBLE INTANGIBLE 
1.000 
0.l32 1.000 
0.093 0.365 1.000 
0.030 -0.052 0.007 1.000 
0.175 0.047 -0.020 0.336 
0.052 0.063 -0.065 0.318 
0.105 -0.160 -0.l37 0.171 
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FINANCING 
1.000 
0.337 
0.007 
SERVICE HOST 
1.000 
0.101 1.000 
~.-:;.---.----.-.---.:-~-.. -.-
Table 11.8 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the relationship between ITP audits and corporate attributes. 
Panel A: Overall results Predicted 
Intercept 
NATIONALITY 
SIZE 
Financing 
Panel B: NZ results 
Intercept 
INDUSTRY 
SIZE 
Panel C: Australia results 
Intercept 
SIZE 
Panel D: China results 
Intercept 
SIZE 
TANGIBLE 
FINANCING 
Note: * Slgmficant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
sign 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
11.4.2.3 New Zealand Companies 
Coefficient Standard Significance 
Error 
-2.8629 0.5956 0.000*** 
1.2161 0.4359 0.0053*** 
0.2785 0.1448 0.0545* 
0.3212 0.1529 0.0357** 
Number of observations: 146 
Log likelihood: 150.532 
Goodness offit: 145.437 
-3.1961 0.8366 0.0001 *** 
1.2800 0.7451 0.0858* 
0.6242 0.2919 0.0325** 
Number of observations: 59 
Log likelihood: 49.428 
Goodness offit: 50.586 
-3.0553 0.8290 0.0002*** 
0.8423 0.2844 0.0031 *** 
Number of observations: 45 
Log likelihood: 41.540 
Goodness of fit: 39.445 
-3.8430 1.9925 0.0538* 
-0.8182 0.3881 0.0350** 
0.7818 0.4157 0.0598* 
0.6096 0.3171 0.0545* 
Number of observations: 42 
Log likelihood: 40.874 
Goodness of fit: 39.586 
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the significance of corporate attributes for 
New Zealand finns are shown in Panel B of Table 11.8. The model is significant at the 1 % 
level. It has an overall predictive accuracy of 81.36 percent, indicating a good fit for the 
model. In the logit model, both Industry and Size are statistically significant at the 10% and 
the 5% levels, respectively. These suggest that the industry type of the respondent firm and 
the size of the company are important variables in ITP auditing decisions for the New Zealand 
tax authority. Referring to the results of the Chi-square and the Spearman's correlation 
coefficient tests for individual variables, the results of logistic regression confirm that the size 
of the company is the most important variable in ITP auditing. Hence, it can be concluded that 
the influence of company size on tax audits is significant both directly and interactively. The 
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signs (+/-) of coefficients are positive. The results indicate that the IRD tended to focus its 
. ITP tax audits on large-sized manufacturing firms. 
11.4.2.4 Australian Companies 
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the significance of corporate attributes for 
Australian fimls are shown in Panel C of Table 11.8. The model is significant at the 1 % level. 
It has an overall predictive accuracy of 77.78 percent, indicating a good fit for the model. In 
the logit model, the Size variable is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Referring to the 
results of Chi-square and the Spearman's correlation coefficient tests for individual variables, 
the results of logistic regression confiffil that the Size of the company is the most important 
variable in ITP auditing decisions of the Australian tax authority. Hence, it can be concluded 
that the influence of company size on tax audits is significant both directly and interactively. 
The sign (+/-) ofthe coefficient is positive, indicating that this variable is positively related to 
the dependent variable. The results indicate that the ATO tended to focus its ITP tax audits on 
large-sized fiffilS. 
11.4.2.5 Chinese Companies 
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the significance of corporate attributes for 
Chinese fiffilS are shown in Panel D of Table 11.8. The model is significant at the 1 % level. It 
has an overall predictive accuracy of 78.57 percent, indicating a good fit for the model. In the 
logit model, Size is statistically significant at the 5% level, while both Tangible and Financing 
are statistically significant at the 10% level. Referring to the results of Chi-square and the 
Spearman's correlation coefficient tests for individual variables, the results of .logistic 
regression confirm that the size of the company, the transfers of tangibles and financing are 
the most important variables in ITP auditing decisions by the Chinese tax authority. Hence, it 
can be concluded that the influences of these three variables on tax audits are significant both 
directly and interactively. The signs (+/-) of the coefficients are positive for Tangible and 
Financing, but negative for Size. The Size variable is, therefore, negatively related to the 
dependent variable. The results indicate that the Chinese tax authorities tended to focus their 
ITP tax audits on relatively small-sized firms with greater volume of intercompany 
transactions of tangibles and financing. 
There is evidence that certain attributes of a company are more likely to be associated with 
ITP audits by the tax authorities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Chan and Chow, 1997, 
Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1999, Buckley and Hughes, 2001, Borkowski, 2001) The findings of 
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this survey provide further evidence that transfer pricing audits are associated with several 
. types of corporate attributes in New Zealand, Australia and China. 
The results of the survey suggest that transfer pricing tax audits are associated with certain 
corporate attributes. In interpreting the data, however, it is impOliant to bear in mind that 
correlation does not automatically imply causation. The initiation of a tax audit on related 
party transactions, ultimately, depends on the extent of perceived tax risks associated with the 
affected company's transfer pricing practices. 
11.5 Summary 
This chapter reports on ITP tax audit practices in New Zealand, Australia and China. A 
number of companies used two or more ITP methods. The cost plus method is used 
predominantly in all industries. Japanese-based subsidiaries paid greater attention to the use of 
APAs. 
Transfer pricing tax audits are associated with some types of corporate attributes. Overall, the 
influences of Nationality, Size and Financing on ITP audits are significant both directly and 
interactively. Hence, there is strong statistical support for the conclusion that tax authorities in 
New Zealand, Australia and China tended to focus their ITP tax audits on Japan or Hong 
Kong-based, large-sized subsidiaries, with greater volume of intercompany transactions in 
financing. Japan-owned subsidiaries are frequently audited by host countries' tax authorities 
around the world. Japanese companies might, therefore, employ APAs in order to defend their 
transfer pricing policies. 
For New Zealand and Australia, the influence of company size on ITP audits is significant 
both directly and interactively. In the case of China, besides Size, two other variables, such as 
Tangible and Financing, are also significant on influences of tax audits both directly and 
interactively. 
With these survey findings on ITP tax audits in mind, one further step was taken by looking at 
ITP issues from the perspective of the tax authorities. Four Chinese tax authorities were 
approached by personal contact, together with a further 38 Chinese tax authorities by means 
of a questionnaire. The next chapter reports on the results from these two investigations. 
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Chapter 12 
Interview Results of International Transfer Pricing Tax Monitoring in 
China 
12.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 provides a description of how the qualitative evidence from four Chinese tax 
authorities was obtained. The findings will be presented according to the order in which the 
interview questions were stated as set out in the interview questionnaire. Namely (1) What is 
the present extent of ITP abuse in China? (2) How do the Chinese tax authorities administer 
an ITP tax audit? (3) How adequate are the existing Chinese control measures? (4) What 
factors constrain the ITP monitoring system in China? and (5) How should the Chinese ITP 
monitoring system be improved? The purpose of this part of the study was to have an in-depth 
and on-site investigation of the Chinese ITP auditing system and practices and to investigate 
their effectiveness in restricting multinational transfer pricing manipulation in China. 
Coupled with the presentation of the interview results, this chapter also presents the results of 
the questionnaire survey regarding Chinese ITP aUditing practices, generated from 38 
respondent tax authorities in China. The questionnaire consisted of five questions, of which 
four were closed. The survey allowed the qualitative evidence to be tested and to be 
generalised for the population. The following section describes the four research sites. 
12.2 Taxation Administrative Units in the Study 
The unit of analysis ofthese studies was four State Tax Bureaux (STB). Two of these were in 
a major coastal city with provincial status and two were in a medium-sized inland city, the 
capital city of its province. These two city locations are referred to as City A and City B. 
Subject to the National SAT, City A's Municipal STB is responsible for tax investigation and 
collection. It supervises a large number of County STB and a few District STB, each of which 
selects FIEs to audit. In 2002, FIEs contributed about 21.8 percent of City A's total tax 
revenue. One, in particular, of these County STB, subject to the Municipal STB, has twelve 
departments, among which, its foreign tax department is responsible for transfer pricing audits 
throughout its area of the city. 
In City B, the Inland Provincial STB, guided by goals established by the National SAT, is 
responsible for tax investigation and collection in the province. In the province in 2002, fifty-
one FIEs that had business transactions with their associated enterprises were audited in the 
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province. As a result, the transfer prices of 36 FIEs were adjusted, resulting in an increase of 
,taxable income by Renminbi 163.18 million. Eight FIEs were adjusted by adopting the 
comparable uncontrolled price method, two were adjusted by adopting the resale price 
method, seventeen were adjusted by adopting cost plus method, one was adjusted by adopting 
profit split method and eight were adjusted by adopting the deemed profit method. 
These adjustments resulted in a total profit for nine FIEs for 2002, and this was sufficient to 
make up for the accumulated loss brought forward from the previous year, which, in turn, 
resulted in an increase of tax revenue by Renminbi 46.34 million. 
In addition to the substantive responses by questionnaire from companies in New Zealand, 
Australia and China, and the responses secured by personal contact in China itself, the final 
group of responses elicited for the data collection consisted of tax officials in China, who 
were contacted by mail. As indicated in chapter 8, to overcome possible shortcomings arising 
from the data from other sources, and to pennit the generalizability of the main findings from 
the interviews of the four tax authorities, a one page semi-structured questionnaire was sent to 
80 Chinese tax authorities, representing a wide cross-section of the Chinese tax system. They 
included 26 provincial (municipal) tax bureaux and 54 city (district) tax bureaux located in 
the urban areas of China but only one of the six Autonomous Regions was selected for 
inclusion. Compared with the other areas of China, the Autonomous Regions attract few 
FDIs, Guangxi being the exception. ITP is therefore not considered a prominent issue for tax 
authorities in these regions. For the most part they have no officers in place specifically to 
deal with ITP. 
12.3 What is the Current Extent of International Transfer Pricing Abuse in China? 
Many FIEs are heavily engaged in transactions with overseas associates. A large number of 
FIEs have reported accounting losses (Chan and Chow, 1998). From the statistics of tax 
revenue, it appears that 35 percent to 40 percent of FIEs were in a loss-making position from 
1988 to 1993. For 1994 and 1995, the percentage increased to between 50 percent and 60 
percent. The percentage further increased to between 60 percent and 70 percent for 1996 
(Cho, 1998). 
The Chinese government suspects that transfer pricing has caused serious losses for tax 
revenue to the country. The foregoing data on losses may be taken as justification for that 
suspicion. In the interviews reported in this thesis, all the four tax authorities approached 
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expressed deep concel11 that FIEs were not actually paying their fair share of taxes in China . 
. The tax officials justified their concel11 for the alleged transfer pricing abuse by citing the 
magnitude of accountable losses of taxable income relating to transfer pricing. Three out of 
four tax authorities considered that the issue of profit shifting through ITP manipulation in 
their province or city was significant. Their verbatim comments included the foHowing: 
We have noted that many FIEs report persistent losses but continue to expand their 
operations. Except for normal operating losses, a number of FIEs may engage in tax 
avoidance by transferring their profits abroad and reporting losses in China. 
FIEs rely highly on imported inputs including machinelY and equipment, intermediate 
products and raw materials. Many FIEs have reported operating losses. Some of those 
FIEs may be engineering losses by importing materials and equipment into China from 
their overseas associates at a high price and exporting goods to their affiliated firms 
abroad at a low price. The issue of tax avoidance by transfer pricing is becoming all the 
more pressing as the number and types of cross-border transactions are expected to 
increase as the volume of MNEs doing business in China continues to growl-l. 
Many developing economies are so eager to attract foreign investment that they have little 
interest in ITP controls (Rahman and Scapens, 1986; Lin et aI., 1993). China has long 
adopted a zone policy whereby preferential tax rates and tax incentives are available for FIEs 
that operate in the designated investment incentive cities and regions along the coast of China. 
As a result of the series preferential tax policies that have been adopted in their jurisdictions, 
FDls are concentrated in the coastal provinces or cities. 
The different tax treatment for FIEs causes some problems. For example, regional 
discrepancies at multiple levels in existing preferential tax policies hamper foreign 
investment in the development of inland, remote and poor areas. At the same time, it 
also triggers harmful competition between local governments by willfully formulating 
preferential policies, leading to unnecessary losses for the State. 
ITP manipulation is not a significant practical concel11 to the tax authority in the inland city. 
The tax officers of the inland city tax authority explained the reasons for their lack of 
attention to ITP issues. 
Compared to the coastal cities in China, ITP manipulation is not a serious concern to 
our tax authority. In the city, corporate income tax accounts form a relatively small 
proportion of total tax revenue. On average, corporate income taxes contributed only 
16.7 percent of the total tax revenue in 2002. As an inland city, it is not easy to attract 
FDIs. The local government often attempts to provide an attractive investment 
environment for foreign investors and therefore is reluctant for the tax authority to 
adopt strict transfer pricing scrutiny for fear of inducing a flight of capital. In addition, 
from the government's viewpoint, the losses of corporate income taxes collected from 
FIEs can be more than compensated by a significant increase in FDI, because the 
14 All quotes in italics are quotes from interviews. 
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increased foreign investment should produce significant increases in revenues from 
other more productive taxes such as VATs, consumption taxes and business taxes. 
Another reason is that 
most of the FIEs operating in the city are newly established and should still be covered 
by tax holiday and tax rate reduction periods. Income adjustments to related party 
transactions of these FIEs do not significantly affect the collection of tax revenue. 
Although the inland city tax authority has not devoted much attention to ITP issues in the 
past, it has now started to challenge FIEs on the issue of ITP. The inland city tax authority has 
examiners who specialise in transfer pricing audits. 
Although the auditing sector was erected in 1992, the government worries that the 
imposition of tight control practices might impede foreign investment in the city. For 
many years, our central objective was to attract foreign investments rather than to 
collect income tax revenue from FIEs. Not until very recently has our tax authority 
noted the ITP manipulation issue and taken steps to combat tax avoidance by transfer 
pricing abuses of FIEs in the city. At present, there are four tax officers who fully 
concentrate on ITP tax auditing in our tax authority. 
Lall (1973) found that MNEs in Colombia over-priced their imports from 33 percent to over 
300 percent in the pharmaceutical sector, and from 24 percent to 81 percent in the rubber and 
electrical industries. In the case of China, to shift profits made by a Chinese subsidiary to the 
home country of its parent company, the parent firm can use ITP manipulation in a simple 
form, such as deliberately overpricing imports sent by the parent company to its Chinese 
subsidiary, or intentionally undervaluing exports by the subsidiary to its parent firm. A tax 
officer interviewed describes the situation as follows: 
It is often the case that an overseas parent company controls the purchases and sales of 
products of an FIE that operates in China. On the one hand, it intentionally inflates the 
price of equipment, raw materials and spare parts purchased and imported by the 
Chinese subsidiary. On the other hand, it suppresses the prices of finished products 
exportedfrom China. 
Besides cross-border transactions of goods or servIces, tax avoidance through the 'thin 
capitalisation' of Chinese subsidiaries of MNEs is also involved. 
Foreign investors sometimes do not invest sufficient capital in their Chinese 
subsidiaries. The capital needed for operations has to be borrowed from parent 
companies abroad at high interest rates. As a result, the FIEs' interest expenses are 
increased. 
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ITP abuses have severely hanned the economies of countries where MNEs operate, especially 
. in developing countries that have poorly equipped legal systems and lack professional 
expertise, in comparison with developed countries, to thwart the attempts of MNEs to 
manipulate transfer pricing (Plasschaeli, 1985). Lin et al (1993) indicated the costs of ITP 
manipulation to the host countries to be: (1) tax losses; (2) difficulty in auditing and 
evaluating films; (3) monopolised markets; (4) difficulty in entering the intemational market; 
(5) worsening the foreign exchange situation. The interviewees admitted that 'tax losses' were 
the major concem of ITP manipulation. Other important concems were that ITP abuses 
"increase the risk for credits and lenders", "generate a negative impact on the balance of 
foreign exchange", "worsen balance of trade" and "cause an unfair advantage of FIEs over 
domestic competitors". 
12.4 How do the Chinese Tax Authorities Administer an International Transfer Pricing 
Tax Audit? 
12.4.1 The International Transfer Pricing Tax Auditing Procedures 
The current Chinese transfer pricing regulations are used to govem the administration of tax 
audits to be conducted by tax authorities on related party transactions. The rules set out 
detailed procedures on how to carry out transfer pricing audits. In general, the tax audit 
procedures and approaches are classified as follows. 
12.4.1.1 Identification of Related Party Transactions 
Circular 59 classifies four major categories of reportable transactions with associated 
enterprises: 
• purchases and sales, transfers and use of tangible assets including buildings, 
transpOliation vehicles, machinery and equipment, tools and merchandise (products); 
• transfers and use of intangible assets, including land use rights, copyright, trademarks, 
brands, patents, proprietary technologies, industrial property rights and the provision 
of services relating to such transfers or right to use; 
• financing, including short-tenn and long-tenn loans and guarantees, sales of securities, 
and all kinds of interest bearing prepayments and deferred payments; and 
• provision of services, including provision of market research, marketing, management, 
administration, technical services, repairs, design, consulting, agency, research and 
development, legal and accounting services. 
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The tax auditors are required to record the details of these transactions on seven standardised 
, fonTIs which are then acknowledged and signed by the taxpayers. 
12.4.1.2 Office (Desk) Auditing 
On selecting the target, tax authorities will first stmi with office (desk) auditing and reviewing 
work papers, including all infonnation provided by taxpayers. Attention will be given to (1) 
profit levels, return on assets or operating margins; (2) completeness of sales revenue; (3) 
reasonableness of costs and expenses; (4) reasonableness of interest rates; and (5) transfer 
prices of intangible propeliy. 
12.4.1. 3 Field Auditing 
Following the office audit, a field audit will be conducted, if its desirability is indicated. A 
designated tax team will visit the company and conduct an on-the-spot inspection. The field 
inspection will include the factory, warehouses, accounting books and records, vouchers, 
contracts and other related documents, and involves interviews with key personnel. In China, 
the efficiency of tax audits was constrained by both the lack of internal staff resources and the 
lack of a sound institutional framework to deal with the issue. Sophisticated techniques - for 
example, the functional and economic analyses of the relevant entities and transactions -
which have been adopted widely by many developed nations to detennine both the source of 
income (or loss) and the ann's length allocation, have been rarely used by Chinese tax 
authorities. 
12.4.1.4 Transfer Pricing Tax Assessment 
If the auditors are sure that the related party transactions were not conducted in an arm's-
length manner, the tax authorities will adjust the FIE's taxable income using one of a range of 
methods, including the comparable uncontrolled price method; the resale price method; the 
cost plus mark-up method; the comparable profit method; profit split method; and 
transactional net margin method. Of the various methods, resale price and cost-plus tend to be 
used most often. 
Generally, the statute of limitation for transfer pricing audits and adjustment is three years. In 
the case of adjustments made for previous years, the statute of limitation could be up to ten 
years (Article 37 of State Administration of Taxation Circular [1998] No. 59). If the taxpayer 
does not agree with the transfer pricing adjustments made by the tax authority, he can provide 
additional supporting documentation. Tax authorities may re-evaluate adjustments and consult 
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further with the taxpayer. On approval from the competent tax authority, a notice of payment 
. for transfer pricing adjustment will be issued. 
12.4.1.5 Penalties 
The transfer pricing adjustments made can be punitive. Besides paying tax on the increased 
taxable income arising from a transfer pricing adjustment, if the enterprise does not also 
adjust its accounting books to reflect a receivable from the related party for the excess 
price/fee charged, the amount of the adjustment will also be treated as a deemed dividend. 
This deemed dividend, if deemed paid to a foreign party, will be subject to a 20 percent 
withholding tax. The withholding rate may be reduced under a tax treaty, depending on the 
definition of dividends in the particular treaty. For any adjustments made on a royalty or 
interests that have been paid to the foreign party and that have already been subject to 
withholding tax, no refunds on withholding tax previously paid will be granted (Article 10 of 
State Administration of Taxation circular [1992] No. 237, Oct. 1992). A late payment charge 
(0.2 percent daily) applies where a taxpayer fails to make a payment according to the due date 
set by the tax authorities on an amount resulting from a transfer pricing adjustment. 
12.4.2 Circumstances under which Tax Authorities Initiate Audits 
As a check for compliance with the arm's length pricing principle for related party 
transactions, the Chinese transfer pricing rules not only provide for the circumstances under 
which high-risk FIEs can be identified but also require the Chinese tax authorities to audit at 
least 30 percent of the enterprises on the target list. These circumstances include the 
following: 
1. Production and operational decisions controlled by associated enterprises; 
2. Large transaction amounts with associated enterprises 
3. Long periods oflosses - for more than two consecutive years; 
4. Lower profits or losses for an extended period, but a continuously expanding scale of 
operations; 
5. Fluctuating profit patterns, with frequent interchanging of profits and losses; 
6. Transactions with associated enterprises established in tax havens; 
7. Lower profitability than enterprises in the same industry; 
8. Lower profit margins than other group companies; 
9. Unreasonable expenses paid to associated enterprises; and 
10. A sudden and significant drop in profits after a preferential tax treatment period, such 
as the expiration of a tax holiday period. 
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The interviewees were asked to express their relative concern about ITP abuses by FIEs under 
the above listed circumstances. 'FIEs whose production and operational decisions are 
controlled by associated enterprises' was commonly considered as their most significant 
concern. They also reported that 
In addition, we also pay great attention fo those FIEs whose supply of raw materials 
and sales offinished products are controlled by their overseas parent companies. These 
transactions may trigger transfer pricing audits when we consider that purchases are 
ovelpriced or sales underpriced and, because of the particular concern of pricing abuse 
in the area of intercompany transfers of tangible goods and properties, we are devoting 
increasing resources to auditing such sorts of transactions. 
Other important concerns expressed included 'FIEs that have losses, but continuously expand 
the scale of their operations', 'FIEs with a fluctuating pattern of profits or losses, that is, FIEs 
that have a profit or loss every other year or in an irregular pattern' and 'FIEs with 
transactions with associated enterprises established in tax havens'. In conclusion, FIEs which 
are controlled by associated enterprises and consistently report substantial losses are 
particularly vulnerable to transfer pricing audits by tax authorities. In addition, FIEs 
continually reporting profit and losses fluctuations from year to year and those transacting 
with related enterprises in tax havens are also vulnerable to transfer pricing audits. 
Based on the results of the interviews, a questionnaire was sent to 80 Chinese tax authorities 
to check how concerned they were about ITP abuse by each of the ten types of FIEs, with 
their related party transactions. The underlying assumption is that tax officers will intensify 
their scrutiny of those firms they suspect of ITP manipulation. Thirty-eight returns were 
obtained. The results from the 38 respondent tax authorities from this survey are shown in 
Table 12.1. 
It can be seen that 'production and operational decisions are controlled by associated 
enterprises' was indicated by the respondents as the most significant concern for possible ITP 
abuses. Other significant concerns included 'lower profits or losses for an extended period, 
but continuously expands the scale of its operations', 'sudden and significant drop in profits 
after a preferential tax treatment period, such as the expiration of a tax holiday period', 
'transactions with associated enterprises established in tax havens' and 'lower profitability 
than enterprises in the same industry'. 
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Table 12.1 
Concerns about ITP Abuses Cited by Tax Authorities According to the Types of Firm 
Types of Firms Means SD 
VAR 1 Production and operational decisions are controlled by associated enterprises 4.68 0.525 
V AR 4 Lower profits or losses for an extended period, but continuously expands the 4.53 
scale of its operations 
V AR 10 Sudden and significant drop in profits after a preferential tax treatment period, 4.42 
such as the expiration of a tax holiday period 
V AR 6 Transactions with associated enterprises established in tax havens 4.34 
VAR 7 Lower profitability than enterprises in the same industry 4.34 
V AR 2 Large transaction amounts with associated enterprises 4.32 
V AR 9 Unreasonable expenses paid to associated enterprises 4.16 
V AR 3 Long periods of losses (more than two consecutive years) 4.08 
VAR 5 Fluctuating profit patters (with frequent interchanging of profits and losses) 3.97 
VAR 8 Lower profit margins than other group companies 3.79 
Note: The mean for each variable was based on a scale from 1 = very possible, to 5 = nnposslble. For an easier 
understanding, the original Likert-like code was reversed to 1 = impossible, to 5 = VeIY possible, high 
means indicating a greater concern for ITP abuses. The standard deviation measures the volatility of a 
variable: the higher the standard deviation, the more volatile the variables. 
Three variables were indicated as being of relatively greater concern by the respondent tax 
authorities. They are 'large transaction amounts with associated enterprises', 'unreasonable 
expenses paid to associated enterprises' and 'long periods of losses-more than two 
consecutive years'. Variables that were of moderate concern included 'fluctuating profit 
patterns, with frequent interchanging of profits and losses' and 'lower profit margins than 
other group companies'. 
12.4.3 Related Party Transactions Investigated 
FIEs typically engage in a wide range of related party transactions with overseas associates. 
Circular 59 classifies four major categories of reportable transactions with associated 
enterprises as follows. 
1. purchases and sales, transfers and use of tangible assets; 
2. transfers and use of intangible assets; 
3. financing; and 
4. provision of services. These transactions can be detailed as follows: 
12.4.3.1 Purchases and Sales, Transfers and Use of Tangible Assets 
FIEs often rely on associated enterprises outside China for raw materials, machines and 
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equipment, and sale of finished products to overseas affiliates. These sorts of transactions 
. typically trigger transfer pricing examination when purchases are overpriced and sales 
underpriced, or leasing fees for equipment are excessive (Sun, 1999). 
12.4.3.2 Transfers and Use of Intangible Assets 
Transfer pricing of the use of intangible property includes patents and know-how owned by a 
foreign associated enterprise but licensed to an FIE in China for production or operational 
purposes. If the royalties and other payments for the transfer of intellectual property rights 
charged by an associated enterprise are not at arm's length, the tax authorities may adjust the 
amount of royalties claimed by the FIE for tax purposes (Sun, 1999). 
12.4.3.3 Financing Transactions 
Transfer pricing usually comes into consideration when the interest rate used by an FIE in 
such transactions is higher or lower than the normal interest rate for similar transactions. If an 
FIE borrows funds from a related party and is charged an excessive interest rate on the loan, 
transfer pricing would be triggered (Sun, 1999). 
12.4.3.4 Provision of Services 
Generally, when an FIE provides services to associated enterprises free of charge or with 
umeasonably low fees, or when an FIE pays excessive fees for services provided by 
associated enterprises, the Chinese tax authorities are likely to use fees for similar services 
provided by independent parties as the basis for an arm's length price (Sun, 1999) . 
The interviewees were asked to express their relative concern about ITP abuses of FIEs via 
the four types of transactions. A typical response was that "one of the most common forms of 
ITP abuses in China is when an FIE makes excessive payments to its overseas affiliates for 
importing of materials or equipment, and when the same FIE underprices its sales or exports 
of finished products to the overseas associates." 
For that reason 'purchases and sales, transfers and use of tangible goods' was chosen as their 
most significant concern. Consequently, tax authorities would generally select transactions 
with the following features as targets for investigation, as quoted by the respondents: 
1. Where machinery and equipment is provided to the FIE by its foreign affiliates; 
2. Where the FIE's raw materials are supplied by its foreign affiliates; and 
3. Where the FIE's products are sold to its foreign affiliates. 
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A questionnaire was sent to 80 Chinese tax authorities to check how concerned they were 
,about lTP abuse by each of the four types of FIEs, with their related party transactions. The 
underlying assumption is that tax officers will intensify their scmtiny of those firms they 
suspect of lTP manipulation. The results from the 38 respondent tax authorities are shown in 
Table 12.2. 
Table 12.2 
Concerns about ITP Abuses Cited by 
Tax Authorities According to the Type of Transaction between Related Parties 
International transfers Mean Standard Deviation 
Tangible goods 4.68 0.620 
Intangibles 4.24 0.820 
Financing 3.92 0.941 
Services 3.82 1.062 
Note: the mean for each vanable was based on a scale from I = very possIble, to 5 = ImpossIble. For an eaSIer 
understanding, the original Likert-like code was reversed to I = impossible, to 5 = very possible, high 
means indicating a greater concern for ITP abuses. The standard deviation measures the volatility of a 
variable: the higher the standard deviation, the more volatile the variables. 
It can be observed that 'the transfer of tangible goods' and 'the transfer of intangibles' were 
cited by the respondents as being of great concern for potential lIP abuse, whereas 'the 
transfer of financing' and 'the transfer of services' were cited by the respondents as being of 
moderate concern for potential ITP abuse. This result is consistent with Chan and Chow 
(1997a, 2001) who found that, predominantly, tax audits (95 percent) were concerned with the 
buying and selling of goods and materials. Since financing through inter-group loans is not a 
common practice in FlEs, and thin capitalisation is unlikely to be a substitute mechanism for 
shifting profits out of China, 'the transfer of financing' is not a significant concern of tax 
authorities for lIP abuse in China. 
12.4.4 Industry and Size of Targeted FIEs for Transfer Pricing Examination 
Chan and Chow (1997a) detected income shifting behaviour of FIEs in certain industries, 
such as the manufacture of audio/video equipment, garments, and plastics raw 
materials/products. Chan and Chow (1997b) also found that, in 1992-1993, tax audits on 
transfer pricing were confined mainly to medium- and small-sized foreign investments. 
The interview results confirm Chan and Chow's finding. The four tax authorities focused their 
tax audit efforts on relatively small-sized FIEs in the electronic and telecommunications 
equipment, garment, plastics and other re-processing industries. The tax officials explained 
the reason as that 
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we are required to audit at least 30 percent of the high-risk entelprises identified on the 
target list. Audits of large FIEs require sophisticated techniques and are time consuming. 
At present, our tax authority lacks sufficient staff resources and experience to tackle 
large FIEs for transfer pricing issues although we believe that the problem of transfer 
pricing is more serious in large companies. 
In addition, 
a major goal for the local government is attracting foreign investment, particularly from 
large-sized multinational companies and for hi-tech projects. Excessively strict transfer 
pricing scrutiny may induce aflight of capital. 
Under China's FIE income tax law, the corporate tax rate is 30 percent plus a 3 percent local 
tax on that sum, amounting to a 33 percent total tax rate. In order to attract more foreign 
investment, a package of special preferential tax treatments has been granted to FIEs based in 
designated cities and regions. These treatments include: 
(l) A preferential income tax rate of 15 percent granted to FIEs based in designed zones, 
including Special Economic Zones, Economic and Technology Development Zones, 
High-technology Development Zones and the Pudong New Development Zones in 
Shanghai; 
(2) A preferential rate of 24 percent offered to industrial FIEs based in Coastal Open 
Economic Zones and Cities, or in Old Urban Districts where Special Economic Zones 
and Economic and Technology Development Zones are located. 
Due to these preferential tax policies, FIEs operating in different places may be subject to 
different tax rates. This has some tax planning implications for FIEs. For instance, an FIE 
located in an interior city can shift profits to its associates that operate in a coastal city where 
tax concessions are offered. Out of concern for the multinational tax avoidance issue due to 
income tax rate differentials between different regions in China, the Inland Province STB 
does not confine itself only to the evaluation of cross-border transactions. Related transactions 
conducted between associated enterprises within China are also targeted for transfer pricing 
examination. 
12.4.5 Transfer Pricing Methods Enforced by Tax Authorities 
Article 13 of the Chinese Tax Law provides that "the payment or receipt of charges or fees in 
business transactioris between an enterprise with foreign investment, or an establishment, or a 
place set up in China by a foreign enterprise to engage in production or business operations, 
and its associated enterprises, shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of 
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charges or fees in business transactions between independent enterprises. Where the payment 
. or receipt of charges or fees is not made in the same manner as in business transactions 
between independent enterprises and results in a reduction of the taxable income, the tax 
authorities shall have the right to make a reasonable adjustment". 
Article 54 of the Tax Law stipulates that if the buying and selling between an enterprise and 
its associated enterprise are not priced at arm's length, the tax authorities may adopt an 
appropriate method to make adjustments. Pricing methods include the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, cost plus and the resale price method. Owing to the lack of 
reliable public data in China, the tax authorities, in reality, also consider 'other methods' to 
include price transactions as appropriate methods. These are 'profit-base' methods such as the 
comparable profit method, profit split method, transactional net margin method, and deemed 
profit method. 
The participants were asked to select one or more pricing method normally used in income 
adjustment. It appears that the cost plus method and the deemed profit method are most 
frequently used by the tax: authorities during transfer pricing tax audits. The cost plus method 
involves the cost plus reasonable expenses and profit margin, as quoted. 
In application of the cost plus method, we generally use the cost of the product for both 
accounting and incorfle tax purposes and apply a reasonable deemed profit margin to 
arrive at an arm's length price. 
The reason given for the use of the cost plus method as a favourite pricing was that "it is 
simpler to administer and it is understandable. In addition, the data in using that pricing 
method are more readily available". An important aspect of the cost plus method is to decide 
the appropriate mark-ups. In cases where it is difficult to decide mark-ups among comparable 
enterprises or where there are differences that materially affect the cost plus mark-ups earned 
in the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, 'bargaining' usually arises between the tax 
authorities and the taxpayers to negotiate a mutually acceptable pricing. 
The deemed profit method is another popular method used by the tax authorities in the 
circumstances under which the FIE could not provide complete and accurate information 
associated with costs and expenses and did not calculate taxable income correctly. No detailed 
guidelines are issued on the application of this method. Tax authorities assess the taxable 
income of related party transactions by adopting a comparable profit margin. In the absence of 
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comparable transactions, tax authorities consider the deemed profit method as an option. The 
. comparable uncontrolled price method uses the market price for the transfe11'ed goods and 
services and is often thought of as the 'best pricing method'. The comparable uncontrolled 
price method is not used as often as expected by the tax authorities because "the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction required by using the comparable uncontrolled price method is often 
difficult to locate or it is not available in the Chinese market at all". The results on methods 
used from the 38 respondent tax authorities are shown in Table 12.3. 
Table 12.3 
Legal Oriented ITP Methods 
Enforced by Tax Authorities for Buying and Selling Goods and Materials 
Pricing Methods # of tax authorities Percentage 
Cost plus method 32 28.1 
Deemed profit method 24 21.1 
Comparable uncontrolled price method 23 20.2 
Resale price method 17 14.9 
Comparable profit method 10 8.8 
Profit split method 5 4.4 
Transactional net margin method 2 1.8 
Other methods * * 1 .9 
Total 114* 100 .. 
Note: * 12 tax authonttes used more than one ITP method. 
** Other method is the global formulary apportionment. 
It can be seen that the method most commonly used in income adjustments is 'cost plus 
method', which was adopted by 32 (28.1 percent) tax authorities in the sample. Other popular 
methods used are 'deemed profit method', 'the comparable uncontrolled price method', 'the 
resale price method' and 'the comparable profit method', used, respectively, by, 24 (21.1 
percent), 24 (20.2 percent), 17 (14.9 percent) and 10 (8.8 percent) of the tax authorities. The 
least widely used methods by the tax authorities in the sample include 'profit split', 
'transactional net margin method' and 'other methods' such as the global formulary 
apportionment. 
12.4.6 Advance Pricing Agreement 
AP As can be uniteral, bilateral, or multilateral in nature. Chinese transfer pricing regulations 
do not contain formal APA procedures. However, as indicated in the Chinese transfer pricing 
regulations, AP As are acceptable avenues of negotiation with local state tax authorities. To 
receive an AP A approval, a taxpayer is required to submit an "application fmm for 
determining APAs". Taxpayers can negotiate APAs with provincial state tax authorities, and 
no approval from the SAT, the highest tax authority in China, is required. Of the four STB, 
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only the Inland Province STB has established AP As with two large-sized FIEs. FIEs appear 
, uninterested in pmiicipating in AP A progranunes. The tax officers explained the reason as: 
The size of some FIEs may be too small to warrant an AP A; the AP As established are 
not as efficient as expected because we have no formal APA procedures to refer to; we 
are not experienced with AP As; it is time consuming, for instance, it often takes several 
months, at least, to establish an AP A; An AP A programme may place a strain on 
transfer pricing audit resources as the process of initiating and negotiating an AP A 
would divert resources earmarked for other purposes to the AP A program; An AP A 
must be initiated by the taxpayers but FIEs are not willing to apply for and negotiate an 
APA with the tax authority; andfinally, the SAT has not issued clear guidelines on how 
to apply for an AP A and on what kind of information is required for this exercise. 
At the time of writing (January 2004), the SAT is attempting to establish formal APA 
procedures. It is reasonable to predict that AP As will be used more often in the future in 
China. 
12.4.7 Sources of Comparable Pricing Information 
The shortage of comparable pricing information is the mam concern for Chinese tax 
authorities in conducting transfer pricing audits and adjustments. One source of information is 
from the taxpayers. Taxpayers transacting with their foreign affiliates are obliged to provide 
information on their associated enterprises, the value and amount of transactions between the 
associated enterprises and the FIEs. The Chinese tax authorities accumulate the pricing 
information reported by taxpayers and have established a network to store and share the 
information nationwide. In addition, the pricing information may be acquired via searching 
the relevant internet sites or other media. Besides the pricing information collected internally, 
the tax authorities could also acquire pricing information through other authorities in China, 
including customs, industry and commerce, foreign trade and foreign exchange control 
authorities and embassies. Finally, routine information exchanges with competent foreign 
authorities may allow the Chinese tax authorities to access financial information from 
overseas affiliates of FIEs. China has signed income tax treaties with more than 60 countries. 
The SAT is responsible for coordinating the information enquiry with competent authorities. 
Through the SAT, the Chinese tax authorities can exchange information with competent 
authorities in tax treaty countries. 
12.5 How Adequate are the Existing Chinese Control Measures? 
The four tax authorities were asked to comment on the existing transfer pricing auditing 
systems. Three tax authorities considered their auditing systems to be "moderately effective". 
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One tax authority was not satisfied with its auditing system and considered the auditing 
. system to be "ineffective". The tax authorities pointed out that the most common problem 
encountered in the implementation of their ITP tax audits was "the difficulty in obtaining 
relevant pricing information of FIEs with their related companies outside China". Another 
problem was the difficulty in determining the pricing of intercompany transfer of intangibles 
(e.g., research and marketing). "The transfer of intangibles is patiicularly difficult for the 
ann's length principle to deal with as finding useful comparable data is very hard. The 
measures of such transactions such as payments for intellectual property rights, know-how 
and other payments of a similar nature cause the most problem for us". Also, the tax 
authorities faced a difficulty in determining inter-group services and in calculating the fees. 
It is often difficult for us to find a comparable price for such services provided to an 
FIE by its parent company abroad. If we deem that the fees charged are not comparable 
to fees which are agreed to by arm's length enterprises, adjustments may be made, 
accordingly, for tax purposes. 
12.6 What Factors Constrain the International Transfer Pricing Monitoring System in 
China? 
12.6.1 Factors Constraining the International Transfer Pricing Monitoring System 
Brean (1979), Lall (1979), and Plasschaert (1985) argued that developing countries are more 
vulnerable to transfer pricing manipulation because of their greater ignorance of ITP matters. 
Even when they had strong suspicions that transfer pricing were being abused, they might 
lack the information, expertise and staff to tackle the issue. 
The researcher investigated practical difficulties encountered by the Chinese tax authorities in 
auditing the related party transactions of PIEs. The interviewees were asked what factors 
constrained the ITP monitoring system in China and which, therefore, ultimately hampered 
tax collection and administration work. The issues identified through interviews with tax 
officials of the four tax authorities are summarised as follows. 
12.6.2 Lack of Information Exchange with Foreign Tax Authorities and Lack of an 
Appropriate Transfer Pricing Computerised Information System 
FIEs often purchase raw materials and machines and equipment from associated enterprises 
outside China, and then sell finished products to them. The unavailability of pricing 
information of the overseas companies often gives rise to an 'information gap' which makes 
the monitoring of ITP difficult. In addition, there is no effective nationwide computerised 
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. infonnation-sharing network for tax administration so far. Information exchanges with 
. overseas fiscal authorities may be an altemative for solving the problem. 
In the interviews, the respondents indicated that only the SAT, the highest tax authority in 
. China, was responsible for coordination and exchange with foreign tax authorities in respect 
of information about transfer pricing, although local tax authorities can pass their pricing 
enquiry to the SAT for assistance. 
During the interviews, the most often cited issue for transfer pricing monitoring was 'lack of 
information exchange with foreign tax authorities'. The interviewees explained that 
due to the lack of information exchange with foreign fiscal authorities in respect of 
information about transfer pricing. we cannot access financial information ahout 
foreign companies. It is a major challenge for us to determine pricing and income 
adjustments in cases where the raw materials or machines are purchased or the 
products are sold overseas by FIEs. 
12.6.3 Lack of Well-Defined Transfer Pricing Legislation and Regulations and Lack of a 
Sound Institutional Framework for Transfer Pricing Auditing 
Over the past decade, the Chinese govemment has made great efforts to counter ITP abuse 
through developing increasingly complex transfer pricing regulations. Yet, compared with the 
transfer pricing regulations of developed economies, the Chinese transfer pricing legislation is 
considered rudimentary and still needs to become more sophisticated. The tax authorities lack 
enforcement power to deal with transfer pricing issues. The current Chinese transfer pricing 
rules neither introduce guidelines on appropriate documentation in order to assist taxpayers in 
managing the compliance requirements nor cover the pricing of intangible or services or cost 
sharing arrangements. Moreover, although there are general non-compliance penalty 
provisions in the tax law, there is no provision in the transfer pricing regulations to impose 
specific penalties on transfer pricing cases. The penalty against transfer pricing tax evasion is 
mainly restricted to a fine of a relatively insignificant amount15 . Painless penalties can hardly 
be a sufficient deterrent against tax evasion, and violators have little incentive to stop this 
behaviour. 
15 The Chinese transfer pricing regulations stipulate that an delay for an enterprise in filing the required returns 
on related party transactions has a penalty of up to a mere 10000 yuan (U. S. $1200). This hardly amounts to a 
strong deterrent. 
155 
12.6.4 Lack of Well-Trained Personnel to Conduct Tax Auditing and Transfer Pricing 
Surveillance. 
The inland city tax bureau lags behind its counterparts located in the coastal cities in terms of 
training and technical competence. "Compared with coastal tax authorities, our tax authority 
(i.e., the inland city tax authority) has relatively less ability to deal with transfer pricing 
manipulation issues by audit activity". 
12.6.5 Shortage of Adequate Resources 
The inland city tax bureau was not adequately resourced for tax audits on transfer pricing. 
It is only in recent years that a separate division has been set up to fully concentrate on 
tax audits on transfer pricing for our tax authority. With inadequate stqff resources, our 
tax authority is deterred from undertaking large scale audits or from adopting 
sophisticated techniques in tax audits. 
12.6.6 Lack of Expertise and Experience to Tackle Transfer Pricing Issues 
Circular 59 requires an actual audit coverage of at least 30 percent of the identified audit 
targets for each year. However, due to a shortage of staff and the lack of operational funds, it 
is difficult for the tax authorities to achieve this coverage. Although the Chinese tax 
authorities have recently allocated more resources to transfer pricing audits and 
investigations, they still suffer from a shortage of trained personnel and lack of adequate data 
gathering and processing facilities. These problems are likely to continue to impede efforts to 
deal with the complex issue of transfer pricing in the country. The results regarding 
constraining factors from the 38 respondent tax authorities are shown in Table 12.4. 
It can be seen that most of the respondent tax authorities - 35, or 20.7 percent - considered 
'lack of information exchange with foreign tax authorities' as the biggest factor constraining 
the Chinese ITP monitoring system. This is followed, in order, by 'lack of an appropriate 
transfer pricing computerised information system, 'lack technical competence', 'lack of well-
defined transfer pricing legislation and regulations', 'insufficient staff resources', 'lack of a 
sound institutional framework of transfer pricing auditing', 'lack expertise and experience' 
and 'other', ticked, respectively, by, 30 (17.8 percent), 24 (14.2 percent), 24 (14.2 percent), 21 
(12.4 percent), 16 (9.5 percent), 14 (8.3 percent) and five (3.0 percent) of the tax authorities in 
the sample. 
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Table 12.4 
Factors Constraining the ITP Monitoring System 
Factors Number Percentage 
Lack of information exchange with foreign tax authorities 35 20.7 
Lack of an appropriate transfer pricing computerised information system 30 17.8 
Lack technical competence 24 14.2 
Lack of well-defined transfer pricing legislation and regulations 24 14.2 
Insufficient staff resources 21 12.4 
Lack of a sound institutional framework of transfer pricing auditing 16 9.5 
Lack expeltise and experience 14 8.3 
Others 5 3.0 .. 
Note: most tax authOrItIes tIcked more than one factor. 
12.7 How Should the Chinese ITP Monitoring System be Improved? 
The interviewer invited the participants to make suggestions on how the Chinese ITP 
monitoring system could be improved. Their suggestions can be summarised as follows. 
12.7.1 Information Exchange with Foreign Tax Authorities 
China has signed income tax treaties with more than 60 countries around the world. The SAT 
is responsible for exchanging information with the competent authorities of tax treaty 
countries. 
An international exchange network can be set up and routine information exchanges 
withforeign tax authorities should be conducted Information exchanges would allow us 
to access financial information from foreign companies. 
12.7.2 Establishment of an Appropriate Transfer Pricing Computerised Information, 
Administrative and Monitoring System 
As the highest tax authority in China, "the SAT should establish, nation-wide, transfer pricing 
related software to facilitate the collection of comparable information". At the time of writing, 
the SAT is installing a transfer pricing related software. This national computer system can 
facilitate the ability of Chinese tax authorities at different levels to share pricing information. 
12.7.3 Improving Technical Competence of Tax Officials 
The Chinese tax authorities should provide training for tax officials on transfer pricing. Since 
1991, China has been sending delegations of tax authorities to the Netherlands, Japan and the 
U.S. for training on transfer pricing. In addition, "the SAT has organised several transfer 
pricing training seminars for training tax officers from local tax authorities". Components of 
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study include the OECD approach to transfer pricing, a functional and risk analysis, the 
. identification of comparable transactions and comparable unrelated entities, and an evaluation 
of various transfer pricing methods. Transfer pricing specialist teams should be set up by all 
provincial level tax authorities. The transfer pricing specialist teams shall collaborate with 
other authorities in China to strengthen their transfer pricing audit capabilities. 
China is a latecomer to the ITP field. Compared with the transfer pricing regulations of 
developed economies, the Chinese transfer pricing legislation is considered rudimentary. In 
China, the efficiency of tax audits is constrained by both internal staff resource shortages and 
the lack of a sound institutional framework to deal with the issue. On the improvement of the 
Chinese ITP monitoring system, some comments from an open question in the questionnaire 
survey to the provincial and city tax authorities are quoted as follows: 
Tax examiners are often frustrated in their attempts to gather evidence of transfer 
pricing abuses. The exchange of tax information with domestic and overseas 
counterparts may allow them to obtain the necessary information in combating 
international tax evasion and avoidance. 
An international exchange netv.1ork can be set up and routine information 
exchanges with foreign tax authorities should be conducted. To strengthen the 
enforcement of transfer pricing examinations, tax authorities should enhance 
cooperation with other authorities such as customs, industrial and commercial 
departments. 
One way to perform transfer pricing audits more efficiently is to establish internal 
databases to be available to the various levels of tax authorities by way of computer 
networks. 
Since no serious punishment is imposed on ITP abuse, even when we succeed in 
challenging a related party transaction, it will normally be worthwhile for an FIE 
to 'hy it on '. To strengthen the enforcement of transfer pricing examinations, it is 
imperative to inh'oduce specific transfer pricing penalties in the tax law. The 
current low penalty law must be changed to give violators real financial 
consequences if they fail to comply. 
In future, transfer pricing audits will become more rigorous as the Chinese tax authorities 
have been strengthening their administrative ability in tax collection, by using a greater 
degree of computerisation in tax administration, the establishment of a rigorous tax inspection 
system and formalised tax legislation procedures for dealing with transfer pricing 
manipulation. The comments from a tax officer of the SAT reflect the general points of most 
Chinese tax officers: 
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China is a developing country. Tax administration governing transfer pricing is 
in its infancy. We lack experience. What we must do now is to improve our tax 
laws, train our tax persOlmel, strengthen intemational co-operation, learn from 
intemational experience and CatTY forward our endeavours actively according to 
the Chinese circumstances (Cho, 1998, pp.99). 
As the volume of FIEs doing business in China continues to grow, and the Chinese 
government continues to draw on the experience of the developed economies in enforcing its 
own transfer pricing rules, it can be anticipated that the tax authorities in China will intensify 
their investigations of related party transactions over time to prevent the loss of future income . 
FIEs need to prepare now, more than ever, to support their transfer pricing tax positions when 
managing their financial affairs involving substantial dealings with associated enterprises. 
12.8 Summary 
This chapter reports on the interview and survey results conducted with Chinese tax 
authorities. The next chapter will summarise the study results and present conclusions drawn 
from findings of this research. Policy implications and limitations of this study will also be 
presented . 
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Chapter 13 
Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
13.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents conclusions drawn from the findings of this study. Policy implications of 
the findings for ITP theory and practices will be discussed. Finally, this chapter will also present 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
13.2 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
13.2.1 Conclusions 
The objectives of this study are four-fold. First, it investigates the similarities and differences in 
ITP practices by MNEs in New Zealand, Australia, and China. Second, it ascertains whether an 
ITP tax audit is an important concern of MNEs in formulating their ITP policies. Third, it 
identifies the characteristics of MNEs that make them more vulnerable to ITP tax audits. Fourth, 
it examines the ITP monitoring system in China. 
The results of this study reveal statistically significant differences between the transfer pricing 
methods used by Chinese companies and their New Zealand and Australian counterparts. 65.9 
percent of Chinese firms use market-based methods while only 43.2 percent and 39 percent of the 
New Zealand and Australian respondent firms respectively use market-based methods. Compared 
with their New Zealand and Australian counterparts, Chinese companies tend to use market-
based methods. The findings of this study are consistent with Chan and Chow's studies (1998, 
2001) who found that Chinese companies tended to use market-oriented methods. In their studies, 
38 or 59 percent of Chinese subsidiaries used market-based methods, whereas 26 or 41 percent of 
Chinese subsidiaries adopted cost-based methods. With regard to the use of individual transfer 
pricing methods, 'full plus fixed profit' is widely used by both the New Zealand and Australian 
respondent companies, while Chinese firms prefer to use 'full market price' and 'negotiation 
based on costs' . 
Statistically significant differences are also found between the two sets of companies regarding 
the degree of emphasis they place on environmental factors affecting their ITP policies. In this 
study, a number of environmental factors are virtually introduced by government policies, 
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especially those in developing countries. They include customs duties, restrictions on repatriation 
of income, import restrictions, foreign currency exchange controls, price controls of host 
government, political and social pressure, and royalty restrictions. The Chinese companies place 
more emphasis on almost all the 17 environmental variables than the New Zealand and 
Australian firms. The Chinese companies engage in a relatively wider range of intercompany 
transactions, and business operations in China are subject to more economic, political and social 
risks, owing to the particular vagaries of the Chinese business environment (Chan & Chow, 
1998). Hence, the incentives and motives driving transfer pricing manoeuvres are stronger for the 
Chinese firms than for the New Zealand and Australian companies. These results support 
previous studies which argued that developing countries typically impose more restrictions on 
MNCs than developed countries, and thus government policies and regulations had encouraged 
MNEs to engage in ITP manipulation more often in developing countries than in developed 
countries (Lall, 1973, Plasschaert, 1985, Al-Eryani et aI., 1990). 
For New Zealand and Australia, the scores of 16 environmental variables are not significant. A 
difference is recorded in the case of the ranking of one variable, 'restrictions on repatriation of 
income'. In contrast, for New Zealand and China, on the one hand, and Australia and China, on 
the other, there are significant differences in the case of 15 environmental variables. Only two 
variables, 'comply with tax law and regulations' and 'tax authority transfer pricing audits' are 
shown to have no significant differences. Therefore, it can be concluded that the New Zealand 
and Australian companies share a high level of agreement on the relative importance of the 
environmental variables, while significantly different values are placed on the same variables by 
the Chinese firms. 
In this study, a conjecture was made that multinational transfer pricing practices in New Zealand 
and Australia would be similar as the multinationals in these two countries take similar 
environmental factors into consideration, but different ones from those of their Chinese 
counterparts. To verify the validity of this conjecture, eight hypotheses were developed. Table 
13.1 summarises the results of the hypothes is testing. The results are classified as "accepted" or 
"rejected". The results shown in Table 13.1 support the conjecture that different transfer pricing 
systems and strategies would be employed within the context of the different social, economic 
and legal environments of nations. 
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Table 13.1 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Test results 
Hypothesis Oa: There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in New Zealand, Australia and China Rejected 
Hypothesis Ob: There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in New Zealand and Australia Accepted 
-
Hypothesis Oc: There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in New Zealand and China Rejected 
Hypothesis Od: There are no differences in ITP methods used by multinationals in Australia and China Rejected 
Hypothesis Oe: There are no differences in the rating of factors affecting ITP in New Zealand, Australia and China Rejected 
Hypothesis Of: There are no differences in the rating of factors affecting ITP in New Zealand and Australia Accepted 
Hypothesis Og: There are no differences in the rating of factors affecting ITP in New Zealand and China Rejected 
Hypothesis Oh: There are no differences in the rating of factors affecting ITP in Australia and China Rejected 
'----- ---_._-- - --- _ .. - - ----
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With regard to the relative impOliance of the 17 environmental variables in each country, the 
variable 'tax authority transfer pricing auditing' is ranked only 13th by the Chinese respondents 
but fifth by both the New Zealand and Australian respondents. In other words, the tax authority 
transfer pricing audit is an important concern in transfer pricing decisions for New Zealand and 
Australian companies. In contrast, it was relatively unimportant to the Chinese firms. This is 
perhaps because the New Zealand and Australian tax authorities are more aggressive than their 
Chinese counterparts in administering and enforcing their transfer pricing rules. In comparison 
with China, therefore, ITP practices are more strictly constrained by the transfer pricing audits of 
New Zealand and Australian tax authorities. The global transfer pricing survey by Ernst and 
Young (2004) reveals that both New Zealand and Australian taxpayers ran a high risk of transfer 
pricing audits but this risk was only of a modest order for Chinese taxpayers. The result of this 
study is consistent with Ernst and Young (2004). 
This study hypothesed that a number of a company's corporate attributes were likely to trigger 
ITP audits by tax authorities. The test results support the hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between ITP tax audits and corporate characteristics. Overall, the influences of Nationality, Size 
and Financing on ITP audits are significant both directly and interactively. Therefore, there is 
robust statistical support for the conclusion that tax authorities in the three countries tend to focus 
their ITP tax audits on Japan or Hong Kong-based; large-sized subsidiaries, with greater volumes 
of intercompany transactions in financing. 
For individual countries, while New Zealand and Australian tax authorities tend to audit large-
sized firms, the Chinese tax authority tend to focus their ITP tax audits on relatively small-sized 
firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) contended that larger companies encountered more 
government scrutiny. This survey shows that the IRD and the A TO tend to audit large-sized 
multinationals. Large firms in non-competitive environments, whose internal transfer prices are 
not readily compared with market prices, can maintain complex transfer pricing systems aimed, 
in pati, at tax-avoidance. Small firms facing more competition, whose transfer prices the tax 
officers can readily check against market prices, do not have the opportunity to use such 
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manoeuvres to their tax advantage l6 (Caves, 1996). Another explanation is that the tax authorities 
would spend more time and effort scrutinizing larger transactions to enhance their tax revenues. 
There are much more tax dollars at stake in a large company. For example, if transfer prices are 
adjusted by 10 percent on a $1 million transaction, the result will not be as significant a tax 
change as if there were a 10 percent adjustment on a $10 million transaction. The New Zealand 
and Australian tax authorities, therefore, focus their tax audit efforts on large firms that lack 
arm's length bases for setting transfer prices. However, as the audits of large companies require 
sophisticated techniques, Chinese tax authorities claim that they lack sufficient staff resources 
and experience to tackle large multinationals over transfer pricing issues. These findings are 
consistent with Chan and Chow (1997, 1998) who found that tax audits on transfer pricing were 
confined mainly to medium- and small-sized firms in China. They argued that an effective audit 
of large MNEs required a costly and sophisticated audit unit which Chinese tax authorities could 
not provide or afford. 
Four Chinese tax authorities were interviewed to further investigate ITP tax auditing practices in 
China. The interview results showed that the Chinese tax authorities considered that the issue of 
profit shifting through ITP manipulations in the country was significant. 'The transfer of tangible 
goods' and 'production and operational decisions are controlled by associated enterprises' were 
indicated by the respondent Chinese tax officials as of greatest concern for potential ITP abuses. 
The participants were asked to select one or more pricing methods normally used in income 
adjustment. The 'cost plus method' and the 'deemed profit method' were most frequently used by 
the tax authorities during transfer pricing tax audits. In this study, seven factors were also 
identified as constraining the Chinese ITP monitoring system. They are: 'lack of information 
exchange with foreign tax authorities', 'lack of an appropriate transfer pricing computerised 
information system', 'lack of technical competence', 'lack of well-defined transfer pricing 
legislation and regulations', 'insufficient staff resources', 'lack of well-defined institutional 
framework of transfer pricing auditing', and 'lack of expertise and experience'. The findings of 
this study partly support Brean (1979), Lall (1979), and Plasschaert (1985) who argued that tax 
authorities of developing economies have suffered from relative inexperience and insufficient 
resources. This made their economies more vulnerable to transfer pricing manipUlation than those 
of developed countries. 
16 Large firms have at least some monopoly control over the prices they charge. Small companies have little 
influence on market prices. They usually produce goods and sell them at market prices (Caves, 1996). 
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13.2.2 Policy Implications 
A main requirement for doctoral research is to make an original contribution to knowledge. A 
PhD thesis can make a contribution to knowledge by "looking at areas that people in the 
discipline have not looked at before". This study provides comprehensive statistical evidence 
about the ITP practices of both developing and developed economies. Specifically, this study 
investigated and compared multinational transfer pricing practices and tax audits in New Zealand, 
Australia and China. This has not been undertaken in the ITP literature before. In this study, the 
issue of ITP was examined from the perspectives of both the MNCs and the tax authorities. The 
combination of surveys of ITP practices and tax audits in developing and developed economies is 
both innovative and interesting. This study, therefore, provides a useful and original contribution 
to the understanding of transfer pricing theory and practices. The policy implications drawn from 
the findings of this study can be presented as follows. 
MNEs use a large variety of pricing methods to deal with intercompany transfers crossing 
international boundaries. Contingency theory can be employed to explain a firm's choice of 
transfer pricing method. The contingency theory approach states that companies choose the ITP 
systems that are perceived as optimal for their particular situation. (Borkowski, 1980). 
In this study, the transfer pricing methods actually employed are systematically compared 
between the three Asia-Pacific economies involved to clarify the reality of what occurs in 
practice. The findings of the study indicate that the transfer pricing systems used differ between 
New Zealand and Australia on the one hand, and China, on the other. The explanations for the 
variations discovered are subsequently explored in the course of examining policy determinants 
in the three countries in the study. The results of this research support the contingency theory 
approach, in which an MNE chooses the pricing method that best fits its needs in the operating 
environment (Borkowski, 1990). Researchers may, in future, develop different transfer pricing 
theories and concepts within the context of the different social, economic and legal environments 
of developing and developed nations. 
The findings of this study have implications for managers of foreign-owned compames In 
formulating their transfer pricing policies in New Zealand, Australia and China. One of the 
motivations of the research was to derive some guidelines about managing transfer pricing that 
would be useful for practice. The empirical research has provided generalisable conclusions 
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regarding the environmental determinants of ITP policies in New Zealand, Australia and China. 
In this study, there are four commonly impOltant variables affecting lIP policies in the three 
countries. They are 'comply with tax law and regulations', 'competitive position of the 
subsidiary', 'overall profit to multinational group' and 'corporate profit of the subsidiary'. These 
findings suggest that complying with tax law and regulations, while maintaining competitive 
position and maximizing consolidated and subsidiary profits, predominantly affect the lIP 
decision-making process in the three countries. MNEs operating in the three countries can 
explore how to tailor their ITP strategies to 'fit' the environmental contexts. 
This research has significant implications for New Zealand, Australian and Chinese transfer 
pricing legislation. Tax authorities can develop regulations that better reflect the economic, social 
and political realities of cross-border transfers. In addition, in this study, seven factors are 
identified as constraining the Chinese transfer pricing monitoring system. Guided by the findings, 
the Chinese tax authorities can now make efforts to improve their transfer pricing monitoring 
system. 
13. 3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
There are some limitations for the current research. These limitations provide a number of 
opportunities for future research on ITP practices. 
First, the survey sample is foreign-controlled subsidiaries. Subsidiary managers must typically 
make periodic reports on their activities to their parent companies, and their accounting and other 
rules and regulations also have to meet requirements in their home countries. Depending upon the 
degree of subsidiary autonomy (decentralisation), their activities and practices are more or less 
limited by their parent companies (Yunkers, 1983, Oyelere et aI., 1999). Since the headqualters 
of multinational firms are located in one or more foreign nations, each of which has its own 
economic, social and political system, the inter-country interactions may have an effect on the 
research findings. A study by Arpan (1972) indicated that the nationality of the parent company 
affects the transfer pricing system used by MNEs and showed the importance given to the various 
factors in setting transfer prices. Only parent firms may be knowledgeable about group pricing 
policies. Selecting overseas parent companies with subsidiaries in New Zealand, Australia and 
China might be an option but it was an impossible task for this researcher because of the diverse 
geographic area, linguistic issues, the time and budget. 
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Second, this empirical study has been carried out through a questionnaire survey. The weaknesses 
of such an instrument may affect the findings of the study. Corporate internal pricing is an 
extremely sensitive and secretive area for all firms, especially for multinational firms. Decisions 
about transfer pricing and its relevant practices generally are viewed by management as highly 
important matters. Out of confidential consideration, the firms investigated might be reluctant to 
divulge information relating to their operations and strategy (Plasschaert, 1979). The quantitative 
analysis using aggregated data to analyse the combined respondents could not capture all aspects 
of the corporate pricing strategy as a questionnaire cannot delve into the survey questions in 
depth (Chan & Chow, 2001). For example, the questionnaire survey has provided rankings for 
multinational transfer pricing motives. But the uniqueness of each company's transfer pricing 
environment makes it unrealistic to expect these rankings to be universally applicable. Individual 
companies may have specific ITP policies. Because a questionnaire survey can only monitor 
general trends in factors affecting ITP, some particular environmental variables affecting ITP 
policies in some MNCs might not have been identified by the questionnaire survey. In addition, 
respondent bias and the superficiality of the survey instrument are potential problems17. 
Additional research could take the form of a field/case study into one or more companies to 
explore in detail their ITP policies and the variables affecting their pricing decisions. However, a 
case study has its own drawbacks. In a case study, only a limited number of sites can be studied 
because of time and cost constraints. Also, the evidence and results of a case study are highly 
dependent on the researcher. Both researcher bias and misinterpretation may prejudice case study 
results (Fisher, 1995). 
Third, the survey results show that the variable - 'tax authority transfer pricing auditing' - was 
ranked only 13th by the Chinese respondents but fifth by both the New Zealand and Australian 
respondents. In addition, while New Zealand and Australian tax authorities tended to audit large-
sized firms, the Chinese tax authority tended to focus their ITP tax audits on relatively small-
sized firms. Brean (1979), Lall (1979), and Plasschaert (1985) argued that developing countries 
are more vulnerable to transfer pricing manipUlations. This could be due to the fact that 
governments in developing countries generally lack institutional frameworks, information, 
expertise and staff to tackle the ITP issue. To further investigate ITP audit issues in China as the 
largest developing country in the world, the researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with 
17 The response rate varied from one research setting to another. The response rate for the Chinese firms was only 
10.81 percent. This may have caused some unknown bias in the data (Tang, 1981). 
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Chinese tax officials. Because of the constraints of the time and budget, the researcher failed to 
interview the New Zealand and Australian tax authorities. This limitation might impair part of the 
comparative nature of this study. 
Fourth, the research results cannot be generalised to firms based in other developing or developed 
economies, because the study focused on New Zealand, Australia and China and their 
idiosyncratic cultural characteristics, respectively, and also because the different tax and tariff 
requirements are specific to each particular country in the world. Thus, the findings of this 
research must be considered within the context of this limitation. Future research could be 
undertaken to compare multinational ITP practices between other developed and developing 
economies. 
13.4 Summary 
lIP has long been a contentious issue between MNEs and tax authorities in host countries and it 
remains one of the most subtle and complex areas of international business management (Tang, 
1979; Rugman & Eden, 1985; Borkowski, 1997b). Owing to the increase of cross-border activity, 
ITP is likely to continue to be a popular research topic in the future. The current research has 
significant implications for lIP theory, and provides useful insights into ITP practices and audits 
across New Zealand, Australia and China, providing MNEs and other businesses, which already 
operate or intend to operate between these three markets, with better guidance for complying with 
the transfer pricing regulations of the three Asia-Pacific national economic regimes. This 
research, however, was not without limitations. The limitations of the study led to a number of 
suggested areas for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Cover Letter for NEW ZEALAND Companies 
23 April, 2003 
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES 
We would like to invite you to take part in our survey of international transfer pricing practices of 
New Zealand companies. We would appreciate if you would complete the enclosed survey 
questionnaire and return it to us in the freepost envelope provided by Thursday 15 May 2003. 
This survey is part of an authorised PhD research programme based at Lincoln University which 
observes the highest level of academic and professional integrity. The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of New Zealand has provided funds for this research, which aims to enhance our 
understanding of how companies make international transfer pricing decisions and the conditions 
that influence such decisions. The results of the study should provide multinational companies 
with significant insights on international transfer pricing issues and practices in New Zealand. 
In accordance with the highest principles and traditions of academic research, complete 
anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed. A copy of the summary results from the survey 
will be provided to you if you request it. 
If you have any questions regarding this research or concerns about the questionnaire, please do 
not hesitate to contact Jian Li by email atlij3@lincoln.ac.nz or by phone (03) 3253627. We are 
very grateful for your cooperation and thank you for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jian Li 
(This research is being carried out under the supervision of Dr Peter Oyelere and Professor Fawzi Laswad) 
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APPENDIXB 
Survey Questionnaire for New Zealand Companies 
TO THE RESPONDENT: 
1. Your assistance is extremely impOliant to us. Thank you for taking pali in this survey. 
2. Most of the questions may be answered by only ticking (--I) the appropriate box. All the 
information you give will remain completely anonymous and confidential. 
3. We look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire in the freepost envelope provided 
by Thursday 15 May 2003 (No stamp required) . 
NOTES: 
The following terms used in the survey questiOlmaire are explained below: 
- International transfer pricing means the unit price assigned to goods or services 
transferred between your company and a related party outside New Zealand. 
- Your company refers to your company and its operations in New Zealand (excluding your 
parent company, its other subsidiaries and/or operations outside New Zealand). 
- A related party may be your parent company, other subsidiary, associate and foreign 
branch outside New Zealand. 
SECTION I 
-- - - General Informaiion~o-n' Your 'C-ompany and 'its Relate,fPady Transactions -, -'F! 
-,-, , - ~ ~ ~ , 
1. Which of the following best describes the primary industry of your company? (please tick 
ONE only). 
Services 0 Manufacturing 0 
Finance and Insurance 0 Construction 0 
Mining 0 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0 
Education 0 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 
Transport & Storage 0 Wholesale Trade & Retail Trade 0 
Other (please specify): 
2. In which country is your ultimate parent company located 
------------------------
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3. What is the value of your company's total sales in 2002? (please give estimates if the exact 
figures are unknown or difficult to ascertain). 
Less then NZ$20 million 
NZ$20 million - NZ$l 00 million 
NZ$l 0 1 million - NZ$200 million 
D 
D 
D 
NZ$201 million - NZ$500 million 
NZ$501 million - NZ$800 million 
More than NZ$800 million 
D 
D 
D 
4. Please tick every item in the appropriate column to indicate the frequency of each of the 
following transfers (Le. transfers of tangible goods, services, intangibles and financing) of 
your company with its related parties such as the parent company, other subsidiaries, 
associates and foreign branches outside New Zealand. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
Tangible goods D D D D D 
Intangibles D D D D D 
Financing D D D D D 
Services D D D D D 
5. Of your company's total transfers of tangible goods, services, intangibles and financing in 
2002, what proportion of its transfers is with its related parties outside New Zealand (please 
give estimates if the exact figures are unknown or difficult to ascertain)? 
Less than 5% D 
5%t020% D 
21%to 50% D 
51% to 70% D 
71% to 85% D 
More than 85% D 
6. Has your company been the subject of an international transfer pricing audit since 1998? 
Yes D No D 
7. What is your company's status regarding advance pricing agreement (APA)? (please tick 
ONE only) 
Have concluded an AP A with the IRD D 
Are currently in negotiations with the IRD for an AP A D 
Plan to apply for an AP A with the IRD 0 
Have no plans to apply with the IRD 0 
Don't know D 
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SECTION II 
-- - International Trnnsfer Pricing Methods Used -
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8. Please tick one or more method (s) used by your company to price transfers of goods or 
services with its related parties outside New Zealand. 
A. Cost-based price 
1) Full standard cost 0 
2) Full actual cost 
3) Full plus fixed profit 
4) Variable standard cost 
5) Variable actual cost 
6) Variable plus fixed contribution 
B. Market-based price 
7) Full market price 
8) Adjusted market price 
C. Negotiation-based price 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
9) Negotiation based on market prices 0 
10) Negotiation based on costs 0 
11) Umestricted negotiations 
D. Others (please specify) 
12) 
o 
9. If you ticked more than one method above, which of one would you describe as the most often 
used? (select ONE only from the above methods by giving its number) __ _ 
10. Listed below are the five pricing methods Section GD 13(7) ofthe Income Tax Act 1994 sets 
out for calculating an arms length consideration for setting intemational transfer prices. 
Please tick one or more method (s) used in calculating/adjusting the value of transactions 
between your company and its related parties outside New Zealand. 
Comparable uncontrolled price method 0 
Resale price method 
Cost plus method 
Profit split method 
Comparable profit methods 
Other (please specify): 
o 
o 
o 
o 
------------------------------------
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SECTION III 
En"h'omnental Varj~lbles of Illternatiollal Transfel' Pricing 
, . -, -~ . . - . , 
._~_~-,,_~_._._' __ .r_._._ .. , 
: ~-- -"-.:..'-- "-<~ ... ~:..~~l 11. This section presents a list of environmental variables that may influence the selection of 
international transfer pricing methods by multinational companies. 
Please tick every item in the appropriate column to indicate your company's view of the 
importance of the item as it affects international transfer pricing method choice of your 
company. 
·:_-~_-... -."'-'_-":_-""1 
- -.- .-. 
-_-"'~_'~:"_-_'-'""--""':"_-_"L' 
"- .. - ----.". 
__ ~~_' ~.T:"';~_~_~.;"':_~.' Extremely Very Slightly Not 
~<~ .......... r.-:./l- .• -,:..-. 
Environmental variables important important Important important important 
T T T T T 
Differences in income tax rates 0 0 0 0 0 
~-;"-'---- - ~.- ".---<-:'-~ Rates of custom duties 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax authority transfer pricing audits 0 0 0 0 0 
Comply with tax law and regulations 0 0 0 0 0 
Restrictions on repatriation of income 0 0 0 0 0 
Competitive position of your company 0 0 0 0 0 
Overall profit to multinational group 0 0 0 0 0 
. -.'-_. __ ."-- Corporate profit of your company 0 0 0 0 0 
Import restrictions 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign currency exchange controls 0 0 0 0 0 
Good relations with host government 0 0 0 0 0 
Price controls of host government 0 0 0 0 0 
Existence of local partner 0 0 0 0 0 
Performance evaluation 0 0 0 0 0 
:.:.::..--"-"---.---:..l-"---=---
'--'--~-' .... -.... '-.-'_\ ......... :...,'--
Political and social pressure 0 0 0 0 0 .----------
Royalty restrictions 0 0 0 0 0 
Maintenance of cashfows 0 0 0 0 0 
Thankyoufor your cooperation in completing this questionnaire! 
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APPENDIXC 
Cover Letter for New Zealand First Reminder 
22 May, 2003 
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES 
On 23 April 2003, we sent you a questionnaire requesting your participation in a survey on 
international transfer pricing practices of multinational companies. If you have already 
completed and returned it, please disregard this reminder and accept our sincere thanks 
instead. 
If you have not completed the questionnaire, please now find enclosed another copy. We 
would appreciate if you would complete the enclosed survey questionnaire and return it to 
us in the freepost envelope provided by Monday 16 June 2003. 
This survey is part of an authorised PhD research programme based at Lincoln University 
which observes the highest level of academic and professional integrity. The research aims 
to enhance our understanding of how companies make international transfer pricing 
decisions and the conditions that influence such decisions. The results of the study should 
provide multinational companies with significant insights on international transfer pricing 
issues and practices in New Zealand. In accordance with the highest principles and 
traditions of academic research, complete anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed. A 
copy of the summary results from the survey will be provided to you if you request it. 
If you have any questions regarding this research or concerns about the questionnaire, 
please do not hesitate to contact us on (03) 3253627. We are very grateful for your 
cooperation and look forward to receiving the completed questionnaire. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jian Li 
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APPENDIXD 
Cover Letter for New Zealand Second Reminder 
18 June 2003 
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES 
On 23 April and 22 May, we sent you a questionnaire requesting your patticipation in a 
survey on international transfer pricing practices of New Zealand companies. If you have 
already completed and returned it, please disregard this reminder and accept our sincere 
thanks instead. 
If you have not completed the questionnaire, please now find enclosed another copy. We 
would appreciate if you would complete the enclosed survey questionnaire and return it to 
us in the enclosed prepaid envelope provided. 
However if you cannot return the questionnaire would you please tick any of the boxes 
below explaining your reason/s why and return this letter in the prepaid envelope provided. 
Please note that the deadline for responses has been extended to Friday 18 July 2003. 
Reason Tick if applicable 
There are no international transfers to related firms 
The volume of international transfers to related firms is insignificant 
We have a standard firm policy of not responding to questionnaires 
The questionnaire is too sensitive to be answered 
I do not have time 
Other (please specify): 
Thank you for your time. 
Jian Li 
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APPENDIXE 
Cover Letter for Australian Companies 
5 July, 2003 
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES 
We would like to invite you to take part in our survey of international transfer pricing 
practices of Australian companies. We would appreciate if you would complete the 
enclosed survey questionnaire and return it to us in the freepost envelope provided by 
Friday 25 July 2003. 
This survey is part of an authorised PhD research programme based at Lincoln University 
which observes the highest level of academic and professional integrity. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of New Zealand has provided funds for this research, which aims to 
enhance our understanding of how companies make international transfer pricing decisions 
and the conditions that influence such decisions. The results of the study should provide 
multinational companies with significant insights on international transfer pricing issues 
and practices in Australia. 
In accordance with the highest principles and traditions of academic research, complete 
anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed. A copy of the summary results from the 
survey will be provided to you if you request it. 
If you have any questions regarding this research or concerns about the questionnaire, 
please do not hesitate to contact Jian Li by email atlij3@lincoln.ac.nz or by phone (03) 
3253627. We are very grateful for your cooperation and thank you for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jian Li 
(This research is being carried out under the supervision of Dr Peter Oyelere and Professor Fawzi Laswad) 
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APPENDIXF 
Survey Questionnaire for Australian Companies 
TO THE RESPONDENT: 
1. Your assistance is extremely important to us. Thank you for taking part in this survey . 
2. Most of the questions may be answered by only ticking ("') the appropriate box. All the 
information you give will remain completely anonymous and confidential. 
3. We look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire in the freepost envelope provided 
by Friday 25 May 2003 (No stamp required) . 
NOTES: 
The following terms used in the survey questionnaire are explained below: 
- International transfer pricing means the unit price assigned to goods or serVIces 
transferred between your company and a related party outside Australia. 
- Your company refers to your company and its operations in Australia (excluding your 
, parent company, its other subsidiaries and/or operations outside Australia). 
- A related party may be your parent company, other subsidiary, associate and foreign 
branch outside Australia. 
SECTION I 
;- - --, -- Genera) Information on Your Corol)anyand its Related Pal1y-Transactions 
I 
I ~~ _ ~_ . _ _ __ ___ _ ~_I 
1. Which of the following best describes the primary industry of your company? (please tick 
ONE only). 
Services D Manufacturing D 
Finance and Insurance D Construction D 
Mining D Electricity, Gas and Water Supply D 
Education D Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing D 
Transport & Storage D Wholesale Trade & Retail Trade D 
Other (please specify): 
2. In which country is your ultimate parent company located 
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3. Please tick every item in the appropriate column to indicate the frequency of each of the 
following transfers (i.e. transfers of tangible goods, services, intangibles and financing) of 
your company with its related parties such as the parent company, other subsidiaries, 
associates and foreign branches outside Australia. 
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
Tangible goods 0 0 0 0 0 
Intangibles 0 0 0 0 0 
Financing 0 0 0 0 0 
Services 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Of your company's total transfers of tangible goods, services, intangibles and financing in 
2002, what proportion of its transfers is with its related parties outside Australia (please give 
estimates if the exact figures are unknown or difficult to ascertain)? 
Less than 5% 0 
5% to 20% 0 
21%to 50% 0 
51% to 70% o 
71% to 85% 0 
More than 85% 0 
5. Has your company been the subject of an international transfer pricing audit since 19987 
Yes o No o 
6. What is your company's status regarding advance pricing agreement (APA)? (please tick 
ONE only) 
Have concluded an AP A with the A TO 0 
Are currently in negotiations with the ATO for an AP A 0 
Plan to apply for an AP A with the A TO 0 
Have no plans to apply with the ATO 0 
Don't know 0 
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SECTION II 
, - - International Transfel'-PI~icing Methods Used -
.... "'-.-'-<- ~ - - ~ -- ~ ~ ~~ T _ __. -~ --<' ...... ~ • 
7. Please tick one or more method (s) used by your company to price transfers of goods or 
services with its related parties outside Australia. 
A. Cost-based price 
1) Full standard cost 0 
2) Full actual cost 
3) Full plus fixed profit 
4) Variable standard cost 
o 
o 
o 
5) Variable actual cost 0 
6) Variable plus fixed contribution 0 
B. Market-based price 
7) Full market price o 
8) Adjusted market price o 
C. Negotiation-based price 
9) Negotiation based on market prices 0 
lO) Negotiation based on costs 0 
11) Unrestricted negotiations 
D. Others (please specify) 
12) 
o 
8. If you ticked more than one method above, which of one would you describe as the most often 
used? (select ONE only from the above methods by giving its number) __ _ 
9. Listed below are the five pricing methods the ATO sets out for calculating an arms length 
consideration for setting international transfer prices. 
Please tick one or more method (s) used in calculating/adjusting the value of transactions 
between your company and its related parties outside Australia. 
Comparable uncontrolled price method 0 
Resale price method 
Cost plus method 
Profit split method 
Comparable profit methods 
Other (please specify): 
o 
o 
o 
o 
------------------------------------
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SECTION III 
· ............ . 
, - Envir'onmental Vnriables of International Tl'mlsfer l)ricillg , 
. ,. , ~ . . - . '" - , 
1 O. This section presents a list of environmental variables that may influence the selection of 
international transfer pricing methods by multinational companies. 
Please tick every item in the appropriate column to indicate your company's view of the 
importance of the item as it affects international transfer pricing method choice of your 
company. 
Extremely Very Slightly Not 
Environmental variables important important Important important important .. .. .. .. ~ 
Differences in income tax rates 0 0 0 0 0 
Rates of custom duties 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax authority transfer pricing audits 0 0 0 0 0 
Comply with tax law and regulations 0 0 0 0 0 
Restrictions on repatriation of income 0 0 0 0 0 
Competitive position of your company 0 0 0 0 0 
Overall profit to multinational group 0 0 0 0 0 
Corporate profit of your company 0 0 0 0 0 
ImpOlt restrictions 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign currency exchange controls 0 0 0 0 0 
Good relations with host government 0 0 0 0 0 
Price controls of host government 0 0 0 0 0 
Existence of local partner 0 0 0 0 0 
Performance evaluation 0 0 0 0 0 
Political and social pressure 0 0 0 0 0 
Royalty restrictions 0 0 0 0 0 
Maintenance of cashfows 0 0 0 0 0 
Thank you for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire! 
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APPENDIXG 
Cover Letter for Australian First Reminder 
26 July, 2003 
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES 
On 5 July 2003, we sent you a questionnaire requesting your participation 111 a survey on 
international transfer pricing practices of multinational companies. If you have already completed 
and returned it, please disregard this reminder and accept our sincere thanks instead . 
If you have not completed the questionnaire, please now find enclosed another copy. We would 
appreciate if you would complete the enclosed survey questionnaire and return it to us in the 
freepost envelope provided by Friday 8 August 2003. 
This survey is part of an authorised PhD research programme based at Lincoln University which 
observes the highest level of academic and professional integrity. The research aims to enhance 
our understanding of how companies make international transfer pricing decisions and the 
conditions that influence such decisions. The results of the study should provide multinational 
companies with significant insights on international transfer pricing issues and practices in 
Australia. In accordance with the highest principles and traditions of academic research, complete 
anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed. A copy of the summary results from the survey 
will be provided to you if you request it. 
If you have any questions regarding this research or concerns about the questionnaire, please do 
not hesitate to contact us on (03) 3253627. We are very grateful for your cooperation and look 
forward to receiving the completed questionnaire. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jian Li 
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APPENDIXH 
Cover Letter for Australian Second Reminder 
3 September 2003 
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES 
In July and August, we sent you a questionnaire requesting your participation in a survey 
on international transfer pricing practices of Australian companies. If you have already 
completed and returned it, please disregard this reminder and accept our sincere thanks 
instead. 
If you have not completed the questionnaire, please now find enclosed another copy. We 
would appreciate if you would complete the enclosed survey questionnaire and return it to 
us in the enclosed prepaid envelope provided. 
However if you cannot return the questionnaire would you please tick any of the boxes 
below explaining your reason/s why and return this letter in the prepaid envelope provided. 
Please note that the deadline for responses has been extended to Friday 3 October 2003. 
Reason Tick if applicable 
There are no international transfers to related firms 
The volume of international transfers to related firms is insignificant 
We have a standard firm policy of not responding to questionnaires 
The questionnaire is too sensitive to be answered 
I do not have time 
Other (please specify): 
Thank you for your time 
Jian Li 
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Cover Letter for Chinese Companies 
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APPENDIXJ 
Survey Questionnaire for Chinese Companies 
SURVEY ON INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICES OF FOREIGN FUNDED COMPANIES 
2003 ~Jjtffilffi~*Ff:k~1fij~~~it~1f ~Wf~~J~\1W±it::t;f4WfillI: 
*JfX1t~~iJ:JE1fl"Wf~ 
:il:.$J9i (TO THE RESPONDENT) : 
~*if~JEit7t;fJf 0 Thank you for taking part in this survey. All the infonnation you 
give will remain completely confidential and will be used only in aggregate fonn. 
2.~m:iEJ I3ff1raJ1i~*~i*~A~ S"J @] m~1~ti 0 ~~~~~j:~~fB"J 1'ciJ ~~A i~ 
@]m~1~til*J, j)tAffJtili.B"Jm~lfJc1~*§~PPJ 0 7C~~~j~5[1im~~o Please return 
this survey by placing it in the pre-paid envelope provided and posting to us. No 
stamp is needed. 
3 .:!lO * 1~ $ ~ LIt ~U -1)t :*>llJf J1: B"J ~ * , if j:~ ~ 1~ I*J B"J jj iR i-& ill:: @] fA;f~ , 
*~~Jt !=jjG)5)tB"J fQ]~-fEQ~A@]m~1~#~PJjJ 0 If you would like to receive a 
copy of the summary results of this survey, please note this in your reply. 
£*m~ (NOTES) : 
OO~~U~~, ~~mm0~~~*~~~~~~*H.£,~*~tt*~~~M 
~Ut.J B<J I*J ·MiHfr~ 0 International transfer pricing means the unit price assigned to 
goods or services transferred between your company and a related firm outside 
China. 
~~~~, ~m~0~&~M.~m0~~.£,~*~tt*~~B<J, ~~OO~* 
:i5 '§' B<J ~~ 0 A related finn may be your parent company, other subsidiary, 
associate and foreign branch outside China. 
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General Information of Related Party Transactions 
1, itt~l±\~~~ 2002 ~ll~m~"~1I*1£:~ (~-B3:~~) zfa]Jtt1Ta<J!~fF~Jy!~* 
~t*2t~a<J~~lill? (itx-t~JY!~1T "-..j" f'F~) 0 
~'M':&1: tgt'M':&1: ~1l1:&1: ~1i&:&1: JA*:&1: 
:ff%Mtz:B<JW;J~~, ~{iJ:*U1~ffl 0 0 0 0 0 
7C % ~j tz: B<J ~{iJ:*n 1~ffl 0 0 0 0 0 
~~im~~ 0 0 0 0 0 
tnd~~* 0 0 0 0 0 
2, iwt~l±\:m:~~ 2002 ~ll.-tJ£~*tt*~~IF3tl±\~1&IOCa<J11l';f&, ~ffl~W! (ep~ 
~~~m*~1I*1£:~~~*tt*~aW!)~~~~~w~*tt*~aw!a<J~~~(.~ 
~~~-~~1T"-..j"f'F~o~.~IOC~~~.m,it.m*.~*@~)o 
1~T 5% o 51%~ 70% o 
5% ~ 20% o 71% ~ 85% o 
21% ~ 50% o ~T85% o 
3, it Ill] § 1998 ~~*m*Wn~~X1~~~~m~"~1I*1£:~ (~-B3:~'§j) ZI'aJ1f 
~~~,~*,ti~dtt*~W~a11l';f&&m.M~f'FM~~**? 
~a<J o 
o 
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5,ffi~~1fr~~~MmAffi~~;!t~~*~.~~~OO*fi~am*.~*iJ:J;E1fr 
1J¥!~m*m~*~, ~.~~*iJ:J;E1fr1J¥!~~~~~~~a~~#~m*m~m. 
~o.mWffi~J;E1fr~~1J¥!ftm~itJ~*fflM~(.~_~r:p-~~n"~"ft 
~) 0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
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International Transfer Pricing Methods Used 
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Environmental Variables ofInternational Transfer Pricing 
8,.~0~.m~w~.~a_~~~ •• ~~um~ •• ~$$~oo~.o.m 
~~~~~OO~~.~ft~~~~ •• %~~m •• ~(.~.~~n"~"~~,~ 
~~.~~~.%~.m~~*~~)o 
~P/nJ~. -t*£~ bt!tlt£~ -~£~ /F*£~ *1t*/F£~ 
1) ~OOm1J;H5tf5t$~# D D D D D 
2) itt~ Q1tlJ:~~m D D D D D 
3) f5t*ff~ n~il~1fr'$'it D D D D D 
4) ~IVA ~ OOf5tt&¥*1f~J\l~ D D D D D 
5) 1¥l£~U~IJ¥[ ill ~lHl5u D D D D D 
6) 1Jo5j0~jt*±il!1frBtl1ffl~ D D D D D 
7) 0PJ.m~U~IJ!l:k1tBtl$~ D D D D D 
8) ~0E]*~~UM!l:k1t$~ D D D D D 
9) ,PJf 1£ 00 rm Jf6 itt Q ~I[ 1I5u D D D D D 
10) ,PJTl£OO~1Tj~¥[3ta1~1I5U D D D D D 
11) ~ 3 ±il!J£J(!ff 9!.lr.l~jf Btl * * D D D D D 
12) ,PJf 1£ 00 ~ iT m- Jf611r ~ ~I[ 1I5u D D D D D 
13) 1¥1£~±ili-§-~WG-§-1f~ D D D D D 
14) 1,SY:1f10~ ~~;g~l~iBtl$~ D D D D D 
15) .~WGU~)X\.~ D D D D D 
16) ,PJfl£ 00)(1~~U:tJ(~ilBtl ~I[ 1I5u D D D D D 
17) tt~m~ Btl0~ J.m~~ft::I: D D D D D 
~{jz~i~j1~ 8"Jf~flk3t~~~~ ! 
Thank you for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire! 
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APPENDIXK 
English Version Interview Questions for Chinese Tax Authorities 
What is the present extent of transfer pricing abuse in China? 
1. In your opinion, do you think the foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) are actually 
paying their fair share of taxes in your province (or city)? 
2. Do you think the issue of profit shifting through transfer pricing manipulations in your 
province (or city) to be significant, moderately significant or not significant at all? 
3. Please briefly assess the profit shifting issue through transfer pricing manipulations in 
your province (or city). 
4. What is your major concern with the effects of transfer pricing abuse in your province 
(or city)? Why? 
How do the Chinese tax authorities administer a transfer pricing tax audit? 
5. For FIEs under the following circumstances, please indicate those that your tax 
authority is most concerned about regarding potential transfer pricing abuse in your 
province (or city)? Why? 
D Production and operational decisions are controlled by associated 
enterprises 
D Large transaction amounts with associated enterprises 
D Long periods of losses 
D Lower profits or losses for an extended period, but continuously 
expands the scale of its operations 
D Fluctuating profit patters 
D Transactions with associated enterprises established in tax havens 
D Lower profitability than enterprises in the same Industry 
D Lower profit margins than other group companies 
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o Umeasonable expenses paid to associated enterprises 
o Sudden and significant drop in profits after a preferential tax 
treatment period, such as the expiration of a tax holiday period. 
6. For the following intercompany transfers, please indicate those that your tax authority 
is most concerned about regarding potential transfer pricing abuse in your province (or 
city)? Why? 
o Transfer of tangible goods 
o Transfer of intangible goods 
o Transfer of financing 
o Transfer of services 
7. Does your tax authority focus its tax audit efforts on certain industries? 
o Yes (go to question 8) o No (go to question 9) 
8. What are the major industries that are subject to the greatest scrutiny by your tax 
authorities? 
9. Does your tax authority focus its tax audit efforts according to a certain size of 
enterprise? 
o Yes (go to question 10) o No (go to question 11) 
10. What group of enterprises does your tax authority focus its tax audit efforts on? 
o Large-sized enterprises 
D Medium-sized enterprises 
o Small-sized enterprises 
11. Of the seven transfer pricing methods used to adjust taxable income of FIEs for related 
party transactions, please indicate those that are often used by your tax authority. 
12. What are the main motives for your tax authority to use cost plus method? 
13. What are the main motives for your tax authority to use the deemed profit method? 
14. Please briefly explain the use of the deemed profit method. 
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15. An Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) is a binding legal agreement between 
taxpayers and the tax authority. Has your tax authority ever signed an AP A with the 
taxpayer(s)? 
D Yes (go to question 16) D No (go to question 20) 
16. In your opinion, what are the main benefits or advantages of the use of the APAs in 
your tax authority? 
17. Does your tax authority have any difficulty in the use of an AP A? 
DYes (go to question 18) D No (go to question 20) 
18. What is the difficulty for your tax authority in the use of an APA? (go to question 20) 
19. Please briefly explain the reason why it is unavailable for your tax authority to have an 
AP A with the taxpayer. 
20. How does your tax authority obtain related party transfer information of a FIE? 
How adequate are the existing Chinese control measures? 
21. Do you think the existing transfer pricing auditing system in your tax authority to be 
effective, moderately effective or ineffective? 
22. What is the main difficulty encountered in the implementation of a transfer pricing tax 
audit for your tax authority? Why? 
What factors constrain the transfer pricing monitoring system in China? 
23. What factors constrain the transfer pricing monitoring system in China? 
24. In your opinion, are there any areas in the transfer pricing monitoring system that 
should be further improved? 
How should the Chinese transfer pricing monitoring system be improved? 
25. What are your suggestions for improving the transfer pricing monitoring system in 
China? 
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APPENDIXL 
English Version Survey Questionnaire for Chinese Tax Authorities 
TO THE RESPONDENT: 
1 ). Your assistance is extremely important to us. Thank you for taking part in this survey. 
2). All data are collected anonymously and will be used exclusively for the research, with 
results reported in aggregate form. We assure you that your responses will remain 
completely confidential. 
3). Please return this survey by placing it in the pre-paid envelope provided and posting to 
us. No stamp is needed. 
1. For the following ten types of enterprises, please indicate your concern about possible 
transfer pricing abuse by each of them with its related parties. 
1 means very possible, 5 means impossible. 
Production and operational decisions are controlled by associated 
enterprises 
Large transaction amounts with associated enterprises 
Long periods of losses 
Lower profits or losses for an extended period, but continuously 
expands the scale of its operations. 
FI uctuating profit patters 
Transactions with associated enterprises established in tax havens. 
Lower profitability than enterprises in the same Industry 
Lower profit margins than other group companies. 
Unreasonable expenses paid to associated enterprises. 
Sudden and significant drop in profits after a preferential tax treatment 
period 
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2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2. Please indicate your concern about the possible transfer pricing abuse by a 
multinational enterprise through the following transactions with its related parties. 
I means very possible, 5 means impossible. 
Tangible goods 1 2 3 4 5 
Intangibles 1 2 3 4 5 
Financing 2 3 4 5 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Listed below are seven transfer pricing methods used to adjust taxable income of 
multinational enterprises for related party transactions. Of the seven pricing 
methods, please tick those which are often used by your tax authority. 
Comparable uncontrolled price method 
Resale price method 
Cost plus 
Comparable profit method 
Profit split method 
Transactional net margin method 
Deemed profit method 
Others (please describe): 
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o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
4. Listed below are a number of respects which may require improvement in auditing 
multinational transfer pricing. Please indicate those which need to be improved in 
your tax authority. 
Lack of technical competence 
Lack of information exchange with foreign tax authorities 
Insufficient staff resources 
Lack of expertise and experience 
Lack of well-defined transfer pricing legislation and regulations 
Lack of a sound institutional framework of transfer pricing auditing 
Lack of an appropriate transfer pricing computerised information system 
Others (please describe): 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
5. What are your suggestions for improving the transfer pricing monitoring system in 
China? 
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